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ABSTRACT
Environmental, Social, and Governance Risk and Performance: Implications for Audit
and Corporate Governance Research
Jenna J. Burke
Chair of the Supervisory Committee:
Gibbons Research Professor, Rani Hoitash, Ph.D.
Accountancy Department
This dissertation examines oversight of environmental, social, and governance
(ESG) related risk and performance. These considerations are a new piece of business
language, and are crucial in monitoring and evaluating the sustainable impact of modern
corporations. The dissertation is comprised of three archival studies, which together
contribute to an emerging accounting literature at the intersection of audit and corporate
governance.
The first study uses hand-collected data on voluntary board-level committees that
oversee ESG-related issues to investigate the performance implications of these
committees. This paper presents a theoretical framework and methodology that incorporate
the committee’s role in shared value creation and the heterogeneity of ESG-related issues.
When this theoretical and methodological approach is applied, I find that committees with
ESG-related responsibilities do have positive performance implications.
The second and third studies use a new dataset to explore accounting-related
consequences of negative media coverage of ESG practices. In the second study, I find that
when audit client reputation is damaged via negative media coverage, auditors respond to
protect against reputation loss spillovers. Specifically, results suggest that auditors avoid
undue reputation risk by resigning from engagements and reduce/share undue risk by
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charging higher audit fees. This study is important because it documents auditor oversight
of, and response to, ESG-related risks. Further, the study answers recent calls for U.S.
evidence of auditor reputation risk as a component of auditors’ risk considerations.
Finally, in the third study, I investigate whether corporate boards hold CEOs
publicly accountable for negative media coverage of ESG practices. Understanding board
sensitivity to ESG issues, measured by their turnover decisions, is important given a rising
demand for sustainable business practices. Findings of this study suggest that when ESG
issues are highly publicized, CEO dismissal likelihood is higher. Overall, findings support
both the importance of these issues to modern corporations and the monitoring role of the
media.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Modern corporations and their boards face new oversight responsibilities as managing
stakeholder interests becomes an essential component of running an ethical for-profit
organization. Sustainability risk management has also become crucial, as business strategy
now must ensure that sustainability policies and impacts do not deflect from achievement
of primary business objectives (COSO 2013). One primary mechanism to integrate these
considerations is through specialized sustainability committees at the board level. These
committees oversee impacts on the community, employees, the environment, consumers,
suppliers, and more. Such committees have become increasingly prevalent, representing a
shift towards stakeholder (i.e. any group who affect, or are affected by, a company’s
operations) accountability and the creation of shared value at the highest level of firm
governance (Porter and Kramer 2011; The Conference Board, 2010; The Corporate
Library, 2010). Presumably, this formal accountability to stakeholder groups is a
substantive oversight mechanism.
Surprisingly, the extant literature finds little evidence of an impact of sustainability
committees on performance outcomes (Al-Tuwaijiri et al. 2004; Berrone and GomezMejia, 2009; Mallin et al. 2013; Rodrigue et al. 2013; Walls et al. 2012). For example,
Rodrigue et al. (2013) and Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009) detect no association between
these committees and environmental performance or environmental metrics in executive
compensation, respectively. This finding is puzzling and inconsistent with the finding that
high sustainability companies adopt such a committee (Eccles et al., 2014) and the findings
of broader corporate governance literature that governance via committee specialization
influences corporate outcomes (e.g., Beasley, 1996; Klein, 1998; Singh and Harianto,
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1989; Uzun et al. 2004). Gaining a better understanding of this new board composition
feature and its performance is an important practical endeavor.
Our first objective is to examine the existence of these committees and offer a
framework through which their contribution to sustainability performance can be
investigated. In doing so, we theorize that sustainability committees are a mechanism to
create shared value (Porter and Kramer 2011), where the interests of a diverse group of
stakeholders is satisfied and sufficient profit is achieved (Lopez et al. 2007). This approach
is evident in several of the responsibility statements of sustainability committees that we
analyze in this manuscript, which address stakeholder expectations while prioritizing
economic success. To create shared value, sustainability committees manage opportunities
and risks to pursue positive sustainability performance and to limit the impact of negative
sustainability performance. Importantly, we hypothesize that a sustainability committee
may not have a consistent impact on both of these performance indicators. We predict that
a sustainability committee contributes to positive indicators such as giving to charities or
adopting environmentally friendly policies, which generate value to both shareholders and
stakeholders. For negative indicators, such as lending practices that have led to
controversies or environmental pollution, we caution that certain risks may be inherent to
a company’s operations and that a sustainability committee may rather serve as a highlevel control mechanism to protect value by managing risk, and its resulting impact will
depend on the company’s risk appetite.
To test these hypotheses, we use corporate social performance (CSP) strengths and
concerns data from MSCI ESG STATS to proxy for positive and negative performance
indicators, respectively. We find that a sustainability committee has a positive impact on
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both CSP strengths and concerns, which is consistent with the committee generating value
from opportunities and protecting value from risks. The latter result is possibly driven by
companies that inherently have greater sustainability concerns and adopt committees to
monitor the impact of these concerns on shared value. For these companies, fully mitigating
concerns may be difficult or value-destroying. Prior literature examining sustainability
committees has not considered these important conceptual and empirical differences
between positive and negative sustainability performance.
Our second objective is to explore the diverse range of stakeholder impacts that a
sustainability committee oversees, which prior literature has not considered. For instance,
research often uses the term “environmental committee” to refer to a broad scope of
committees that focus on not only environmental issues, but also those that have general
names such as “public policy,” “public affairs,” and “corporate responsibility” (e.g.,
Rodrigue et al. 2013). Aggregating committees in this way may explain why consistent
associations with relevant performance outcomes have not been detected. In reality,
sustainability is a multi-faceted construct that encompasses a firm’s environmental and
social impacts. As might be expected when voluntary sustainability committees are formed,
responsibilities differ greatly from one company to another. These committees are a formal
acknowledgement of responsibility to specific stakeholder groups, which enhances
accountability (i.e., the expectation that one may be called upon to justify one’s actions to
others) and acts as a goal to affect action and strengthen the performance impact for those
stakeholders (Dubnick 2005; Ryan and Smith 1954). For example, committees that focus
on the environment are theoretically and practically likely to influence different actions
and performance outcomes than committees that focus on employee-related issues. Further,
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some committees may focus on a single stakeholder, while others focus on many
stakeholders and must balance these competing interests. Treating these heterogeneous
committees equally can lead to incorrect inferences from empirical analysis.
To achieve this second objective, we offer a methodology rooted in accountability
and goal setting theories for measuring sustainability committee existence and focus.
Specifically, we hand collect sustainability committee responsibility disclosures from
public company proxy filings of U.S. firms for the period 2003 – 2013. Within these 1,243
disclosures, firms explicitly claim accountability for oversight of four stakeholder groups
(i.e., community, employee, environment and consumer/supplier). We combine this handcollected data with publicly available data on committee characteristics. To the best of our
knowledge, our study provides the first comprehensive examination of the existence and
focus of sustainability committees within a large sample of public companies. Guided by
accountability and goal setting theories, we argue that research can be improved by
evaluating the effectiveness of committees that focus on a specific stakeholder based on
their performance along that dimension. We also predict that, beyond stakeholder focus,
sustainability committees are heterogeneous in their effectiveness due to resource
availability. We perform univariate analysis to examine how committee size,
independence, and meeting frequency are associated with performance variation within the
committee sample and each group of focused committees.
Empirically, we use CSP data from MSCI ESG STATS to test these predictions.
Griffin and Mahon (1997) state “collapsing the KLD’s [MSCI] multiple dimensions into a
unidimensional index may mask the individual dimensions that are especially important
and relevant for a specific company or industry”. We address this critique with our
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aforementioned disaggregated performance analysis. Further, we address the critique of
industry heterogeneity by recognizing that a cross-sectional analysis within the entire
sample may not appropriately capture the industry-specific nature of CSP. For example,
committee focus and effectiveness will likely differ between the Oil and Gas Extraction
and Retail industries. We thus present a quantitative approach to classifying industries
based on their sensitivity to different stakeholder groups using the four dimensions of CSP
in MSCI: Community, Employee, Environment and Consumer/Supplier. These two
disaggregation techniques, analyzing CSP by dimension and within industries sensitive to
certain stakeholder groups, contribute to our goal of drawing reliable conclusions on the
impact of sustainability committees on performance.
In sum, we contribute to the literature by presenting a comprehensive examination
of sustainability committee existence and focus. These committees are becoming
increasingly prevalent, and are mechanisms to create shared value for stakeholders and
shareholders. We offer a method to classify committee responsibilities, which generates
interesting descriptive statistics that help emphasize the heterogeneity of committee
responsibilities and will aid future research in understanding sustainability oversight
practices at these institutions. We conduct our analysis by a) separately examining positive
and negative sustainability performance outcomes, b) pairing committee stakeholder focus
with the relevant performance outcome, and c) isolating the sample to relevant sensitive
industries. These methods of disaggregation resulted in empirical findings that are
consistent with theory. These findings suggest that board-level sustainability committees
focused on specific stakeholder groups have performance implications in that stakeholder
dimension, which supports accountability theory. We generally find that sustainability
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committees positively influence sustainability strengths, but do not mitigate concerns.
These associations are consistent with our overarching theory that sustainability
committees contribute to shared value creation, where they both generate value by pursuing
strengths and protect value by monitoring, but not necessarily mitigating, concerns.
Further, in univariate tests of additional committee characteristics we find that if boards
don’t dedicate the proper resources to these committees, even focused sustainability
committees can fail to enhance performance.
Overall, we provide evidence for a more nuanced understanding of the performance
impact of sustainability committees. This evidence should prove useful for both
practitioners and future research. Practically, we provide evidence that stakeholders can
gauge committee effectiveness from the information published in proxy filings (e.g.,
committee focus, industry alignment, size, independence, and meeting frequency). Future
research can follow a similar method in other sustainability-related contexts.
II. BACKGROUND ON SUSTAINABILITY COMMITTEES
As awareness of key stakeholder relations rises, many firms have restructured their
traditional corporate governance structure to include a committee to manage stakeholder
oversight demands (The Conference Board, 2010; The Corporate Library, 2010). Firms
voluntarily adopt these board-level committees in addition to the principal audit,
compensation and nominating committees mandated by the major US stock exchanges.
Recent practitioner publications have examined the prevalence of sustainability related
committees, reporting that 65 percent of the S&P 100 firms and nearly one-fifth of the
Russell 1000 have such a committee. These committees are most frequently found in
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industries that are classified as environmentally sensitive (The Corporate Library, 2010). 1
Committee duties span from a general focus on overall sustainability policies and
procedures to specific foci on stakeholder groups such as employees or the environment.
Since these committees are voluntary, a board can dictate which stakeholder groups they
focus on. For example, in 2013, Arch Coal, Inc. had an “Energy and Environmental Policy”
committee, which focused on compliance with emerging environmental policy. Delta Air
Lines Inc. had a “Safety and Security” committee in the same year, which focused on
ensuring the safety of the airline’s employees and passengers. While the responsibilities of
these committees are vastly different, both are forms of stakeholder oversight and represent
the extension of corporate accountability to non-shareholder stakeholder groups. 2
Therefore, we define a sustainability committee as the extension of governance to the
impacts of the business on various stakeholder groups – these stakeholder groups include:
the community, employees, the environment, consumers, and suppliers.
There is limited research on voluntary board-level sustainability committee as an
element of board structure. Ostensibly, the existence of these committees is a formal and
visible commitment to stakeholders, making concrete the relationship between corporate
governance and sustainability. While broader corporate governance research consistently
finds positive performance implications of board-level committees (Baxter et al., 2013;
Beasley, 1996; Beasley et al., 2000; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Klein, 1998; Singh and

1

Of note is that previous academic literature has used the term “environmental committee” and other
general terms to describe the very same classification. We use the term “sustainability” as the descriptor
throughout this study as it labels the committees most effectively as stakeholder related.
2
Stakeholders are defined as those that have a legitimate stake or claim on the business (Donaldson and
Preston, 1995) because they affect or are affected by the business (Freeman, 1984). These stakeholders range
from customers to employees, suppliers, and the local community (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984). The
increasing popularity of the voluntary board-level sustainability committee is important in reflecting the
extent that stakeholder interests have been integrated into corporate decision-making (Luoma and Goodstein,
1999).
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Harianto, 1989; Uzun et al. 2004)3, findings for sustainability-related committees have
been less consistent. Two studies that examine the direct association of environmental
committee existence and performance outcomes have not detected significant associations
(Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009; Rodrigue et al. 2013).
III. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
Accountability theory
Voluntary governance at the board-level is unique in that a brief description of any formal
committee responsibilities must be listed in the annual proxy filings. Explicitly listing
responsibilities serves to establish and communicate the priority of these issues to external
parties, and makes a company’s intentions known to the relevant audience. In this way, the
voluntary creation of sustainability committees is presumably a sign of accountability to
stakeholder groups.
A person or group of persons is said to be accountable when they acknowledge and
assume responsibility for actions, decisions, and policies within the scope of their role.
Accountability refers to the implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called upon to
justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to others (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). Being held
accountable motivates and triggers directors, and thus the committees they sit on, to do

3

Prior research has examined the existence of several board-level committees and their direct impact on
respective areas of responsibility. For instance, accounting research finds that before the requirement to have
an audit committee, firms that voluntarily formed audit committees were generally found to have higher
quality financial reporting processes and better external audit oversight (e.g., Beasley, 1996; Beasley et al.,
2000). Further, extensive literature examines the performance outcomes of nominating and compensation
committees (e.g., Conyon and Peck, 1998; Singh and Harianto, 1989; Uzun et al., 2004). While these three
principal committees are now common on corporate boards, research continues to find that voluntary
committees, such as the finance and investment committee or risk committee also have an impact on relevant
outcomes (e.g., Baxter et al., 2013; Klein, 1998). Of note is that the Dodd-Frank Act now requires boardlevel risk committees for certain bank holding companies.
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what they are tasked with or risk being punished for failures (Gilson, 1990; Srinivasan,
2005; Tetlock, 1983).
The means for stakeholders to hold a company accountable are often tied to their
everyday actions related to the corporation. For instance, community stakeholders can
choose whether or not to support local operations. Employees can influence a corporation
through their employment choices. Representatives of the environment stakeholder can
hold firms accountable through their votes on regulation affecting an industry. Consumers
and suppliers can hold firms accountable through their purchases and offering behavior.
Together, these stakeholder actions can influence reputation and impact overall firm value
(Filbeck et al. 1997; Anderson and Smith 2006). This is particularly true in the current
business environment where attention to sustainability is prevalent in the news media.
Stakeholders can further raise attention to sustainability issues if they feel performance is
inadequate. Recent anecdotes illustrate that sustainability issues can become detrimental to
a company’s primary business objectives. For instance, Volkswagen’s emissions scandal
(e.g., Russell et al. 2016, Vlasic and Chapman 2016) and Chipotle’s food safety issues
(Surowiecki 2015) are sustainability issues that have led to widespread negative media
coverage and caused major business continuity concerns. This type of negative attention
informally holds sustainability committee members accountable.
Shareholders are also a major stakeholder group and have the power to hold
directors accountable through their voting rights and resolutions. Using unique data, recent
shareholder voting literature has found that committee members are held accountable for
the specific performance of the committees they sit on, making these members more
effective (e.g., Gal-Or et al. 2016, Ertimur et al. 2012). Specific to sustainability issues,

10

shareholder activism is also on the rise, and the literature has found that even if these
proposals do not receive a majority vote, they are effective at improving performance on
the focal issue (Grewel et al. 2016). Thus, it’s clear that sustainability issues such as caring
for the environment and treating employees well are also desired and sometimes enforced
by shareholders.
The expectation of being held accountable for one’s responsibilities and actions
results in an individual seeking to meet the perceived demands of the audience they are
accountable to (Tetlock, 1991), increasing the probability of strong performance (Dubnick,
2005). In this way, the listed responsibilities of sustainability committees operate in the
same way as goals, where direct attention to issues motivates effort towards that issue. Goal
setting theory (Locke and Latham 1990) is closely aligned with the accountability
arguments we set forth. Specifically, committee responsibilities act as conscious goals to
affect action (Ryan and Smith 1954), strengthening the accountability to performance
relationship.
Creating shared value
Recent literature has focused on “win-win” situations as motivation for company
investment in sustainability (e.g., Ameer and Othman, 2012; Eccles et al., 2014; Laine,
2010; Lopez et al. 2007; Porter and Kramer, 2011). These situations are those which satisfy
the aforementioned diverse group of stakeholders while also achieving sufficient profit
(Lopez et al. 2007). Public corporations, who by law must protect shareholders’ interests,
have begun to recognize sustainability as a competitive advantage. While economic
success and shareholder protection are the precondition for taking care of stakeholder
responsibilities (Laine, 2010), the two are not opposing forces. Increasingly evident over
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time is that sustainability and financial performance are often mutually beneficial, not
exclusive (Ameer and Othman, 2012; Eccles et al., 2014). By addressing stakeholder needs
that intersect with their business, companies can generate economic value (Porter and
Kramer 2011). There are various means for economic value to be positively impacted when
addressing stakeholder needs, including cost savings, employee retention, customer
loyalty, regulatory compliance, gaining competitive advantage, revenue growth,
innovation, and improvement in brand and reputation – all of which have a positive impact
on the bottom line.
Within this approach to creating shared value, management is an important element
influencing successful execution (Porter and Kramer, 2011). Specifically, boards can adopt
committees and tailor their responsibilities in order to effectively develop opportunities
and manage risks to generate and protect shareholder value, respectively (Kleffner et al.,
2003; Beasley et al., 2005). The focus on shared value is evident in the responsibility
statements of sustainability committees, which address stakeholder expectations while
prioritizing economic success. For example, the following is an excerpt from the
responsibility statement of Aflac’s “Sustainability Committee”:
The Sustainability Committee assists management in setting strategy, establishing goals
and integrating sustainability into the daily business activities of the Company’s U.S.
operation, including the formulation and implementation of policies, procedures and
practices that permit the Company to respond to evolving public sentiment and government
regulation in the areas of environmental stewardship, energy use, recycling and carbon
emissions, that foster the sustainable growth of the Company’s U.S. operations.
“Sustainable growth” means the ability to meet the needs of our shareholders and
customers while taking into account the needs of future generations. “Sustainable growth”
also equates to the long-term preservation and enhancement of the Company’s financial,
environmental, and social capital [emphasis added].

Many other committees add a similar disclaimer, where attention to stakeholder issues is
valued if they have an impact on operations, financial performance, or public image. These
responsibilities make it clear that stakeholder needs are addressed with economic impact
12

in mind. Therefore, we theorize that this shared value consideration (Porter and Kramer
2011) motivates the existence of committees and the actions they take. While a
sustainability committee is a formal sign of accountability to stakeholders, committees are
unlikely to use resources to advance the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders if value
is not created. Rather, a board-level sustainability committee serves as a formal mechanism
to identify and prioritize sustainability issues based on their value importance, either by
generating positive impacts or mitigating negative impacts.
Generating and protecting value
It is unreasonable to believe that a committee will uniformly value, prioritize, and impact
sustainability-related opportunities and risks. For example, a committee may influence the
action of adopting environmentally friendly policies, but may also allow firm operations to
be a contributor to environmental harm (as seen in Aflac’s Sustainability Committee
responsibility statement). Sustainability opportunities can generate value, whereas risks
can destroy value. A sustainability committee is likely to pursue sustainability-related
opportunities that could enhance the firm’s accountability towards stakeholders. At the
same time, a sustainability committee will monitor lower-tail downside risks that could
prove detrimental to firm value, and thus keep sustainability risks within the risk appetite
of the organization. Companies are likely to have varying levels of both opportunities and
risks, and committees are likely to have varying impacts on both as well. These
opportunities and risks are realized in the form of positive and negative indicators of
sustainability performance, commonly referred to corporate social performance (CSP)
strengths and concerns, respectively.
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Prior literature on sustainability committees has not always considered the
conceptual differences between strengths and concerns, which is perhaps the explanation
for inconsistent findings of a sustainability committee’s impact (Rodrigue et al., 2013;
Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009). However, broader sustainability literature illustrates
that the two are conceptually distinct constructs and that firms often simultaneously engage
in responsible and irresponsible behavior (Mattingly and Berman, 2006; Strike et al., 2006;
McGuire et al., 2003). For these reasons, it will prove important to separately predict a
sustainability committee’s impact on CSP strengths and concerns.
IV. HYPOTHESES
Aggregate performance impact of sustainability committees
Sustainability committee existence and CSP strengths
Corporate social performance (CSP) strengths include best practices concerning risks and
opportunities related to the community, employees, diversity, the environment, human
rights, and product dimensions of performance. These dimensions can be examined in
aggregate and/or individually. For example, Walls et al. (2012) examine three board
characteristics (committee existence, diversity, and board size) to determine how they
combine to affect environmental performance of a company. Their study is one of the first
to examine the link between corporate governance and environmental performance and
finds significant associations between each element and environmental strengths.
Extending this finding, Mallin et al. (2013) label the same board characteristics as evidence
of stakeholder orientation and find that stakeholder orientation of the firm is positively
associated with the people and product dimensions of CSP.
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Guided by a shared value framework, a committee’s impact on CSP strengths will
depend on their ability to generate value. Strengths capture a company doing good and can
generate value in a variety of ways, including their impact on employee retention, customer
loyalty, revenue growth, improvement in reputation, and more. Aforementioned prior
literature has shown sustainability investment to be positively associated with CSP
strengths. Since the existence of sustainability committees can be considered such an
investment, we make a directional prediction in our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a: The existence of a board-level sustainability committee is
positively associated with CSP strengths.
Sustainability committee existence and CSP concerns
In addition to the aforementioned positive association between environmental committees
and environmental strengths, Walls et al. (2012) also detect a positive association between
environmental committees and environmental concerns. These findings are consistent with
committees serving a risk management function. That is, companies that a-priori face
greater sustainability risks are more likely to create sustainability committees.
The business environment today presents many challenges and potential risks to
firms. For instance, a company may choose to oversee sustainability-related risks that are
inherent to the company or industry including the risk of major detrimental events such as
oil spills, product recalls, and occupational safety incidents. Effective management of
sustainability risks does not necessarily imply that these risks are not or should not be taken
by an entity, but rather it ensures that risk mitigating practices do not deflect from
achievement of primary business objectives (COSO 2013). 4

4

Enterprise risk management is a crucial form of organizational governance, where companies aim to identify
potential events that may affect the entity and manage risk to be within its risk appetite (COSO 2004).
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In this way, a sustainability committee is a high-level control mechanism that
assesses sustainability-related risks and evaluate their potential impact on achievement of
primary business objectives. Once risks are assessed and understood, the decision on
whether to take action to minimize risk will often depend on value considerations (Godfrey
et al. 2009). Value is not generated if committee actions are not expected to sufficiently
reduce costs associated with the resource investment or if the positive effects of risk
reduction (e.g., reduced likelihood of negative events, reputation, sales, employee morale,
etc.) are not material. Therefore, a committee that is focused on risk management may not
generate positive performance implications for CSP concerns.
In sum, the prediction for the association between sustainability committees and
CSP concerns is not without tension. It is possible that the dedication of board resources in
the form of sustainability committees may lead to less concerns. In contrast, if
sustainability committees are a risk control mechanism for firms with a-priori greater
sustainability risks, then managing these risks may not result in less concerns. For this
reason, we present the following hypothesis in non-directional form:
Hypothesis 1b: The existence of a board-level sustainability committee is not
associated with CSP concerns.
Heterogeneous performance impact of sustainability committee focus
Value considerations can also help prioritize corporate governance issues related to
stakeholders by determining how resources should be allocated. The balancing of
conflicting stakeholder interests can be difficult in practice and “rather than producing
every kind of social value for every stakeholder, organizations find themselves constrained
in practice by limited resources and bounded rationality, and thus tend to prioritize their
stakeholders according to instrumental and/or normative considerations” (Jamali, 2008).
16

This suggests that certain stakeholder groups are prioritized differently amongst public
companies according to their salience to the business model (Agle et al., 1999). Relatedly,
specific goals are found to lead to higher performance (Locke et al. 1989). Specific
responsibility statements remove ambiguity and allow a committee to focus on precise
actions related to selected stakeholders, allowing performance to be more explicitly
affected. For example, MGM Resorts “Corporate Social Responsibility Committee”
focuses on the environment in its responsibility statement:
The primary goal of our environmental sustainability initiative—the “Green Advantage”—
is to reduce the impacts of our business on our natural environment. The premise of our
Green Advantage is that environmentally responsible actions by us benefit our planet now
and for the future, and result in more efficient operations, lower costs, and enhanced value.

However, the statement also mentions oversight of employee issues:
The primary goals of our diversity and inclusion initiative include effective integration of
diversity strategies into our major business functions and operations and promotion of an
inclusive work environment and culture that are compatible with and respectful of the
diversity of our employees, customers and business invitees, and that maximize employee
engagement in accomplishment of our mission and business objectives.

Clearly, sustainability committees have heterogeneous foci which many not uniformly
impact performance outcomes. Thus far, research on committees that oversee stakeholder
interests has focused on the environmental dimension and detected little to no impact on
environmental performance (Al-Tuwaijiri et al., 2004; Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009;
Mallin et al., 2013; Rodrigue et al., 2013). While these results are interpreted as
environmental committees being primarily symbolic, we posit that the methodological
choice to use an aggregate “environmental” committee construct may obfuscate the
findings. In fact, these studies have included committees that seemingly have little
environment related focus (e.g., public policy, sustainability, corporate responsibility). 5

5

For example, a public policy committee would be included in the Rodrigue et al. (2013) sample as an
environmental committee, but could quite possibly have no environmental focus, leading to a measurement
error that could explain the lack of significant results.
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Given the increasing popularity of these committees in public companies, it is
important to clarify their outcome effectiveness. While perhaps appropriate for previous
research questions, the typical approach to associating sustainability committees and/or
CSP in aggregate does not allow a distinction between committees that are accountable to
and generate value from different stakeholders (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Mallin
et al., 2013; Rodrigue et al., 2013; Walls et al., 2012). Committees may focus on a single
stakeholder group or multiple stakeholder groups (e.g., the community and employees).
The oversight of one stakeholder group likely requires different decisions than the
oversight of another group, and may cause variation in outcome effectiveness. These
decisions may also have varying impacts on value. For instance, how a firm manages its
employees can lower turnover, improve productivity, and increase worker commitment,
whereas positive consumer perceptions about product quality and safety can lead to
increased sales and decreased costs (Berman et al., 1999).
For our purposes of comprehensively examining the impact of sustainability
committees on CSP, we argue that committees hold heterogeneous responsibilities and
warrant a more granular examination. We predict the performance implications of this in
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: A board-level committee with accountability towards specific
stakeholders will have a stronger positive association with CSP
performance in that dimension, relative to companies without a
sustainability committee or those with a committee that is not focused on
that dimension.
V. METHODS
Sample and data
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We collect performance data from MSCI ESG STATS (formerly KLD) 6, which is merged
with hand-collected data on the presence and responsibilities of board-level sustainability
committees. We merge this data with Compustat and IRRC to obtain financial performance
and governance characteristics data. The resulting sample includes a total of 11,458 firmyear observations with available data for all variables for the period 2003 – 2013. Table
1,1 displays information on the sample, including sample attrition and sample distribution
by year. The sample increases over time, and by 2013 it includes data for 1,103 U.S.
companies. Across all years, 1,742 unique companies are included in the sample.
[INSERT TABLE 1.1 HERE]
Variables and analysis
Dependent variables
We use various CSP measures as dependent variables in our empirical specifications. These
measures are all constructed from the MSCI database, which provides data on six major
dimensions of social performance (i.e. community, diversity, employee relations,
environment, human rights, and product) that are commonly used to construct overall CSP
measures (Hillman and Keim, 2001).7 Following prior literature, we do not include the
corporate governance dimension as it is considered distinct from CSP (Servaes and
Tamayo, 2013). We create two measures of aggregate sustainability performance by

6

The MSCI ESG STATS database assesses firms’ CSP across a range of dimensions geared towards
institutional investors (Sharfman, 1996). The database covers the largest 3,000 U.S. publicly traded
companies by market capitalization, which includes both the S&P 500 and the MSCI KLD 400 Social Index.
Data on CSP is collected from publicly available industry and company reports.
7
Within the database, public companies are rated on approximately 60 indicators across seven major
environmental and social responsibility categories. Each indicator is a dichotomous variable equal to one if
the company meets the criteria established for that indicator, and zero otherwise. For example Apple, Inc.
received a 1 in employee relations strengths for its supply chain labor standards, but also received a 1 for
employee relations concerns for its child labor.
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summing total strengths (CSP strengths) or total concerns (CSP concerns) for each of the
six listed dimensions.8
The extant literature that discusses the validity of MSCI data finds that there are
three major issues. First, it is conceptually difficult to create a rating that fully captures the
complexities of positive and negative exchanges with multiple stakeholder groups (e.g.,
Berman et al., 1999; Chatterji et al., 2009). Second, the overall CSP score, which is
commonly used in prior literature, has low explanatory power due to the netting of
strengths and concerns (Mattingly and Berman, 2006). Lastly, an aggregate view of the
CSP construct may be mistaken. CSP is a construct that represents a wide range of
stakeholder impacts, and actions related to each of these stakeholders impact the overall
construct differently and should be examined in this way (Jayachandran et al. 2013). 9 These
critiques closely mirror our critique of sustainability committee measurement, and thus
they are addressed in our research design.
We take guidance from Flammer (2015) when constructing our disaggregated
measures of CSP. We create four sub-indices of stakeholder investment from the MSCI
data, separately examining strengths and concerns related to investment in the community

8

We also recognize that there have been critiques as to the validity of traditional constructions of CSP
outcomes with MSCI data. By drawing our main conclusions and contributions from models using
dimension-level MSCI data, we avoid many of the critiques of the CSP score construction process. To be
sure, we perform analysis using two alternative measures of the dependent variables to ensure our results are
consistent to variable specifications. We adjust all dependent variables by the industry average in each year.
We also construct percentage dependent variable measurements, by dividing the scores used in the main
analysis by the number of categories each firm-year was rated in. Results are consistent across all of these
alternative specifications.
9
A burgeoning literature has also addressed this issue by utilizing the split dimensions within MSCI to create
tailored CSP variables (e.g., Bouslah et al., 2013; Jayachandran et al., 2013; Kabongo, Chang, and Li, 2013;
Walls and Hoffman, 2013; Walls et al., 2012).9 These studies often use individual dimensions of the KLD
database, whether that be only environmental (Walls and Hoffman, 2013), only diversity (Kabongo et al.
2013), only environmental and human rights performance (Berliner and Prakash, 2014), or each of the
dimensions individually (Bouslah et al., 2013). Recently, Flammer (2015) find that the impact of product
market competition on CSR investment varies depending on the category of investment.
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(community and human rights dimensions)10, employees (employee relations and diversity
dimensions)11, the environment (environment dimension), and consumers and suppliers
(product dimension). This method allows for both a more comprehensive analysis as well
as better matching between the test and dependent variable. 12
Independent variables
We hand-collect the information necessary for our test variable, board-level sustainability
committee existence and focus. To identify these committees, we first reviewed the
complete universe of unique committee names in the BoardEx database and flagged
committees that are likely CSP related.13 We took a lenient stance in our initial
classification of committee names to ensure we, to the best of our abilities, identified all
committees focusing on sustainability issues. Next, we manually collected the committee
responsibilities as stated in the company’s annual proxy filing and assessed whether they
explicitly list oversight of stakeholder groups. Recognizing that committee responsibilities
can fluctuate, we collect and classify data for each year of committee existence. We
discovered that there are many committees that qualify as sustainability related based on
their responsibility towards specific stakeholder groups, that based on key search terms in
prior literature would not have been captured. 14 In contrast, we also found that many
committee names suggested a sustainability related nature, but the description of their

10

The human rights dimension deals with underprivileged groups in the community.
The diversity dimension corresponds largely to actions that affect employees.
12
While some critics of this split measure approach argue that narrow measures do not reflect the full view
of a company’s CSP, our study bypasses this by merely examining performance relative to the specific
stakeholders focused on in the extended governance structure, rather than the broad definition of CSR.
13
BoardEx contains data on all board committees as reported in public company proxy filings. While prior
studies have used limited samples and manually searched company websites for the existence of these
committees, through BoardEx we are able to identify the full scope of unique committee names.
14
For example, unique names such as “civic & charitable affairs”, “ethics, compliance, & sustainability”,
“employee development and retention”, “excellence”, “clinical quality”, and more listed in Appendix A.
These committees were not classified as sustainability committees by most prior studies.
11
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responsibilities contradicted this classification.15 In aggregate analyses for Hypotheses 1a
and 1b we employ a Committee variable equal to one if the firm-year observation has a
board-level committee with sustainability responsibilities explicitly listed in their proxy
filing, and zero otherwise.
Next, we conduct a comprehensive coding of the collected committee
responsibilities towards stakeholder groups. Prior to data collection, we drafted a taxonomy
rooted in the MSCI dimensions of CSP, which allowed for the coding of committee
responsibilities into four stakeholder groups. This taxonomy, as well as sample committee
classifications, can be found in Appendix B. We create four indicator variables to represent
committee foci on stakeholder groups, including Community focus, Employee focus,
Environment focus, and Consumer/supplier focus.16 For example, community committees
assume responsibility for oversight of ethics compliance, charitable giving programs,
housing/education programs, volunteering and community engagement, or human rights
issues. Employee committees assume responsibility over internal health and safety, union
relations, child labor issues, workforce diversity, and more. Environment committees, as
previously examined in the literature, have responsibilities ranging from water
conservation to waste management and pollution control. Lastly, consumer and supplier

15

About 26 percent of the originally identified sample was lost due to non-CSP related descriptions. For
example, committees with “employee” in their name would initially be flagged as CSP related, but upon
review often had only employee stock option plan responsibilities, which we would not consider to be an
element of CSP. Similarly, an “asset quality” committee was originally flagged due to its reference for
quality, but was deemed unrelated as it claimed oversight for the company’s credit practices and loan loss
reserves. The largest portion of committees that were removed from our committee sample upon review of
their responsibilities were “trust” committees, whose name may signal CSP related activity, but
responsibilities consistently involved investment policies within finance industries.
16
Two research assistants and one author independently coded committee responsibilities into focus indicator
variables. The coders’ initial agreement rates were above 90 percent and Cohen’s kappa was over 0.80 for
each category, suggesting very high intercoder agreement (Freelon 2010). The coders met to resolve their
coding differences and the updated coding is used in analysis.
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committees focus on product quality and safety initiatives. These focus variables are not
mutually exclusive; a firm-year observation can have multiple foci if there is more than
one committee for that firm-year, or if the committee focuses on multiple stakeholder
groups (for example, one committee may focus on environment, employee, and
consumer/supplier related issues). To properly isolate the impact of these foci, we create
another set of variables for firms that have a sustainability committee that is not focused
on the stakeholder group being analyzed: No community focus, No employee focus, No
environment focus, and No consumer/supplier focus. We use these variables to draw
comparisons to firms without a sustainability committee and to firms with a sustainability
committee that does not focus on a specific dimension. Using our two earlier committee
examples (Arch Coal and Delta Air Lines), a coding example can be found in Appendix C.
Control variables
We include several other control variables identified in prior literature as determinants of
CSP (e.g., de Villiers et al., 2011; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000), including: board size,
independence, tenure, board busyness, firm size, firm liquidity, firm profitability, research
and development investment, and leverage. These variables are defined in Appendix A.
Lastly, all models include industry and year fixed effects and standard errors clustered at
the firm level.
VI. RESULTS
Descriptive statistics
Table 1.2 presents summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis. The median
CSP score is zero and the mean is 0.240, suggesting that the models will largely predict a
zero-baseline value of aggregate net CSP. This suggests that the net measurement of all

23

dimension strengths and concerns fails to capture the rich social performance data available
in the MSCI dataset. Beyond splitting measurement by strengths and concerns, the separate
calculation of strengths and concerns for the four dimensions of CSP also shows variation,
providing evidence that each grouping represents distinct aspects of CSP. Descriptive data
for control variables show similarity to those presented in recent literature (Mallin et al.
2013; de Villiers et al. 2011). On average, boards in our sample have around nine members,
are 75.8 percent independent, and have a mean director tenure ranging from zero to 30
years. Sixteen percent of the boards in our sample are considered busy. Additionally, Table
1.2, Panel C presents a correlation matrix of the key variables in our analysis. 17
[INSERT TABLE 1.2 HERE]
Figure 1.1 shows that sustainability committee are becoming increasingly prevalent
throughout the sample period. It also illustrates that there is variation amongst committee
foci, providing further evidence that sustainability committees are heterogeneous and
should be treated as such in empirical analysis. While prior literature has focused on
environmental committees (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Rodrigue et al., 2013),
Figure 1.1 shows that consumer and supplier focused committees are the most frequently
observed in our sample, followed by committees with an environment focus. Consumer
and supplier committees are those that focus on the health and safety implications of
product development, as well as quality, excellence, best practices, and more. We observe
a steady increase in this focus throughout the sample period while other foci have remained
fairly constant.

17

For sake of presentation, only key variables (dependent variables, committee variable, and key control
variables) are displayed. A full correlation matrix was examined, along with the VIF test statistic for each
variable. All VIFs are below 10 in all our models suggesting that multicollinearity is not a serious problem
in interpreting the results (Cohen, et al., 2003).
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[INSERT FIGURE 1.1 HERE]
Further, it is interesting that these committees often claim oversight of multiple
stakeholder groups. It is most common for a committee to focus on two stakeholder groups
at once. Figure 1.2 graphically depicts how many committees focus on multiple issues
within each stakeholder focus. Further, Table 1.2, Panel D contains a complete breakdown
of the various combinations of committee foci. Within community focused committees, it
is common for the committee to focus on multiple issues (e.g., consumer and supplier and
environment). In fact, when a committee focuses on community issues, it is common for it
to focus on all of the stakeholder dimensions. When a committee focuses on environmental
issues, it is uncommon for it to focus solely on that issue. Rather, this focus is often
combined with a consumer and supplier focus (e.g., committees that focus on the impact
of products on consumers and the environment). Combined, the varying foci of committees
and the varying amount of foci in each committee motivate the use of an indicator that
controls for committees that do not focus on the given outcome dimension. We are then
able to compare the impact of these focus variations using coefficient comparison tests.
[INSERT FIGURE 1.2 HERE]
As this study is the first to comprehensively disaggregate the sustainability
committee variable according to dimensions of CSP, these summary statistics are important
to document. The heterogeneity in responsibilities evidenced by these summary statistics
illustrates the need to disaggregate CSP when conducting research in this domain.
Empirical estimation results
Hypothesis 1: Aggregate performance impact of sustainability committees
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In Table 1.3, we present the main findings of a sustainability committee’s impact on
aggregate CSP, which we discussed earlier as the motivation for our study given conflicting
results in prior literature. We estimate these multivariate regressions using OLS
distribution models.18 In the first column, the sustainability committee indicator variable
showed no association with net CSP (p-value of 0.204). This result is consistent with the
conclusion of prior research that these committees are largely symbolic.
[INSERT TABLE 1.3 HERE]
This column illustrates the statistical reasons for research using MSCI data to split
aggregate performance into strengths and concerns (Mattingly and Berman, 2006).
Specifically, both test and several control variables illustrate insignificant associations with
the net score, yet strong associations with both strength and concern scores. 19 Additionally,
the Vuong z-statistics comparing the R2 of the CSP score model with the CSP strengths
and concerns models are highly significant, suggesting that explanatory power is much
higher when CSP strengths and concerns are measured as separate constructs. Given these
findings, our hypotheses and all subsequent analysis separately examine CSP strengths and
concerns.
Hypothesis 1a: Sustainability committee existence and CSP strengths

18

Given the nature of our CSP measures, we also ensure results are robust to model specifications that
account for non-negative count data. Stock and Watson (2007) suggest that OLS is appropriate for count
data, but that alternative specifications may better account for count data distribution. We chose to use OLS
in our tabled analysis due to its ability to generate post-estimation goodness of fit measures and for easier
interpretation of regression coefficients (Manner, 2010). Regressions using negative binomial and Poisson
distribution specifications produce the same signs on all coefficients and similar levels of statistical
significance.
19
For an interesting example of the differential impact of a single characteristic on both CSP strengths and
concerns, see Boulouta (2013). Findings of this study show that board gender diversity has a stronger
influence on CSP concerns than on CSP strengths.
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In Column 2, we detect a positive and significant coefficient when estimating CSP
strengths (p-value = 0.000).20 These results support H1a and provide strong empirical
evidence that, within our sample, there is a significant impact of sustainability committee
existence on CSP strengths. This suggests that sustainability committees view strengths as
value-generating, which allows the formal commitment to stakeholders to translate into
positive performance implications.
Hypothesis 1b: Sustainability committee existence and CSP concerns
In Column 3, we detect a positive and significant coefficient when estimating CSP
concerns (p-value = 0.000). Given that H1b is presented in non-directional form, this
finding rejects the null hypothesis in H1b.
The finding that the existence of a sustainability committee is positively associated
with concerns may seem perplexing since the existence of a sustainability committee is a
voluntary dedication of resources to sustainability issues. However, this finding is
explained by shared value motivations where mitigating concerns does not generate value
(i.e., the economic cost of mitigating concerns exceeds the cost associated with these
negative impacts). In other words, a sustainability committee may exist because the board
is reacting to CSP concerns that already exist or are inherent to the business. 21 Thus, it
appears that the prevalence of sustainability committees is a sign that companies recognize

20

Beyond statistical significance, it is important to discuss the economic significance of the impact detected
before making practical recommendations (Bettis et al. 2016). Holding other factors constant in our sample,
the existence of a sustainability committee is associated with one additional strength. Since the mean overall
strengths score for the full sample is 1.83, this is a substantial 54.64 percent increase in strengths associated
with the existence of a committee.
21
We are able to identify 22 first-time committee adoptions within our sample. Univariate tests suggest that
CSP concerns are significantly higher in companies that adopt a sustainability committee than in those that
do not. This is consistent with a risk management explanation, where CSP concerns are risk factors that lead
to the creation of a sustainability committee.
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the risk negative CSP impacts pose for their business and stakeholders, but that a risk
mitigation response does not follow this recognition.
Combined, H1 findings suggest that committees do not mitigate CSP concerns, but
do positively impact strengths. There are various explanations for this finding. For one,
committees may prioritize strengths because it easier to generate strengths than reduce
concerns. Prior literature suggests that it takes longer to address concerns than it does
strengths (Post et al. 2011).22 Further, organizational change literature suggests that it is
harder to enact change (i.e. reduce concerns) than it is to introduce new policies (i.e.
increase strengths). Second, committees may prioritize strengths because they generate
more value than concerns. Lastly, companies with sustainability committee oversight may
have had even more concerns, or these concerns may have a greater negative impact,
without these committees.
Hypothesis 2: Disaggregated impact of sustainability committees on CSP
Next, we further disaggregate committee existence and CSP into its stakeholder focus. We
measure both sets of variables by dimension, estimating regressions pairing specific
committee focus on stakeholder groups with the respective dimension of CSP, while
controlling for the existence of a sustainability committee not focused on that stakeholder
group. Table 1.4, Panels A and B, present results of regressions with dependent variables
for paired dimension strengths and concerns, respectively.
[INSERT TABLE 1.4 HERE]
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Strike et al. (2006) find that R&D intensity is associated with CSP strengths, but not CSP concerns. This
finding suggests that when a company invests in innovation and presumably social performance, they are
able to enhance strengths, but are not able to prevent concerns.
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The models include two mutually exclusive dummy variables that allow a
comparison between three levels of oversight – no sustainability committee, a committee
not focused on the given stakeholder group, and a committee focused on the given
stakeholder group (and perhaps other stakeholders). Since H2 predicts that focused
committees will be more strongly associated with paired strengths, we employ F-tests for
significant differences in coefficients of focused and non-focused committees to ensure
proper conclusions of differential impact.
In Panel A of Table 1.4, consistent with our predictions, we find that a committee
with a community focus has a significantly greater association with community strengths
than a committee not focused on the community (p-value = 0.016). These results support
our method of pairing committee responsibilities with relevant CSP outcomes. The effect
of a focused committee on its respective dimension of CSP is also economically significant.
For instance, the community strengths model provides evidence that a committee focused
on the community has 0.35 more community strengths than firms without a committee,
whereas a committee not focused on the community is not significantly different those
without a committee. Together, these findings suggest that the community focus matters in
determining committee effectiveness. Results are consistent for environment focused
committees and environmental performance. This enriches the findings of Rodrigue et al.
(2013) who do not find environmental committees to have an impact on environmental
performance outcomes. Also of note in these results is the effect magnitude for both
employee focused and non-employee focused committees on employee related
performance (coefficients of 0.80 and 0.35, respectively). These coefficients are
significantly different, suggesting that employee focused committees are more strongly
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associated with employee strengths than non-focused committees, but that non-focused
committees are still positively associated with employee strengths. Recent literature has
suggested that of all stakeholder groups, it is easiest to draw employee attention to CSR
initiatives, as they are the most closely tied to the firm and may receive communications
directly (Madsen and Rodgers, 2015). In our setting, it is possible that employees are more
knowledgeable of their own company’s governance, and are therefore are impacted by both
board-level investment in their own oversight and in general stakeholder oversight.
Inconsistent with findings for the community, employee, and environment
stakeholder groups, the consumer/supplier strengths model in Panel A of Table 1.4 shows
no significant difference between committees that do and do not focus on the
consumer/supplier dimension, with both types of committees positively impacting
performance in that dimension. There are several possible explanations for this finding.
First, these committees occur most frequently in our sample and their impact may be
saturated. Additionally, the nature of oversight of consumers and suppliers is more closely
linked to a company’s financial performance (Jayachandran et al., 2013) and thus, all
boards may focus on these issues, regardless of the existence of a committee focused on
the issue.
When examining concerns, Panel B of Table 1.4 shows results of either a nonsignificant association (community and employee concerns models) or a positive
association (environment and consumer/supplier models) between sustainability
committee focus and relevant CSP concerns. Consistent with H1b findings, this suggests
that firms with a committee are more likely to have CSP concerns than those without. Yet,
except for environmental concerns, we do not find that firms with focused committees have
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more concerns in the focused dimension than firms without focused committees. It largely
appears that sustainability committees do not mitigate dimension concerns, regardless of
committee focus. While surprising given the assumed role of corporate governance in
enhancing strengths and mitigating concerns, this finding is not inconsistent with prior
literature. Specifically, Walls et al. (2012), who examine a single dimension of committees
and performance using the same CSP data, find that environmental committees are
positively associated with both environmental strengths and concerns. Consistent with a
risk management explanation, Walls et al. (2012) frame this finding as environmental
committees having a dual purpose where they support environmental strengths by
providing expertise and resources, and mitigate environmental concerns by placing
emphasis on issues at the board level.
In sum, we find partial support for Hypothesis 2. Results suggest that community,
employee, and environment focused committees are positively associated with CSP
dimension strengths, which is stronger than the same association for sustainability
committees not focused on these dimensions. However, we do not find that
consumer/supplier focused committees have a stronger impact on consumer/supplier
strengths than committees focused on other stakeholder groups. We also do not find that
community, employee, or consumer/supplier focused committees have a stronger impact
on CSP dimension concerns than non-focused committees.
Further characteristics impacting sustainability committee effectiveness
Thus far, our empirical analyses suggest that committee focus on community, environment,
and employee stakeholder groups contributes to performance in that dimension. Yet, we
acknowledge that focused sustainability committees themselves have heterogeneous
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characteristics that may enhance or impede their ability to oversee stakeholder interests
(Peters and Romi, 2014). To explore this, we examine three common committee
characteristics that have been studied in-depth at the board-level: committee size,
independence, and meeting frequency (e.g., Beeken, Stedham, and Yang, 1998; Dalton et
al., 1998; Walls et al., 2012; Vafeas, 1999). Table 1.5 shows that the average sustainability
committee size is around 4.5, 75.3% of sustainability committees are composed entirely of
independent members and sustainability committees meet on average four times a year. 23
[INSERT TABLE 1.5 HERE]
Next, we examine whether these characteristics contribute to the effectiveness of
sustainability committees. Specifically, we stratify our committee sample into
“ineffective” and “effective” committees based on their standing relative to CSP
strengths24, and examine if these additional characteristics are significantly different
between ineffective and effective committees. 25 In Panel B of Table 1.5, a committee is
coded “effective” if the total CSP strengths in that year is above the sample mean for firms
within the specified sample (e.g., all committees, community focused committees, etc.).
Results show that committee size, independence, and meeting frequency, for the
most part, positively impact the effectiveness of focused committees. These findings
suggest that there is heterogeneity even within the paired committee focus and performance
dimension relationship and that effectiveness of sustainability committees is greater when
boards substantively dedicate resources to subcommittees operations, allowing
23

Characteristic data is not available for all of the 1,243 committee-firm-year observations in our sample,
thus the sample for this analysis is 1,196 committee-firm-year observations with complete data on committee
size, independence, and meeting frequency.
24
We choose to evaluate effectiveness based on CSP strengths, rather than net CSP or CSP concerns, given
the significance and consistency of this finding in our primary analyses.
25
We caution that a univariate analysis is used for simplicity of presentation, and that results should not be
interpreted on the same level as multivariate findings for H1 and H2.
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accountability to translate into performance (Dubnick 2005). This is an important practical
consideration: if boards do not dedicate substantive resources to their committees, even a
focused committee can fail to improve relevant performance.
CSP sensitive industry classifications
Our analysis thus far has accounted for the industry-specific nature of sustainability by
including industry fixed effects in all models. However, because CSP strengths and
concerns are fundamentally different across industries (Koh et al. 2014) and firm
determinants of CSP may also differ across industries (Flammer, 2015), committee value
considerations and effectiveness may vary across industries. 26 Therefore, just as we argue
for proper pairing of committee focus and dimension of CSP (e.g., environmental
committee and environmental performance), we also propose that analysis should be
conducted within the proper sample of firms sensitive to that dimension of CSP (e.g.,
environmentally sensitive).
Prior research recognizes the industry-specific nature of CSP and performs analysis
within environmentally sensitive industries (Cho et al., 2006; Rodrigue et al., 2013). We
believe that this should be extended to the other three categories of stakeholders
(community, employee, and consumer/supplier) and present an objective, data-driven,
approach to classify industries sensitive to each dimension. 27 To execute this, we first sum

26

For example, Denbury Resources, Inc. falls within the oil and gas extraction industry and regularly faces
environmental and safety related issues. Accordingly, the company has a “Safety, Environmental, and
Reserves” committee that focuses on environment and consumer/supplier related issues. Conversely,
Marriott International, Inc. faces a vastly different CSP landscape as a service business within the hotels and
lodging industry, and thus has an “Excellence” committee to oversee employee relations. It is evident in these
examples that industry plays a large role in determining both CSP and committee focus.
27
Despite the advantages of a quantitative approach, we do recognize that qualitative approaches have been
used in prior literature and have their own advantages. These classifications consider the impact of common
industry activities on a given sustainability dimension. For instance, environmentally sensitive industries are
often those that are resource intensive, including oil exploration, paper, chemical and allied products,
pharmaceuticals, petroleum refining, and metals (Cho et al. 2006). While common for the environment
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all strengths and concerns within each dimension of MSCI data, asserting that firms with a
greater sensitivity to stakeholder groups are likely to receive both more strengths and more
concerns in that dimension. Next, we compute the average sum score for each dimension
by industry (as grouped by 2-digit SIC code). Lastly, we classify industries as sensitive to
a dimension if they are ranked within the top quartile of average sum scores. 28 This
quantitative approach is unique in that it can be uniformly applied to all four sustainability
dimensions as well as replicated in future large-scale research. This approach relies on the
MSCI data, which is widely considered the standard for CSP research, and is replicable
and generalizable to a multitude of contexts.
Table 1.6 presents the 2-digit SIC codes of industries within each of our specified
sensitive samples. We perform several tests to validate our quantitative approach. 29 We
further test our sensitive industry classifications by examining whether companies in
sensitive industries are more likely to have a committee focused on that dimension. Firms
in these industries are more likely to feel accountable to sensitive stakeholder groups than
to others. Univariate comparisons presented in Table 1.6 confirm this and suggest that
companies in sensitive industries are more likely to have a committee with a relevant focus

dimension, this approach is difficult to apply to all dimensions of sustainability with accuracy (e.g., for the
employee dimension, all firms have employees with issues that must be managed), and to the best of our
knowledge such a classification has not been done for community and consumer/supplier dimensions.
28
Our results are robust to alternative cutoffs for the sensitive industry samples, including above the median,
top quintile, and top decile.
29
First, the resulting classification of environmentally sensitive industries encapsulates all of the resource
intensive industries that have been classified as environmentally sensitive in prior literature (Cho et al. 2006).
This provides comfort that our approach does not result in classifications that conflict extant qualitative
research. Second, we use data external to MSCI ESG STATS to validate the employee sensitive
classification. Since employee sensitive industries are likely labor intensive, we examine the mean number
of employees in each two-digit industry. Industries with the most employees include general merchandise
stores, food stores, hotels and other lodging places, and building materials and gardening supplies. All four
of these industries are classified as employee sensitive through our quantitative process. Further, most of the
industries we classify as employee sensitive are in the top quartile of number of employees. Given these
validations, we feel comfortable extending our quantitative method to the two other stakeholder groups,
which allows the creation of a classification that has not been done under the qualitative method.
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than those not in the sensitive industry. 30 This is consistent with sustainability risk
management, which we propose as an explanation for why committees appear to positively
impact CSP concerns. Specifically, certain industries are more prone to impact stakeholder
groups, so it appears to be common for these industries to have sustainability committees
in order to ensure the risk of impact on these groups is monitored and managed to meet the
company’s risk appetite. Additionally, there may be greater opportunities to generate value
from strengths in these industries. This test also provides independent verification for both
our classification of committee responsibilities and the sensitive industry classifications.
[INSERT TABLE 1.6 HERE]
Results estimating dimension strengths and concerns within these more
homogenous sensitive industry samples are presented in Table 1.7. This mimics the
analysis in Table 1.4, but is restricted to the respective sensitive industry sample. In Panel
A, we find that community, employee, and environment foci are all positive and significant,
while a consumer/supplier focus is not significant. This provides further evidence that a
committee focused on a respective dimension is positively associated with CSP strengths
in that dimension and supports shared value creation, where focused committees positively
influence dimension strengths because these strengths generate value. Within sensitive
industries, Panel B shows that community and employee committees continue to be
insignificant in estimating paired concerns. Additionally, contrary to the previous analysis,

30

We recognize that in order to have a focused committee, the firm-year observation must be within the small
portion of the sample for which a committee exists, and that this may limit the evidence provided in a full
sample comparison. However, when this comparison is done within firms that have a sustainability
committee, we still find a greater likelihood that firm-year observations in sensitive industries have a
committee with a relevant focus. Interestingly, the consumer/supplier committee is more prevalent in
industries that are not sensitive to the consumer/supplier dimension when the test is limited to those with
committees. We attribute this finding to our earlier explanation that the consumer/supplier focus is the least
discretionary and represents an issue that is likely considered by all firms.
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consumer/supplier committees are no longer significant in estimating concerns. While a
positive association remains in the environment dimension, the effect size is not greater
than in the entire sample, which is unexpected given the environmental issues a sensitive
industry would face. Overall, findings of concerns also support shared value creation,
where focused committees determine whether dimension concerns destroy value enough
to warrant mitigation.
[INSERT TABLE 1.7 HERE]
Explanatory power in these models is greater than when estimated across the full
sample, suggesting that the relationship is better targeted in a more homogenous sample of
firm-year observations that are sensitive to the examined dimension. In essence, to enhance
committee effectiveness, it is important to align committee focus with industry needs.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper makes four major contributions. First, we present hand-collected data for a large
sample of board-level sustainability committees in public companies. We find that
committees are increasingly prevalent over our 2003 – 2013 sample period. Our sample
demonstrates that sustainability committees are diversified and that significant variability
exists within their focus. Further, these committees often have multiple foci and it is most
common for a committee to focus on two stakeholder groups at once.
Second, we clarify the conflicting evidence in prior literature on the impact of a
sustainability committee on aggregate CSP. Theoretically, committees appear to be
motivated by shared value considerations, where stakeholder expectations are only met if
they also benefit the shareholder. This is evident in committee responsibility statements
and in our findings. Specifically, we find that sustainability committees are largely

36

successful at generating CSP strengths, but not at remediating CSP concerns. This finding
is consistent with intuitive theory set forth in this paper and suggests that a sustainability
committee is potentially a mechanism to improve a firm’s oversight of and impact on
stakeholder groups, but not at the expense of economic success.
Third, we present evidence that a disaggregated analysis should be used to examine
CSP and sustainability committees. A disaggregated analysis incorporates the
heterogeneous nature of the constructs we examine and recognizes that it matters which
stakeholder groups a sustainability committee is accountable to. Findings illustrate that
focused sustainability committees are associated with more strengths relative to firms with
non-focused committees and relative to firms without a sustainability committee. For
example, not only does a committee with a community focus have an impact on community
performance above firms that do not have a committee, but it is also has a stronger
association with community strengths than a committee not focused on the community.
These findings confirm our predictions that formally claiming board-level responsibility
for specific stakeholder interests results in a positive impact on performance related to these
stakeholder groups. Univariate analyses illustrate that committees that do not have
sufficient resources (i.e., size, independence, meeting frequency) may not be effective.
Fourth, we introduce a quantitative approach to classify CSP sensitive industries
(i.e., those where dimension-specific issues are particularly salient), which can be used in
future research. Results suggest that it is important for committee focus to be aligned with
industry sensitivities to sustainability impacts. In our setting, this quantitative approach to
industry classification has advantages over a qualitative approach (e.g., objectiveness,
applicability to all dimensions of CSP, and generalizability to future research questions).
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However, we do recognize that qualitative classification approaches can provide a more
nuanced understanding of industry impacts and leave this open to future research.
Overall, future research should consider a similar taxonomy in constructing
sustainability measures. Using the proposed method, future research can extend
understanding of the heterogeneous nature of stakeholder oversight. Practically, our results
provide support for public companies to consider board-level sustainability committees as
a mechanism to improve firm performance. We contribute to preliminary evidence of this
in prior literature by cautioning that performance impacts vary with the stakeholder focus
and resource availability of the committee, as well as the industry sustainability landscape.
Although the data we employ required extensive hand-collection, investors and other
stakeholders interested in individual companies can manually access these same data points
in a company’s proxy filings. Using these more granular data should provide better insight
to the performance of sustainability committees.
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Part Two
Auditor Reputation Risk: Evidence of Auditor Response to Client Negative Media
Coverage (co-authored with Rani Hoitash and Udi Hoitash)
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I. INTRODUCTION
This study examines negative media coverage of audit clients as a factor generating auditor
reputation risk.31 Despite the importance of risk management to auditors, there is limited
understanding of auditor reputation risk to date (DeFond and Zhang 2014), and it is not
clear whether and how this risk is managed. To examine auditor reputation risk, we rely on
a new database that quantifies negative media coverage of environmental, social, and
governance (ESG) practices at a large set of public companies. We hypothesize that
negative media coverage of an audit client generates auditor reputation risk and test
whether and how auditors respond to this risk.
The media provides valuable insight into a company’s public perception
(Deephouse 2000) and can publicize firm actions that would otherwise go undetected or be
considered negligible (Bednar, Boivie, and Prince 2013; Miller 2006). For example, in just
a short time Chipotle has fallen from its status as an upcoming darling in the restaurant
industry. The company received widespread negative media coverage (Whaba 2015)
beginning with news of an E. coli outbreak and spiraling into mainstream coverage of
company incidents that may otherwise have been ignored (e.g., mid-level executive
charged with drug possession (Olson 2016)). This and many other recent anecdotes (e.g.,
British Petroleum, Volkswagen, Target, and Sony) illustrate that company reputation is
often at risk due to media coverage of ESG practices.32 When a company’s reputation is at
risk due to negative media attention, the reputation of various related parties may also be

31

Reputation risk has been presented as a component of auditor business risk (i.e., the probability that auditors
will suffer a loss or injury to their professional practice (Brumfield et al. 1983)) and engagement risk
(Knechel et al. 2007)).
32
Similarly, extant literature suggests companies must be environmentally conscious, socially responsible,
and governmentally sound to avoid reputation loss (Bebbington, Larrinaga, and Moneva 2008).
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adversely affected. In this study, we focus on the external auditor, who has incentives to
monitor a client’s negative media coverage and consider how it affects their own reputation
risk.33
Research exploring the role of the media in influencing auditor behavior is very
limited. In fact, to the best of our knowledge there are no archival studies in this domain,
and whether or not auditors respond to client media coverage remains an unanswered
question. While auditors are expected to possess independent and proprietary knowledge
about their clients (Joe 2003), experimental literature suggests that media coverage of
financial statement related issues may cause modification of the audit opinion. In this study,
we move beyond financial statement issues to examine negative media coverage of
practices unrelated to the primary audit process. It is not clear whether auditors will find
coverage of such issues relevant and whether it warrants any reaction. Unlike financial
statement related issues, auditors do not have influence over nor responsibility for client
ESG practices, so negative coverage in this domain may have no influence on auditor
behavior. However, negative media coverage could prove influential to an auditor as an
important factor that elevates its own reputation risk. Specifically, negative media attention
on a client’s ESG activities may intensify the reputation consequences of issuing an
incorrect audit opinion (e.g., potential for engagement to receive negative media attention).
Further, an auditor’s association with a risky client may damage its reputation even when
the audit is conducted properly (Houston, Peters, and Pratt 1999). Reputation damage of
this sort can lead to the loss of current and prospective clients, need to offer fee discounts

33

Informal conversation with audit partners and staff reveal that they monitor client media coverage
frequently through both formal (e.g., email alerts) and informal (e.g., increased attention when a client is
covered in the news) channels.
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to current clients, weakened employee recruiting efforts and damaged employee morale
(Brumfield, Elliott, and Jacobson 1983; Lyon and Maher 2005; Wilson and Grimlund
1990). In this way, negative media coverage of a client can generate auditor reputation risk.
Documenting U.S. evidence of auditor reputation risk has proven difficult (DeFond
and Zhang 2014). While extant literature examines reputation damage following major
audit failures (e.g., Andersen) and regulator-identified audit deficiencies, a research setting
must be separated from traditional audit risk considerations to properly attribute findings
to reputation risk. For instance, Donelson, Ege, and Leiby (2016) examine client litigation
unrelated to financial reporting, which should not impact the auditor given a lack of relation
with the audit risk model. Yet, the authors still find evidence that auditor reputation is
damaged when client litigation occurs and further, that auditors do not pass costs associated
with this reputation damage on to the litigated client. This finding is interesting as it
suggests that auditors are taking responsibility for client misconduct outside of their
oversight realm.
We expand this line of research by examining auditor response to negative media
coverage of client environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practices. RepRisk is a
leading business intelligence provider that conducts daily screening of over 80,000 media
sources (e.g., major print media, blogs, social media) for ESG risks. Generally, studies that
examine media coverage select a narrow scope of major news sources in which to identify
stories (e.g., Christensen 2016; Weber, Willenborg, and Zhang 2008), whereas RepRisk’s
coverage and automatic collection process are more extensive. The data is presented in
indicator variables for 28 ESG issues, along with detail on the severity of the issue and
reach of the media source (i.e., its prominence) in which the issue was identified.
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Additionally, RepRisk calculates an index that captures negative media coverage of ESG
practices, which is a firm-monthly combination of the aforementioned granular issue data.
Since this database is new to accounting research, we conduct several validation tests to
illustrate its robustness, including manually tracing RepRisk’s index and granular issue
data to media sources, correlating the measures with well-known reputation rankings and
using a two-step Heckman correction in our main models. We conclude that this data can
prove valuable for answering research questions in the accounting field and beyond.
Using this data, we follow guidance on risk response from the COSO (2004)
Enterprise Risk Management framework and examine whether auditors respond to
reputation risk, as captured in negative media coverage of a client’s ESG practices. The
COSO framework outlines four risk responses – avoid, accept, reduce, and share. If an
auditor perceives that their reputation is at risk due to client negative media coverage, they
can avoid the risk by resigning from the risky client, can reduce or share the risk by
performing additional work or transferring a portion of the risk to the client through audit
fees, or can accept the risk by continuing with the engagement with no change to audit fees.
Since risk management is crucial for audit firms (Johnstone 2000; Johnstone and Bedard
2003), we predict that audit client negative media coverage will be positively associated
with the likelihood of auditor change and with audit fees.
We examine these predictions within a sample of 7,754 firm-year observations
from 2007-2014. Our results suggest that auditors do respond to client negative media
coverage. Specifically, we find that negative media coverage of an audit client’s ESG
practices has a significant and positive impact on both the likelihood of auditor change and
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on audit fees.34 These findings suggest that auditors may be concerned with reputation
spillover effects, and thus assess a client’s media sentiment when making pricing and
retention decisions. Both the auditor change and fee findings are robust. Specifically, we
find that results are consistent when we use auditor resignations as the dependent variable.
We further observe that a one-year change in negative media coverage is positively
associated with a one-year change in audit fees. Utilizing the monthly risk data RepRisk
provides, we also examine the timing of coverage peaks and find that coverage during the
negotiation phase has the greatest impact on audit fees. This finding supports the risk
sharing explanation, where auditors charge higher fees during negotiation (Hackenbrack,
Jenkins, and Pevzner 2014) to share their reputation risk burden with their clients.
We also investigate the differential response to environmental, social, and
governance categories of media coverage. We find that fees are higher when any of these
risks are present, suggesting that auditors price many forms of negative media coverage.
Interestingly, we find that the likelihood of auditor change is only associated with negative
media coverage of governance practices. This suggests that coverage of environmental and
social practices may not be egregious enough to warrant an auditor resignation. In contrast,
governance practices are more salient to an auditor who must obtain an understanding of
the company’s organizational structure and management team during risk assessment
(PCAOB 2010a).35 This finding is consistent with media dependency theory that suggests
that stakeholders gather information relevant to their decision-making from the media
(Einwiller, Carroll, and Korn 2010).

34

Firm-year observations with an auditor change are removed from the audit fee analysis.
Our measure captures negative media coverage of corporate governance practices. A list of the specific
practices this category can be found in Appendix 1. This measure is different from common corporate
governance measures that focus on the quality of the board, such as board independence or busyness.
35
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A unique feature of the RepRisk database is its collection from both low and high
reach media sources. Prior literature is often constrained to collection of media coverage
in major news outlets such as the Wall Street Journal or Financial Times. Using RepRisk
data, we are able to examine auditor reputation concerns when negative media coverage of
an issue escalates from a low reach (e.g., blog, social media, etc.) to a high reach (e.g.,
Wall Street Journal) source. We find that auditors do not respond to coverage of an issue
in low reach media but do respond when the same issue moves from low to high reach
media. For example, when a child labor issue is covered by a blog, an auditor would likely
incorporate this information if it were important for audit risk judgments, yet we find no
association with audit fees. Rather, there is only a fee response when the child labor issue
escalates to a more prominent source, which suggests that the auditor reacts to protect its
reputation rather than to the underlying issue. This finding is consistent with auditor
response to perceived reputation risk.
We perform several supplemental analyses which illustrate that RepRisk’s mediabased measures of ESG practices capture auditor reputation risk beyond the risk of material
misstatement and financial risk, which extant literature documents as components of
auditor decision-making (e.g. Johnstone and Bedard 2001; Johnstone and Bedard 2003).
First, we construct our sample in four different ways to examine if results hold when we
remove firm-years with various issues. These include firms with high risk of material
misstatement, which we measure in two ways: those who fail Benford’s law for the normal
distribution of numbers (Amiram, Bozniac, and Rouen 2015) and those with high pre-audit
misstatement risk (Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan 2011). We also remove firms with high
financial risk, measured by negative sales growth and stock returns. Our main findings are
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consistent in each of these samples. Second, we measure abnormal audit fees unexplained
by risk of material misstatement and other common controls (Lobo and Zhao 2013;
Dechow et al. 2011). Results are consistent when we use abnormal audit fees as the
dependent variable. Third, we do not find an association between RepRisk’s measures and
outcomes of the risk of material misstatement (i.e., likelihood of going concern opinion,
misstatement, material weakness, and level of discretionary accruals). 36 Fourth, we
examine audit delay and do not find evidence that auditors increase their testing when risk
arises close to the release of the audit report. This illustrates that risks associated with ESG
practices identified in the media do not prompt additional testing, which supports our
conclusion that these considerations are incorporated during the negotiation phase.
Combined, these analyses suggest that negative media coverage measures an incremental
risk that has not previously been examined, which supports our conclusion that auditor
response is explained by reputation risk considerations.
Our study makes the following contributions. First, we introduce and validate a new
database to the accounting literature. RepRisk quantifies negative media coverage and has
several advantages over existing data sources. Importantly, information is collected from
over 80,000 media outlets, allowing for a more accurate picture of overall negative media
sentiment than in prior studies, which have been constrained to data in a small number of
media sources. Further, the database contains coverage in media outlets that are classified
as low reach, such as blogs, as well high reach, such as the Wall Street Journal. This feature
is unique and allows an examination of media prominence and its consequences.
Additionally, this data is provided on a monthly basis, creating many opportunities for

36

This result also holds in a sample where audit fees do not increase, suggesting that these outcomes are
unaffected even when auditors do not increase effort.
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more accurate timing measurement. Future research can use this data in a variety of
accounting and non-accounting contexts. Second, we answer recent calls for research on
understanding the role of auditor reputation risk as a component of auditors’ risk
considerations (DeFond and Zhang 2014). This question has been difficult to address
because settings to examine reputation concerns beyond those tied to the audited financial
statements are not widely available. Using client negative media coverage, made available
in RepRisk, allows us to address this question.
Lastly, we contribute to the auditor change and audit fee literature by presenting
evidence that external auditors incorporate client media coverage into pricing and retention
decisions even when it lacks relation to traditional risk considerations. This finding is also
important for practice, as it documents an unanticipated economic impact of ESG events.
The potential costs associated with an auditor resignation or increased audit fees provide
an additional economic incentive for companies to avoid poor ESG practices. Our findings
also extend an emerging accounting literature that primarily focuses on the disclosure and
assurance of ESG information. We do so by examining auditor oversight of and response
to ESG-related media coverage, which is an area of growing interest for practice.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related
literature and theory and proposes testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the RepRisk
database and our empirical methodology. Section 4 presents our results, and Section 5 is
devoted to a discussion of the major findings and their implications for research and
practice.
II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Auditor Reputation Risk
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A limited literature examines auditor reputation risk (Asthana and Kelekar 2014; DeFond
and Zhang 2014), which contributes to the probability that an auditor will suffer a loss or
injury to their professional practices (Brumfield et al. 1983). Studies have examined how
clients, their stakeholders, and the market responded to Andersen’s diminished reputation
(e.g., Asthana, Balsam, and Krishnan 2010; Barton 2005; Bewley, Chung, and McCracken
2008; Chaney and Philipich 2002). A few international studies, where litigation risk is not
a confounding factor, have similarly examined the impact of an audit failure on audit firm
reputation (e.g., Gao, Jamal, Liu, and Luo 2011; Skinner and Srinivasan 2012; Weber et
al. 2008). Findings suggest that when there is an audit failure, an auditor’s ability to provide
future services is damaged. Specifically, the auditor loses clients and other clients of the
auditor experience negative abnormal returns. Similar consequences are identified when
audit deficiencies are identified by regulators, such as the SEC (Wilson and Grimlund
1990), AICPA peer inspectors (Hilary and Lennox 2005), and the PCAOB (Boone 2015;
Dee, Lulseged, and Zhang 2011; Lennox and Pittman 2010). Further, an impaired
reputation can result in the need to offer fee discounts to current clients and the loss of
current and prospective clients, current and prospective employees, and a decline in
employee morale (Brumfield et al. 1983; Lyon and Maher 2005; Wilson and Grimlund
1990). This body of literature illustrates that auditors have strong incentives to avoid
reputation damage, but apart from consequences following the Andersen failure and
regulatory action, U.S. evidence of this has yet to be documented (DeFond and Zhang
2014).
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It has proven difficult to identify a setting where reputation risk can be investigated,
as it is often confounded by traditional audit risk or litigation risk. 37 Further, while studies
have examined reputation damage as a result of audit deficiencies and failures, examining
if and how actions of affiliated parties influence auditor reputation is less common. One
endeavor is by Donelson et al. (2016), who find that when an audit client is sued for reasons
unrelated to financial reporting (i.e., non-GAAP securities fraud class actions), other clients
in the same city-industry are awarded fee discounts. The authors conclude this reaction is
consistent with an auditor’s reputation being damaged and with subsequent action taken by
the auditor to appease other clients, despite their independence from the damaging event.
Interestingly, the authors do not find that fees are impacted for the litigated client,
suggesting that auditors do not transfer this reputation damage to the client with reputation
issues.
We aim to extend Donelson et al. (2016) by examining reputation spillover between
an audit firm and the damaged client. To the best of our knowledge, studies have yet to
identify a broad setting in which to examine auditor reputation risk. Media coverage of
client practices unrelated to the primary audit process is a promising setting to fill this gap.
Negative Media Coverage

37

Reputation risk has been presented as a component of auditor business risk (i.e., the probability that auditors
will suffer a loss or injury to their professional practice (Brumfield et al. 1983)). Extant literature has focused
on the litigation risk component of auditor business risk, but a recent literature review calls for evidence on
reputation risk (DeFond and Zhang 2014). Documenting evidence of reputation risk has proven difficult in a
U.S. setting, where litigation is often a confounding explanation (i.e., client issues that increase reputation
risk also increase the likelihood that an auditor will be named in a lawsuit related to the issue, as seen in
Andersen’s demise). Donelson et al. (2016) begin to resolve this by examining non-GAAP related lawsuits
at audit clients as an event that would not impact auditor litigation risk. For the same reason, we examine
ESG issues. Untabulated results illustrate that in our sample, only seven firm-years have an auditor named in
a lawsuit in connection with media coverage of an ESG issue, which suggests that our reputation risk measure
does not capture litigation risk.
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The media, and specifically the business press, is an important information distributor to
the market. The media distributes information more broadly, regardless of whether it
creates new content (Drake et al. 2014; Bushee, Core, Guay, and Hamm 2010; Huberman
and Regev 2001; Miller 2006).38 Essentially, media shapes public opinion by packaging
and rebroadcasting information to a broad audience. Agenda setting theory suggests that
media organizations determine what the general populations finds newsworthy and that
media coverage of certain issues raises the salience of these issues in the public’s agenda
(Carroll and McCombs 2003; McCombs and Shaw 1972). The more attention the media
gives to issues, the more likely the public will label these issues as important. This theory
does not predict that the media will be successful in informing the public how they should
feel about certain issues, but rather what issues they should think about. Thus, media
coverage is thought to be a reasonable indicator of the public’s knowledge about a firm
(Deephouse 2000).
Negative media attention, in particular, has created a risky arena for managing
corporate reputation.39 In other areas of accounting research, negative media coverage has
been associated with an increased cost of capital (Kothari et al. 2009), decreased stock
price (Weber et al. 2008), increased stock return volatility (Kothari et al. 2009), and

38

Miller (2006) presents evidence consistent with the dual role of the business press, where it both
rebroadcasts information and conducts original investigation. Consistent with the media uncovering private
information, the author finds that the press often publishes articles regarding accounting fraud prior to public
acknowledgment by the firm or by the SEC.
39
Individuals are often biased towards negative information, which is viewed as more salient and can be
over-weighted in subsequent decision-making (Bednar et al. 2013). This general principle, termed negativity
bias, is found across a broad range of psychological phenomena (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, and
Vohs 2001). Because individuals have limited cognitive resources, negative information receives more
processing prominence and contributes more strongly to final impressions than positive information. Thus,
it is mere human nature for the media and corporate stakeholders to focus on negative events.
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increased likelihood of forced executive turnover (Farrell and Whidbee 2002). 40 This body
of literature documents that negative media coverage can cause reputational and actual
damage to the covered company. Given the broad dissemination of the media, negative
media coverage is likely to be especially salient to certain stakeholders and can trigger
change in which decision makers take action to protect reputation (Bednar et al. 2013). In
this study, a company’s external auditor is the stakeholder of primary interest.
Auditor Risk Assessment of Client Negative Media Coverage
Evidence of the role of negative media coverage in an audit setting is limited (Joe 2003;
Mutchler, Hopwood, and McKeown 1997; Frost 1991). The referenced studies employ
experimental methodology and find that media coverage of financial statement related
issues (i.e., debt default or loss contingencies) is associated with modification of the audit
opinion. While this finding is interesting given that auditors are expected to possess
independent and proprietary knowledge about their clients (Joe 2003), it is limited in its
generalizability. For one, archival evidence of auditor response to media coverage has not
been documented. Additionally, it is unclear whether auditors consider coverage of issues
unrelated to the audit process to be important. These unrelated issues, such as child labor
or local pollution, lie outside of the primary audit process and thus, an auditor’s realm of
consideration. However, coverage of unrelated issues may prove valuable to an auditors’
risk assessment of current clients in a unique way. Specifically, audit client negative media
coverage may escalate into auditor reputation risk.
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Further, two recent working papers suggest that negative media attention influences change at the covered
company. Chen, Powers, and Stomberg (2015) find that firms react to negative media attention about their
tax practices by decreasing income tax footnote disclosure readability, but not their actual tax avoidance.
Conversely, Dhaliwal, Goodman, Hoffman, and Schwab (2016) find that firms with negative media scrutiny
during the Occupy Wall Street window exhibit lower levels of tax avoidance in the following periods.
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Although auditor reputation risk is not formally expressed in the components of the
audit risk model (PCAOB 2010a), an auditor may set audit risk more stringently when
there are greater perceived consequences of an incorrect opinion. This can occur when a
client is already under media scrutiny, and an auditor believes that its engagement may also
receive media attention. Additionally, when a client is subject to negative media coverage,
an auditor’s reputation may decline merely because of an association with that client, even
if the auditor fully complies with auditing standards (Houston et al. 1999). While the
auditor is most likely not responsible for the actions that lead to the negative media
coverage, it may nonetheless affect its own reputation. That is, the auditor may be
perceived guilty by association, which will impact its overall reputation risk.
If auditors perceive there to be risks of reputation spillover, they are motivated to
digest news about their clients’ practices to avoid losses to their own business. In this way,
client practices that the media is bringing to the public’s attention that may not otherwise
impact traditional engagement risk considerations are incorporated into auditor risk
assessment.
Auditor Risk Response to Client Negative Media Coverage
Given the logic presented above, an audit firm is motivated to monitor media criticism of
their clients and consider whether their firm could face increased reputation risk as a result.
We now turn to predicting how auditors respond when this risk is perceived. Auditors face
a risk and return trade-off decision when managing client relationships (Johnstone and
Bedard 2003). Risk management is crucial for audit firms, who seek to balance the
possibility of business losses (e.g., loss of clients, employees, need to offer fee discounts,
etc.) stemming from increased auditor reputation risk with the desire for client revenue.
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If client negative media coverage increases auditor reputation risk, audit firms will
presumably take action to compensate for reputation-related losses and to avoid future
reputation damage. The COSO (2004) ERM framework provides a useful guide to examine
the potential response to this risk.41 In the risk response phase of COSO (2004), an entity
seeks appropriate action to align risk with associated tolerances and appetite. These
responses include: avoid, accept, reduce, and share. The chosen risk response must be
realistic, taking into account costs and benefits of responding to the associated risk (i.e.,
the reasonableness of response choice and severity given additional risk burden). In a
review of auditor response to litigation risk, DeFond and Zhang (2014) identify the
following responses: (a) reducing or bearing risk by adjusting audit fees and (b) avoiding
risk through client retention and acceptance. We hypothesize that these are also the primary
options in responding to increased reputation risk.
Risk Response: Avoidance
An avoidance response entails exiting the activity giving rise to risk (COSO 2004). Audit
firms can avoid future reputation risk by departing from a controversial client. Recently,
the literature has shown that auditors consider multiple risk factors – audit risk, business
risk, and auditor litigation risk – in resignation decisions (Ghosh and Yang 2015). The
avoidance response suggests that no response can be identified that can reduce risk
consequences to an acceptable level (COSO 2004). When a client creates an unacceptable
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This framework is a detailed guide by which companies can approach risk management. In an omission
that has been noted by many scholars (e.g., Eccles, Newquist, and Schatz 2007), reputation risk is surprisingly
absent from the framework. While the framework is designed for client’s to assess their own business risks,
it is also helpful for the auditor to incorporate this understanding of business risk into their own risk
assessment process.
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level of risk for the audit firm, auditors may choose to resign to avoid negative
consequences. We predict this in our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of an auditor change is positively associated with
client negative media coverage.
Risk Response: Reduce or Share
A reduction or sharing response reduces risk to an acceptable level by transferring a portion
of the risk (COSO 2004). If an audit firm does not deem risk to be egregious enough to
warrant resignation, they may reduce risk by transferring it to the client through pricing
decisions. Under the Simunic (1980) audit fee model, audit fees could increase for at least
two reasons. First, risk may impact the production component of the audit fee model. If the
potential for reputation risk spillover exists and an auditor limits the acceptable level of
audit risk, the auditor may increase effort in response. Second, risk may impact the
expected loss component of the model, where reputation risk increases the expected future
losses from reputation losses. An auditor can still face reputation damage even when in full
compliance with auditing standards, so increased effort does not eliminate reputation risk
(DeFond and Zhang (2014). In this case, the auditor may charge the client a fee premium
as compensation for the additional reputation risk. The auditor has incentives to be
aggressive with risky clients to minimize potential reputation loss. Presumably, risky
clients are not in a position to resist a fee increase as this sort of disagreement could lead
to auditor resignation, which would create further risk and associated costs. Thus, audit
clients with greater negative media coverage may bear the expected costs of reputation risk
in the form of higher audit fees, which reflects effort, a risk premium, or both.
Recent literature has found support for the pricing of client misconduct, as
evidenced by a positive association between a misconduct incident and audit fees
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(Donohue and Knechel 2014; Lyon and Maher 2005; Ye, Simunic, and Li 2016). 42 We
expect consistent reactions to our broad media-based measures and predict this in our
second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Audit fees are positively associated with client negative media
coverage.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
Sample
Our sample consists of 7,754 firm-years covered in the RepRisk database from 2007201443 and with complete dependent and control variable data in Compustat and Audit
Analytics. Information on the derivation of our final sample can be found in Table 2.1.
[INSERT TABLE 2.1 HERE]
Measuring Clients’ Negative Media Coverage
Our study relies on the RepRisk database to measure client negative media coverage. This
unique database contains various measures of negative media coverage of environmental,
social, and governance issues of companies. 44 Whereas previous media literature limits
search to selected major news sources to identify articles that are most salient to the public,
this database allows for an aggregation of over 80,000 media sources into a composite
metric. Since collection is broad, RepRisk likely provides a more accurate measure of

42

Lyon and Maher (2005) present international evidence of a significant association between alleged client
misconduct, as measured by the payment of bribes to high-level foreign government officials, and audit fees.
They encourage future research to examine other types of misconduct unrelated to auditors’ primary
responsibilities to see whether this association holds.
43
RepRisk coverage begins in 2007.
44
In a different context, Christensen (2016) employs a similar construct. The author defines “CSR-related
misconduct” as events related to social and environmental issues, which overlap with many of the granular
issues RepRisk collects. The author collects these incidents solely from their coverage in reputable
international business news sources (e.g., Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, etc.). Findings illustrate that
corporate accountability reports can insulate a company’s stock price decline following CSR-related
misconduct.
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overall negative media sentiment that cannot be observed by collecting data from a single
news outlet. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to use this database in the
accounting literature.45
RepRisk originated as a credit risk department at UBS, a global bank in
Switzerland. In response to a request by UBS, in 2006 RepRisk developed a proprietary
framework to identify and assess company exposure to ESG risks. Since development,
RepRisk data has been used as a metric for inclusion in the Dow Jones Sustainability
Indices, as a component of Newsweek’s Green Rankings, and as a partner to the Carbon
Disclosure Project and the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board to support the
annual review of companies’ risks and develop related standards and guidelines. RepRisk
has a variety of clients such as banks, asset managers, insurance companies, and
corporations; in fact, a recent survey of analysts at a major European bank cites RepRisk
as the primary source of corporate social performance information (Luo, Wang, Raithel,
and Zheng 2015). RepRisk has also proven to be an externally valid measure of negative
media coverage. Volkswagen is an interesting anecdote. According to internal documents,
RepRisk was the only ESG research provider to flag the ESG issues related to Volkswagen
ahead of the September 2015 emission scandal (RepRisk 2015). At a granular issue level,
they had published issues related to incorrect emission and fuel consumption statements in
2013. Confirming the comprehensive nature of collection processes, they also identified

45

In fact, the use of RepRisk in other literatures is also very limited. To the best of our knowledge, a recent
study by Kolbel et al. (2017) was the first to introduce this database to academic research. In their study, the
index of negative media coverage is employed as a measure of media-based public pressure to examine how
it impacts other elements of firm risk. We extend this logic to the auditor, a known related party to the client
being criticized.
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the 2015 scandal a day before it broke in mainstream media due to a story from a German
NGO.
To construct the database, RepRisk uses artificial intelligence to conduct searches
for negative coverage across 28 ESG issues. These issues are listed in Appendix D. Third
party sources in fifteen languages are examined (e.g. major print media, thousands of
NGOs, newsletters, news sites, governmental agencies, blogs, and social media). 46
RepRisk focuses on selectively collecting criticism or negative news on companies, which
avoids potential window-dressing (i.e. boasting of positive ESG actions to mask issues)
done in company issued reports. The 28 issues selected by RepRisk represent major
categories within a company’s environmental, social, and governance activity. 47 All
principles of the United Nations Global Compact are captured in these issues, providing
further validity to its scope. After source data is collected, trained analysts then examine
and verify the data before linking it to the 28 issue categories.
Issue data is compiled into an index that captures negative media coverage of ESG
practices. This compilation occurs using a proprietary algorithm, which calculates the
index based on the identified issues, the severity of the issues, the reach of media sources,
and the frequency and timing of information. The severity of the issue is a function of the
consequences of the issue (e.g., no further consequences, injury, death), the extent of the
issue (one person, a group of people, a large number of people), and the cause of the issue
(negligence, intent, systematic). The reach of the media source is a pre-classified

46

RepRisk constructs its universe of companies with a data-driven approach. Specifically, the granular issues
are comprehensively collected using artificial intelligence, and a company is included in the sample to the
extent they have had an ESG issue over the period 2007-2015.
47
These issues encompass individual reputation risk factors that have been examined in prior literature. For
instance, the illegal bribery that Lyon and Maher (2005) examine would be captured by this issue search in
the governance category: “corruption, bribery, extortion, money laundering.”
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determination, where international media (e.g., Financial Times, New York Times, BBC,
etc.) is weighted higher in the index than low influence sources such as local media, blogs,
and internet sites.48 Further, the frequency and timing of the issue is important because
news is only entered into the database to impact the index once, unless escalated to a more
influential source (e.g. a Wall Street Journal article results in a larger index increase than a
blog entry), appears again after six weeks, or additional issues related to the story emerge.
Test Variables
Our primary test variables include (a) a continuous index measure of negative media
coverage of client ESG practices (NEG_MEDIA), and (b) granular measures of the
existence of environmental, social, and governance coverage (E_ISSUE, S_ISSUE, and
G_ISSUE). Given the availability of monthly data in RepRisk, we are uniquely able to
match the timing of our test and dependent variables. To match the RepRisk data with firmspecific information in Compustat and Audit Analytics, we transform the monthly data for
these data points by taking the maximum index within a specific period. 49 For the primary
analyses, the index is taken within the audit negotiation period, when an audit firm makes
client retention and fee contract decisions (Hackenbrack et al. 2014). 50 This negotiation

48

We manually verify well-known ESG incidents within this granular data. Specifically, we traced coverage
moving from low to high severity and low to high reach and it’s consistent with descriptions of the variables
provided by RepRisk. For example, in November of 2009 Apple Inc. experienced negative media coverage
of their use of child labor, damaging their reputation. RepRisk data shows the index jumping from 24 to 39
in November of 2009, when multiple issues of high severity were identified in the following categories:
supply chain, poor employment conditions, occupational health and safety, human rights, and child abuse.
These issues had been previously identified in less influential media sources, but the index was further
increased as negative media coverage escalated.
49
We use the maximum index because the auditor is likely to react to peak risk, rather than average risk.
Results are consistent if the average over the negotiation period is taken.
50
Hackenbrack et al. (2014) interview Big 4 partners to develop a timeline for auditor-client negotiations.
Findings show that the engagement letter is a fixed fee contract and that subsequent billing in addition to the
negotiated audit fee is rare. Because it is difficult to alter the negotiated fee, auditors spend time considering
new developments in standards, client operations, client industry, and the economy before engagement letter
signing.
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concludes with engagement letter signing during the first quarter of the fiscal year under
audit; thus, to capture risk most salient to the negotiation, negative media coverage is
measured within the six months that span the fourth quarter of t-1 and the first quarter of t.
Figure 2.1, which is adapted from Hackenbrack et al. (2014), provides further information
on the timing of risk measurement. Our primary measure of negative media coverage is
NEG_MEDIA, which is measured as the index during the negotiation period, adjusted by
the mean index for all companies in the sample measured during the negotiation period. 51
[INSERT FIGURE 2.1 HERE]
RepRisk provides rich issue data, which we also examine in our study. We create
three indicator variables for the coverage of an issue in each of the following categories:
environment, social and governance, E_ISSUE, S_ ISSUE, and G_ ISSUE, respectively.
These variables are equal to one if a firm year has a granular issue within the respective
broad category, and zero otherwise. Environmental issues surround those related to a
company’s environmental footprint and include pollution, overuse of resources, waste
issues, animal mistreatment, etc. Social issues surround community and employee relations
and include human rights and discrimination as well as labor issues. Lastly, governance
issues range from corruption to executive compensation, anti-competitive practices, and
fraud.
Measuring Auditor Response
Auditor Change and Resignations
To test H1, we regress NEG_MEDIA on the likelihood of auditor change.
AUDITORCHANGE is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm-year observation has an

51

This adjustment is made to address the expansion of RepRisk operations and ability to measure reputation
risk over our sample period, which resulted in more risks identified over time.
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auditor change in the current year. We also examine the impact of NEG_MEDIA on
RESIGN, which is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm-year observation has an
auditor resignation in the current year. H1 predicts that

will be positive and significant

in both models. We also present separate models that replace NEG_MEDIA with E_ ISSUE,
S_ ISSUE, and G_ISSUE, and expect each of these issue indicators to be positive and
significant.
/
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Our empirical models control for other known factors that affect auditor changes (e.g.,
Stefaniak, Robertson, and Houston 2009; Mande and Son 2013). We expect auditor
changes to occur more frequently when: firms are larger (LNASSETS), less profitable
(ROA), riskier (LEVERAGE, SALESGROWTH, ZSCORE), have merger and acquisition
events (MA), and have foreign operations (FOREIGN). We also expect auditor changes to
occur more frequently when clients have a higher risk of material misstatement
(P_SCORE), when the auditor discloses a restatement or going concern (RESTATEMENT,
GC), when audit fees are low (LOGAUDITFEES) and when the auditor is not an industry
expert (INDUSTRYEXP). The models also control for year and industry (two-digit SIC
code) fixed effects and standard errors are clustered by firm.
Audit Fees
To test H2, we regress the negative media coverage measures on the natural logarithm of
audit fees (LOGAUDITFEES). According to predictions in H2, we expect

to be positive

when estimating the total audit fees paid. Consistent with the auditor change model
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presented, we present three additional models that replace NEG_MEDIA with E_ISSUE,
S_ISSUE, and G_ISSUE.
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(2)

We remove any firm that had an auditor change from this sample to adequately test our
prediction that if the auditor does not avoid reputation risk, they share the risk burden
through fees. Following a recent literature synthesis by DeFond and Zhang (2014), we
include a variety of known factors that impact audit fees. All variable measurements are
defined in Appendix E. We expect higher fees among larger (LNASSETS), riskier
(LEVERAGE,

ZSCORE,

P_SCORE,

RESTATEMENT,

MW),

lower

performing

(SALESGROWTH, ROA, GC), more complex (MA, FOREIGN, SEGMENTS), when the
auditor is an industry expert (INDUSTRYEXP), and for firms with year-end that is during
the auditor’s busy season (FYE_DEC).52 The models also control for year and industry
fixed effects and standard errors are clustered by firm.
IV. RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.2 displays summary statistics of test, dependent, and control variables (Panel A)
and a correlation matrix of these variables (Panel B). The raw values of RepRisk’s index
within our sample have a median of 0 and a mean of 10.171. The median of 0 represents
companies who have had negative media coverage in the past, but not in the current

52

Due to a high correlation between auditor size and industry expertise (INDUSTRYEXP), we do not control
for auditor size in the tabled results. However, results are consistent when INDUSTRYEXP is substituted with
a Big 6 indicator.
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negotiation period. According to RepRisk, the mean value falls within the low media
exposure bucket. In fact, the large majority of observations have low media exposure,
making any variation in this measure meaningful. Given a rising trend in raw index values
throughout the sample period, we employ a NEG_MEDIA measure adjusted by negotiation
period mean in all analyses. Summary statistics of indicators for environmental, social, and
governance issues are also displayed. 12.6 percent of firm-year observations in our sample
have environmental issues, 16.0 percent have social issues, and 10.7 percent have
governance issues.
[INSERT TABLE 2.2 HERE]
To validate that negative media coverage is associated with audit client reputation
damage that could spill over to the auditor, we examine its correlation with two popular
reputation rankings. Fortune magazine produces a Most Admired companies list and
Newsweek produces a Green rankings list. These rankings consider both positive and
negative aspects of reputation. As we expect, our primary measure of client negative media
coverage (NEG_MEDIA) is negatively correlated with these rankings.
Table 2.2, Panel A also presents descriptive statistics for the for dependent and
control variables. Audit fees are, on average, $3,837,775, and 2.9 percent of observations
within our sample have an auditor switch during the year. Other firm characteristics are
disclosed and are consistent with prior literature.
Table 2.3 displays industry distribution within our sample, as well as NEG_MEDIA
values and frequency of granular ESG issues within these industries. For the sake of
presentation, we use the Fama-French 12 industry classification. While the industry
distribution is fairly even, a few industries stand out, including manufacturing, business
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equipment, wholesale, and other. However, these are not the industries with the highest
NEG_MEDIA, which provides comfort that our sample is not purely weighted towards
those receiving the highest negative media coverage. Industries with the highest
NEG_MEDIA values include consumer nondurable goods, chemical and allied products,
and utilities. The industry breakdown of ESG issues is also interesting and may encourage
future research.
[INSERT TABLE 2.3 HERE]
Multivariate Results
Auditor Change: Results of Testing H1
Table 2.4 presents the results of estimating equation (1), which examines the association
of client negative media coverage and the likelihood of an auditor change occurring. Each
column represents a different measure of client negative media coverage. Column (1)
suggests that overall coverage of ESG practices, as measured by NEG_MEDIA, is
positively associated with the likelihood of an auditor change occurring. This finding
supports H1. This result is also economically significant. We calculate the economic
significance as the change in the likelihood of auditor change when NEG_MEDIA moves
from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile. Holding all factors at their sample mean, we
observe a 10.52 percent increase in auditor change likelihood.
[INSERT TABLE 2.4 HERE]
We also examine whether auditor changes are more likely in response to all types
of media coverage compiled into NEG_MEDIA. Interestingly, we do not find a significant
response to coverage of environmental and social issues, but do find a significant effect for
coverage of governance issues. Here, we calculate economic significance as the change in
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the likelihood of auditor change when G_ISSUE moves from zero to one. A firm with
coverage of a governance issue is associated with a 40.88 percent increase in the likelihood
of auditor change when all other variables are measured at their sample mean. 53 Combined,
these granular results suggest that an auditor is more likely to respond to coverage of
governance issues and that these issues are driving the positive association with the index
measurement. These results suggest that coverage of governance issues is most likely to
generate auditor reputation risk, which is not surprising considering the auditor’s proximity
to client governance.
Our theory is particularly focused on resignations, as we argue that the auditor
initiates the change to avoid reputation risk spillover. However, an auditor change is not
often classified as a resignation or dismissal because disclosure of reasoning beyond
accounting disagreements is voluntary and infrequent (Hackenbrack and Hogan 2002). For
this reason, we employ an auditor change variable in Table 2.4 that captures both
resignations and dismissals and conduct sensitivity analyses to ensure our interpretation
that auditors depart from controversial clients when an unacceptable level of risk is created
is valid. Specifically, we replace the dependent variable of our H1 analysis with RESIGN.
Table 2.5 presents results of this analysis. 54 Results show that client negative media
coverage is positively associated with the likelihood of resignation and that the likelihood
of resignation increases by 19.50 percent as NEG_MEDIA moves from the 25th to 75th

53

It is important to note that the economic significance in models with an indicator variable capturing a low
frequency event (e.g., auditor changes or resignations) will be relatively high. This is primarily because our
calculation holds all other variables at their sample mean, when they would likely be changing at the same
time.
54
The sample size reported in Table 2.5 is smaller than in Table 2.4. This is expected, as the number of
observations differs across logit models because observations with perfect prediction of success or failure are
dropped from analysis. For example, in Model (1) 203 observations with a two-digit SIC code of 37 are
dropped because there are no observations in the transportation equipment industry that have an auditor
resignation (i.e., the industry fixed effect perfectly predicts failure).
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percentile. Consistent with our H1 findings, auditors appear to resign in response to
coverage of governance issues only. Notwithstanding the unreliable nature of the
classification into resignations and dismissals, this finding supports our interpretation that
auditors initiate the change when risks become too egregious to accept.
[INSERT TABLE 2.5 HERE]
Audit Fees: Results of Testing H2
Table 2.6, Panel A presents the results of estimating equation (2), which examines the
association of client negative media coverage and audit fees. Results in Column 1 suggest
that client negative media coverage, as measured by NEG_MEDIA, is positively associated
with audit fees. This result is also economically significant. Holding other variables at their
sample mean, when NEG_MEDIA moves from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, we
find a 4.79 percent increase in audit fees, which is a substantial and equals $101,584 for an
average firm. We further investigate the strength of these findings in Panels B and C of
Table 2.6. Panel B presents a model which shows the one-year change in NEG_MEDIA is
also positively associated with a one-year change in audit fees. This provides stronger
evidence that the positive association with audit fees is in response to increased negative
media coverage.55
[INSERT TABLE 2.6 HERE]
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In untabulated analyses, we also test for an association between NEG_MEDIA and the auditor response
variables before coverage became high-profile. Specifically, we isolate our sample to firms that are not in the
top decile of NEG_MEDIA in the current year but are in the following year. If our response variables are
driven by inherent characteristics of these companies, we would detect an association with the likelihood of
auditor change and audit fees even in the year before coverage becomes high-profile (i.e., when NEG_MEDIA
is low). In contrast, if auditor response is in fact due to increased negative media coverage as our results
suggest, then we should not find an association at this time. Consistent with the latter, we find no association
between NEG_MEDIA and auditor changes or fees within this isolated sample (i.e., during the period where
negative media is low). This null result provides further support for the conclusion that NEG_MEDIA is
driving auditor response and not a confounding variable.
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In Table 2.6, Panel A we also find that audit fees are positively associated with all
three issue categories, suggesting that audit fees reflect coverage of environmental, social,
and governance issues. This is in contrast to our findings for H1, where auditor changes
appear to be primarily driven by coverage of governance issues. Combined, these results
are interesting and suggest that auditors will choose a more severe reaction, such as
resignation, only for firms with governance-driven coverage. In contrast, our evidence
shows that increasing audit fees is the more common response to coverage of
environmental and social issues. We perform coefficient comparison tests to determine
whether coverage of governance issues is priced more than coverage of environmental and
social issues. We find that coverage of governance issues has a greater impact on audit fees
than coverage of social issues (p<0.10), but is not significantly different from coverage of
environmental issues (p>0.10). Coverage of environmental and social issues are also not
significantly different (p>0.10).
Overall these results support H2. The finding that client negative media coverage
is positively associated with audit fees suggests that audit fees reflect increased effort, a
risk premium, or both. Further, this evidence that auditors are successfully able to increase
fees may indicate that auditors have greater negotiating power over clients with reputation
pressures. These clients likely wish to avoid disagreements with their auditor that could
lead to further negative media coverage and reputation consequences, and therefore may
be more likely to agree to share risk with their auditor.
To explore this explanation, Panel C presents an analysis that examines the timing
of the peak in a client’s negative media coverage during different periods of the audit
process to determine whether an auditor reacts in periods where negotiation is likely to
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occur. Figure 2.1 depicts the timing of each variable’s measurement. To execute this
analysis, we isolate NEG_MEDIA that peaks in certain periods while remaining low in
others. Specifically, we remove the middle quintile of NEG_MEDIA and measure peak
coverage as the top two quintiles and low risk as the bottom two quintiles.
In Column (1), we examine coverage that peaks in the previous period but is low
in the negotiation and subsequent period. To capture this, NEGMEDIA_PEAK_PRIOR is
an indicator variable equal to one if NEG_MEDIA within the first through third quarters of
t-1 is in the top two quintiles and if NEG_MEDIA in the fourth quarter of t-1 and throughout
year t is in the bottom two quintiles. This effectively compares coverage that peaks in prior
periods versus coverage that remains low throughout. The null finding in this column
illustrates that negative coverage in previous periods is not associated with auditors’
response in the current period (i.e., audit fees in period t). One interpretation of this finding
is that auditors do not increase audit fees (via effort) based on risks identified in the prior
audit, which is not surprising given the stickiness of audit fees.
In Column (2), we examine coverage that peaks in the negotiation period but is
negligible within the subsequent period. With this sort of coverage peak, we predict that
an auditor will adjust their fees due to reputation concerns in advance of the audit’s
conduct. NEGMEDIA_PEAK_NEGOT is an indicator variable equal to one if
NEG_MEDIA within the negotiation period (i.e., the fourth quarter of t-1 and the first
quarter of t) is in the top two quintiles and if NEG_MEDIA in the subsequent period (i.e.
the second through fourth quarters of t) is in the bottom two quintiles. The positive
association detected between NEGMEDIA_PEAK_NEGOT and LOGAUDITFEES
suggests that negative coverage that peaks in the negotiation period is more strongly
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incorporated into pricing than risk that is low throughout. An auditor appears to incorporate
risk into the fixed fee contract rather than subsequently billing the client for the risk in later
periods (Hackenbrack et al. 2014).
Lastly, in Column (3), we test the opposite of Column (2), where coverage peaks
in the subsequent period but is

negligible during the negotiation period.

NEGMEDIA_PEAK_SUBSEQ is an indicator variable equal to one if NEG_MEDIA within
the period subsequent to the negotiation period is in the top two quintiles and if
NEG_MEDIA in the negotiation period is in the bottom two quintiles. Results show a
significant and positive association between NEGMEDIA_PEAK_SUBSEQ and
LOGAUDITFEES, which suggests that when negative coverage appears during the audit,
procedures are in fact adjusted as expected in a risk of material misstatement explanation.
However, we observe that the magnitude of the coefficient in Column (2) is more than
double the magnitude of the coefficient in Column (3), which suggest that the economic
effect is more salient when coverage peaks during the negotiation period. Overall this
analysis suggests that auditor response is stronger in the negotiation period when the fee
premium is set than in the subsequent period when effort is altered. This is consistent with
the risk sharing response under COSO.
Supplemental Analyses
Reaction to Level of Media Sources
Table 2.7 presents results examining audit fee response when identified issues move from
low reach media sources (e.g., social media, blogs, etc.) to high reach media sources (e.g.,
The Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, etc.). Regardless of how publicized issues are,
an auditor is expected to incorporate any risk that could result in material misstatement in

68

their audit plan. Thus, if our measures are reflective of the risk of material misstatement,
we would expect a response regardless of the reach of media source and would not expect
a significant response when publicity increases. However, if our measure is reflective of
reputation risk, we would expect a significant response when an issue moves from a low
reach media source to a high reach media source.56 This movement increases visibility on
a risky client and its auditor. LOWHIGH_SUM is a count variable of individual issues (as
displayed in Appendix D) that move from a low reach media source in t-1 to a high reach
media source in t. In Column (1) we measure these variables in time t+1 to examine
whether fees are impacted in the year prior to when coverage of the issue moves from low
to high reach. We do not detect a significant association between LOWHIGH_SUM_LEAD
and LOGAUDITFEES. It does not appear that auditors react to coverage in low reach media
sources in the year before the coverage is elevated to high reach sources. This again
suggests that results are reflective of reputation risk and not the risk of material
misstatement; if so, an auditor would have increased effort regardless of the media outlet.
Conversely, in Column (2) we find a significant and positive association between
LOWHIGH_SUM and LOGAUDITFEES, which suggests that pricing is impacted when an
issue is elevated from a low to high reach media source. Given the media’s influence on
public opinion, this is consistent with auditors reacting to protect their reputation in
response to a client’s high-profile negative media coverage.
[INSERT TABLE 2.7 HERE]
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For example, Safeway, Inc. had highly publicized ESG issues (product-related health and environmental
issues, supply chain, and corruption) in 2010. These issues were identified in low reach media sources (e.g.,
blogs, internet sites) earlier, in 2009. Because auditors continuously monitor client risk factors, they
presumably had knowledge of these issues even when they were reported in low reach media in 2009. The
analysis in Table 7 examines auditor response when issues, such as this example, are in low reach media
sources, and when they move from low to high reach media sources.
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Investigating Alternative Explanations
In addition to the explanation that auditors react to protect their reputation by resigning
from risky clients and charging a fee premium to clients they retain, we must also explore
whether the positive association between client negative media coverage and audit fees is
reflective of the auditors’ increased effort. Specifically, if the media reveal private
information on inherent or control risk factors that an auditor has no previous knowledge
of, an auditor’s judgment of the risk of material misstatement may increase. When this
occurs, the audit risk model illustrates that an auditor should alter the nature, extent, and
timing of procedures to maintain the target level of total audit risk (PCAOB 2010b). We
conduct multiple supplemental analyses to ensure that our audit fee results are not driven
by this increased effort explanation, which would be inconsistent with reputation motivated
responses.
Sample Isolations
Table 2.8 presents results estimating our main hypotheses in samples where firm-years
with various risk issues are removed. Our results could be confounded if NEG_MEDIA is
associated with the risk of material misstatement or financial risk. The first two columns
of each panel remove firms with high risk of material misstatement. In the first column,
firms who fail Benford’s law are removed. 57 Amiram et al. (2015) demonstrate that
disagreement with Benford’s law can be used as a proxy for the level of error in financial
statements. In the second column, firms with high pre-audit misstatement risk (Lobo and
Zhao 2013; estimated using the Dechow et al. (2011) predicted probability of
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Benford’s law states that in random samples, the leading digits of all numeric values will conform to the
Benford distribution, where increasing numbers appear with decreasing frequency (Hill 1995; Amiram et
al. 2015).
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misstatement) are removed. Columns 3 and 4 of each panel remove firms with high levels
of financial risk, which could materialize in audit risk. In the third column, firms with
decreased sales are removed. In the fourth column, firms with negative stock returns are
moved.
[INSERT TABLE 2.8 HERE]
In both Panels A and B of Table 2.8, we find that results are consistent regardless
of the sample isolation. Even when firms perform well (in terms of financial reporting
quality and accounting/market performance), auditors still appear to react to client negative
media coverage. This suggests that NEG_MEDIA captures risk incremental to those that
are typically monitored by the external auditor.
Abnormal Audit Fee Measure
To examine the robustness of our finding that auditors price client negative media
coverage, we use the Lobo and Zhao (2013) abnormal audit fee measure as our dependent
variable, which measures fees beyond the expected level under normal circumstances.
ABFEE is defined as the difference between the actual and fitted values of audit fees
estimated as a function of misstatement risk and other control variables (Lobo and Zhao
2013). Table 2.9 presents results re-estimating Model (2) with ABFEE as the dependent
variable. Results are consistent, which suggests that fees are capturing risks not expected
from client characteristics and risk factors.
[INSERT TABLE 2.9 HERE]
Impact on Business Risk and Financial Reporting Failures
We also examine whether client negative media coverage of ESG practices results in risk
of material misstatement that materializes, as evidenced by the effect of NEG_MEDIA on
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traditional business risk and financial reporting quality measures. An increase in the risk
of material misstatement without change to audit procedures is likely to lead to
misstatements in those periods; we, therefore, examine the association between
NEG_MEDIA and the likelihood of misstatement. We also examine three other commonly
examined outcomes of the audit process: the likelihood of going concern, material
weakness, and the amount of discretionary accruals. Table 2.10, Panel A presents findings
within our full sample. Results illustrate that NEG_MEDIA is not significantly associated
with any of these outcomes. These findings suggest that our media-based measure does not
impact the risk of material misstatement, or that auditors respond to an increased risk of
material misstatement by altering procedures to prevent poor financial reporting quality.
[INSERT TABLE 2.10 HERE]
To examine the latter explanation, we conduct further analysis. Specifically, it is
possible that client negative media coverage is reflective of the risk of material
misstatement and that auditors mitigate this risk by performing additional work (Gaynor,
Kelton, Mercer, and Yohn 2016). Therefore, if NEG_MEDIA is, in fact, reflective of the
risk of material misstatement and an auditor does not increase its effort (e.g., increase
hours, use higher level labor, hire specialists, etc.), NEG_MEDIA will be positively
associated with the outcome variables. To examine this possibility, we repeat the analysis
in Table 2.10, Panel A within firm-year observations where audit fees do not increase.
Panel B presents results of this analysis and again shows no significant association between
NEG_MEDIA and any of the outcome measures. In sum, even when auditors do not
increase their effort, financial reporting failures do not increase. These results provide some
evidence that our main findings are not driven by the risk of material misstatement.
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Impact on Audit Delay
Client negative media coverage could lead to delays in the audit if it is indicative of
additional risk of material misstatement, which would require increased effort (Ettredge,
Li, and Sun 2006). We conduct analysis examining the impact of client negative media
coverage on audit report delays. For this analysis, negative media coverage is measured
during the last quarter of t and the first quarter of t+1, which reflects the period during
which risk could cause auditors to delay signing and releasing the report due to the need to
adjust procedures. AUDITREPORTLAG is measured as the number of days between the
fiscal year end date and the audit report date minus the SEC’s filing deadline requirement
(60, 75, and 90 days for large accelerated, accelerated, and non-accelerated filers,
respectively) (Hoitash and Hoitash 2016). We do not detect an association between
negative media coverage during this period and AUDITREPORTLAG (untabulated). This
suggests that when coverage peaks during the period in which the auditor releases their
report, they do not increase effort to the extent that delays the release of the audit report.
This is inconsistent with a risk of material misstatement explanation and provides further
support for a fee premium/reputation explanation.
Correcting for Potential Selection Bias
Since not all Compustat firms are covered by RepRisk, there is potential that selection bias
is influencing our results (i.e., firm characteristics that determine coverage in the RepRisk
database also influence dependent variables). In untabulated analyses, we empirically
control for a potential selection bias issue through Heckman correction (Heckman 1979).
To do so, we use a two-stage model, wherein the first stage we estimate the likelihood of
being covered in the RepRisk database (i.e., receiving negative media coverage) as a
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function of size and performance controls, as well as dummies for the state of
incorporation. These indicators serve as instrumental variables as they are not present in
the second stage model, where we use the inverse Mills ratio to control for selection bias
in our auditor change audit and audit fee models. Findings are consistent with our main
results.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Despite the importance of reputation to an audit firm, there is limited evidence of auditor
reputation risk as a contributing factor to an auditors’ risk response. In this study, we
explore auditors’ pricing and client retention strategies in response to client negative media
coverage. We present new data, which has not been used in the accounting literature, that
quantifies negative media coverage of environmental, social, and governance activities.
We argue that reputation damage from this coverage can spill over to impact an auditor’s
reputation and that auditors are likely to respond to protect their reputation. In contrast,
since these activities do not directly relate to audit risk, it is possible that the auditor will
not react at all.
Consistent with our predictions, this study provides some of the most direct
evidence to date of auditor reputation risk being an important risk consideration for external
auditors. Using a large longitudinal sample of U.S. public companies from 2007 to 2014,
we find that client negative media coverage is positively associated with the likelihood of
auditor change and audit fees. We attribute this reputation effect to the salience of ESG
news in modern media and the consequences an audit firm could face from their
associations with risky clients. We conduct supplemental analyses to illustrate that the
response detected is incremental to that explained by an auditor’s traditional risk
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considerations. It appears that reputation risks can be egregious enough for auditors to react
through both avoidance and sharing channels even when financial risk and the risk of
material misstatement are not impacted.
We also find that the impact of client negative media coverage on auditor response
is not homogenous. Specifically, results suggest that auditors are more likely to depart in
response to the negative coverage of governance issues. This is consistent with media
dependency theory, under which stakeholders are likely to have a differentiated
dependency on dimensions of corporate reputation. Einwiller et al. (2010) theorize that
stakeholders are more dependent on the news media to learn about attributes of a firm’s
reputation that are important to them. Conversely, coverage of environmental, social, and
governance issues are all positively associated with audit fees, suggesting that audit fees
are a mechanism to share many risk burdens with the client.
Our study has several limitations. First, we are limited in interpreting our finding
for audit fees due to the archival nature of our data. Without data on actual audit hours and
billing rates, we cannot measure directly whether an auditor increases effort or charges a
premium in response to client negative media coverage. Despite conducting a battery of
supplemental analyses, including multiple that utilize monthly data to separate premium
and effort explanations, we still admit this shortcoming and leave the question for future
research. Second, we present comprehensive evidence of auditor response to client
negative media coverage, but do not examine positive media coverage. Using Fortune’s
Most Admired List to measure reputation, Cao, Myers, and Omer (2012) find that positive
aspects of company reputation are associated with higher-quality financial reporting. Given
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this finding, future research may consider if positive reputation characteristics insulate a
company and its related parties from damage following risky events.
Overall, the findings in this study suggest that auditors incorporate client negative
media coverage in their decisions. Managers should consider that consequences of
environmental, social, and governance-related practices can extend beyond their direct
costs, and that related parties such as the auditor are incorporating this information in their
decision-making. These results should motivate future research to consider further risk
factors independent from the risk of material misstatement that are incorporated into audit
pricing and retention decisions.

76

Part Three
Negative Media Coverage of Environmental, Social, and Governance Practices and
CEO Dismissal
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I. INTRODUCTION
This study examines negative media coverage of environmental, social, and governance
(ESG) practices as a determinant to CEO turnover events. 58 The board of directors is
responsible for turnover decisions, and understanding board sensitivity to ESG issues is
important given the rising expectation that companies “do good while doing well” (i.e.,
create a positive impact while maintaining a healthy bottom line). Reflective of this, recent
media scrutiny of company actions extends beyond financial performance (e.g., Deloitte
2014; Medland 2016). For example, Target was subject to public criticism surrounding an
expansive breach of customer information in 2013 (Sidel, Yadron, and Germano 2013).
Similarly, Volkswagen has been under fire for rigging emissions tests on millions of
vehicles (Russell, Gates, Keller, and Watkins 2016). In these two high-profile cases,
coverage of ESG issues resulted in CEO turnover. However, boards of other companies
facing similar criticism have not dismissed their CEO (e.g., Monsanto and Johnson &
Johnson). Thus, despite a rising demand for oversight of ESG issues (e.g., GSIA 2014), it
is unclear whether, on average, CEOs of companies attracting negative media coverage for
their ESG practices are significantly disciplined.
Surprisingly, there is very little research examining executive turnover following
ESG issues, including media coverage of these issues. To the best of my knowledge, there
are no studies that examine turnover resulting from an aggregate measure of ESG issues,
from environmental or social issues, nor from coverage in a diverse range of media sources.
The identified gaps in the literature motivate the current study, which seeks to understand
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As measured in this paper, environmental issues surround those related to a company’s environmental
footprint, such as pollution, overuse of resources, waste issues, and more. Social issues include community
and employee relations issues such as human rights, discrimination, and labor issues. Governance issues
include corruption, executive compensation, anti-competitive practices, and more.
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whether corporate boards hold CEOs accountable for ESG-related coverage in a broad
range of media sources.
Prior studies find an increased likelihood of CEO turnover following media
coverage of declining financial performance and financial misconduct, asserting that
negative publicity pressures corporate boards to consider corrective action (e.g., Efendi,
Files, Ouyang, and Swanson 2013; Farrell and Whidbee 2002, etc.). Yet, is not obvious
whether boards heed to this pressure when it stems from ESG issues. A CEO’s primary
objective is to deliver economic returns to shareholders (Murphy and Zimmerman 1993)
and it is oft-debated whether ESG investment adds or detracts from this objective
(Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2009). Thus, ESG practices may not play an important
role in CEO evaluation. Further, recent literature finds that negative media coverage can
be “sensational” (i.e., to provide entertainment value) and fail to cause the sort of change
one would expect (e.g., Chen, Powers, and Stomberg 2015; Core, Guay, and Larcker 2008).
If negative coverage of ESG practices is merely sensational, boards may deem it
unnecessary to hold CEOs publicly accountable. This may be particularly true for coverage
of ESG practices, wherein the media is able to choose which activities and companies to
cover since there are limited other sources for this information (Kolbel, Bush, and Jancso
2017). In these ways, it is possible that boards behave differently in response to coverage
of ESG issues than to coverage of financial performance issues. 59
Alternatively, regardless of its content, negative media coverage is likely to expand
the visibility of issues (Rhee and Valdez 2009), increase reputation risk (Fombrun and
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More specifically, information on financial performance is available via a variety of mediums (e.g., web
searches, company-issued reports, etc.). Therefore, it is unclear whether findings from studies that show a
positive association between CEO turnover and media coverage of declining financial performance and
financial misconduct (e.g., Efendi et al. 2013; Farrell and Whidbee 2002) will hold in my setting.
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Shanley 1990), and cause decision-makers to take corrective action (Bednar, Boivie, and
Prince 2013; Joe, Louis, and Robinson 2009). Since CEOs bear responsibility for oversight
regardless of their involvement, I predict that boards will be more likely to remove their
CEO when facing negative media coverage of ESG practices.
My sample consists of 9,027 firm-year observations from 2007-2015. RepRisk data
is used to uniquely measure negative media coverage relating to ESG issues. RepRisk is a
business intelligence provider that automatically collects coverage of 28 ESG issues on a
daily basis. Automatic collection allows for comprehensive coverage of a diverse range of
media sources, which are varied in their prominence (e.g., social media, blogs, major print
media, etc.). Collected data is aggregated into a continuous index using a proprietary
algorithm that incorporates the identified issues, as well as the severity of the issues (i.e.,
their consequences, extent, and cause) and the reach of media sources in which they are
identified (i.e., low reach such as a blog, or high reach such as the Wall Street Journal).
This index and indicator variables for the existence of issues in each category serve as my
primary test variables. To identify CEO succession events, initial data is collected from
Audit Analytics’ Director and Officer Changes dataset, which compiles turnover event
information as reported in 8-K filings. To focus solely on dismissals, I supplement this
with hand-collected data on the reason for CEO turnover as cited in the popular press. 60
Overall, findings support the prediction that negative media coverage of ESG
practices impacts CEO turnover events. Specifically, I find a positive association between
aggregate ESG coverage, as well as individual environmental and governance categories,
and CEO dismissal likelihood. This finding suggests that ESG issues do make their way
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Firm-year observations with a voluntary CEO turnover (i.e., one due to retirement, death, for a position
elsewhere, with individual remaining on the board, etc.) are removed from the sample for all analyses.
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into the boardroom when they are covered by the media and on average increase the
likelihood that CEOs will be held publicly accountable. Consistent with the prediction that
media coverage elevates the importance of ESG issues to board decision-making, I find
that for all three categories (i.e., environmental, social, and governance), it is only when
issues are covered by high reach media sources that CEO dismissal is more likely. 61 Thus,
firms could have severe ESG issues, but if they aren’t highly publicized, then it does not
appear that the CEO is forced out. This supports the theory that media coverage of these
issues prompts boards to remove their CEOs.
I conduct additional analyses to examine the association between negative media
coverage and CEO dismissal. First, I find that negative media coverage of environmental
and social practices has a greater impact in a sample of companies held by two popular
ESG-focused funds. Second, I find that boards that have a committee to oversee
sustainability issues are more likely to dismiss their CEO following coverage of
environmental and social issues. These two findings suggest boards that are sensitive to
ESG issues, via additional monitoring by ESG-conscious institutional ownership or a
board-level sustainability committee, are less tolerant of environmental and social
criticism. Conversely, I find that larger and busier boards are less likely to remove their
CEO following negative coverage of governance issues, which is consistent with lower
board monitoring quality. Lastly, I find that results are insensitive to financial performance
(i.e., interactions between media measures and measures of financial performance are not
significant). This partially addresses concerns that my results are solely driven by ESG
issues that harm financial performance.

61

High reach media sources include international media such as Financial Times, New York Times, and
Wall Street Journal, as well as most national and regional media.
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Following CEO dismissal, the optimal replacement strategy is unclear. Recent
anecdotes highlight that boards of troubled companies are criticized if they do not choose
an external candidate. For example, Volkswagen’s choice to hire an internal candidate with
40 years of experience at the company despite the assumed pervasiveness of their emissions
rigging scandal launched a torrent of media criticism (Boston 2015). Interestingly, whether
media coverage influences the choice of CEO successor has not been examined by prior
literature. CEO successors are most commonly selected internally (Booz and Company
2011; Conference Board 2016) and are valued due to their firm-specific knowledge
(Agrawal, Kboeber, and Tsoulouhas 2004; Datta and Guthrie 1994). In contrast, external
candidates are often hired following misconduct or missed performance expectations due
to the perception that they can change firm policies and strategies (Farrell and Whidbee
2003; Gangloff, Connelly, and Shook 2016). Therefore, within firms that dismiss their
CEO, I predict that negative media coverage of ESG practices is positively associated with
the likelihood of an external replacement. Surprisingly, I do not find support for this
prediction. I do, however, find that this association exists in the governance category.
Combined, these findings suggest that boards do not believe that environmental and social
issues warrant a need to break with former policy, but that governance issues are more
likely to tarnish reputations and abilities of internal candidates.
I also examine changes to negative media coverage following CEO dismissal and
successor choice. It is an open question whether criticism will decline following a turnover
event. The board is seemingly removing the CEO to achieve that task (Gangloff et al.
2016). However, negative media coverage may be endemic to a firm and persist even after
an executive is held accountable. Further, it is unclear whether either replacement type will
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be able to fend off media criticism. While insider replacements are seen as valuable due to
their firm-specific knowledge, they may be blinded by an established view of the company
and unable to break from prior policy (Agrawal et al. 2004). An external replacement is
seen as better able to break with former policies, but also needs to gain firm-specific
knowledge before enacting change (Shen and Canella 2002). Interestingly, I find that
negative media coverage declines when boards decide to replace the CEO, but that the
successor’s origin (i.e., external or internal) does not differentially impact future criticism.
Therefore, the conventional wisdom that external successors are necessary following
criticism is not supported in this setting.
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, I contribute to
literature on how corporate boards respond to negative media coverage. I do so using data
that comprehensively captures media coverage of ESG issues in a variety of mediums,
which extends research that examines the media’s role in corporate governance (e.g., Dyck
and Zingales 2002; Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales 2008). Interestingly, findings suggest
that highly publicized ESG issues do garner boardroom attention. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first study to document several determinants of CEO turnover,
including an aggregate ESG measure, environmental and social issues, and coverage in a
diverse range of media sources. Second, I provide evidence that boards that are sensitive
to ESG issues are more likely to dismiss their CEO when facing negative media coverage,
and particularly take environmental and social criticism more seriously. Third, findings of
this study contribute to extant research on the association between CEO turnover,
characteristics of the replacement executive, and subsequent improvement to the original
determinants of turnover (e.g. Francis, Huang, Rajgopal, and Yang 2008; Li, Sun, and
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Ettredge 2010). Specifically, negative media coverage is associated with CEO dismissal
likelihood and CEO dismissal leads to a decline in negative coverage. Lastly, results
contribute to the open debate of insider versus outsider replacement in executive succession
events (e.g. Karaevil and Zajac 2012; Boston 2015). While the media pushes boards to
choose external successors, it does not appear that boards placate this demand or that it
matters for fending off media criticism. Practically, this study provides directors and other
interested stakeholders (e.g., investors, activists, auditors, etc.) information about CEO
succession that could prove useful when facing negative media coverage.
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Negative Media Coverage of ESG Practices
Negative media coverage is likely to shape public opinion. In fact, the agenda setting
paradigm highlights that the media, through its packaging and rebroadcasting role, are
successful at forming public opinion and specifically, can raise the salience of certain
issues in the public’s agenda (Carroll and McCombs 2003; McCombs and Shaw 1972).
The more a story or issue is publicized, and therefore disseminated to parties that may be
otherwise unaware of it, the more likely the public will label it as important. The media is
thus an indicator of the public’s knowledge (Deephouse 2000) and is actively involved in
influencing public concerns. Prior media studies in the business literature most commonly
collect coverage from major international news outlets (e.g., Bednar 2012; Christensen
2016). However, in today’s corporate environment, companies face growing concerns
about the consequences of negative media coverage in a wide variety of information
sources (e.g., social media, blogs, online news, etc.) (Deloitte 2014). These less prominent
sources also influence public opinion (Carter and Bos 2017).
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This is evident in recent anecdotes, where the media creates and disseminates
information about the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practices of public
companies. Scrutiny of public companies extends beyond financial performance (Medland
2016). The media widely reports on company scandals and other misgivings. For example,
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the largest accidental release of oil into public waters,
launched a torrent of public criticism at BP that still lasts seven years later (e.g., Allen
2012). Environmental issues include pollution, overuse of resources, animal mistreatment,
and more. In another example, Apple attracted negative media attention for their use of
child labor in 2009. Criticism of social practices such as this extend beyond child labor to
include poor employment conditions, human rights abuses, discrimination, and health and
safety issues. Governance issues include corruption, bribery, misleading communication
(e.g., greenwashing), anti-competitive practices, and more. ESG issues reflect problems
that are likely to encompass both competence and integrity, and the coverage of these issues
may prove influential to both public opinion and company decision-making.
The media may be particularly powerful at influencing public opinion on ESG
issues because there are limited sources of other information about these practices (e.g.,
Aerts and Cormier 2009). Specifically, information on irresponsible practices is often
created by external observers and distributed by the media (Kolbel et al. 2017). While
various forms of non-financial reporting exist that may also provide this information, these
voluntary company-issued reports are more prone to contain positive information about
ESG practices than negative (Kolbel et al. 2017). This reporting is also still in its infancy
and because it is voluntary, there are concerns over the transparency and credibility of
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information (Huang and Watson 2015). Further, the public in general is more likely to
access and be influenced by daily media than a company-issued report.
Negative Media Coverage and CEO Dismissal
Given the prevalence and prominence of ESG criticism, potential damages associated with
negative media coverage can cause firms to take action to protect reputation (e.g., Bednar
et al. 2013; Chen et al. 2015; Dhaliwal, Goodman, Hoffman, and Schwab 2016). One
particularly intuitive consequence of negative media coverage of ESG practices is
executive turnover, yet academic research at this intersection is limited.
In contrast, research in the broader field of executive accountability is extensive
and includes evidence of an increased likelihood of CEO turnover following poor
performance (Coughlan and Schmidt 1985; Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino 2004; Jenter and
Kanaan 2015; Karaevli and Zajac 2012; Murphy and Zimmerman 1993; Weisbach 1988).
Additionally, top executives of firms that restate their earnings or issue inaccurate
management forecasts experience more turnover than executives of control firms (ArthaudDay, Certo, Dalton, and Dalton 2006; Desai, Hogan, and Wilikins 2006; Gangloff et al.
2016; Land 2012; Lee, Matshunaga, and Park 2012), and this is likely done to repair
organizational legitimacy (Feldmann, Read, and Abdolmohammadi 2009). A few of these
studies examine media coverage of these issues. For instance, Agrawal, Jaffe, and Karpoff
(1999), Farrell and Whidbee (2002), and Efendi et al. (2013) associate CEO turnover with
Wall Street Journal coverage of fraud, poor performance, and option backdating,
respectively. These studies claim that negative publicity pressures boards to consider
corrective action by holding the CEO publicly accountable.
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Prior literature has not examined whether the finding that CEO turnover follows
media coverage of financial issues holds true for ESG issues. Specifically, it is unclear
whether, on average, CEOs are dismissed following media coverage of ESG issues. 62
Given that a CEO’s primary objective is to deliver economic returns to shareholders
(Murphy and Zimmerman 1993), it is not surprising that they are held accountable for
media coverage of declining financial performance and financial misconduct (e.g., Efendi
et al. 2013; Farrell and Whidbee 2002). However, prior literature finds inconclusive
evidence for the impact of ESG investment on financial performance (Margolis et al. 2009).
Thus, if a company is performing well financially, issues such as pollution and human
rights may be considered as lower priority and not play a role in CEO evaluation. Further,
recent studies have shown that media coverage can be “sensational” and fail to cause the
sort of change one would expect. Chen et al. (2015) find that firms do not decrease tax
avoidance in response to negative media coverage of the practice, but rather decrease
disclosure readability as a means to curtail media attention. Similarly, Core et al. (2008)
do not find that CEO turnover increases or CEO pay decreases following negative coverage
of CEO pay. If media coverage of a company’s ESG issues is merely sensational, a
company may deem it unnecessary to hold the CEO accountable, and pursue corrective
action in other ways. For these reasons, it is possible that CEOs are not held accountable
for ESG issues.
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Two recent studies examine a construct related to ESG, using aggregate activity-based measures of
corporate social responsibility (CSR). Chiu and Sharfman (2016) find that corporate social irresponsibility is
positively associated with CEO turnover likelihood, and Hubbard, Christensen, and Graffin (2017) find that
investments in CSR amplify the association between financial performance and CEO turnover likelihood.
These studies did not examine media coverage of these issues, nor did they disaggregate the construct into
ESG-related components.
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Alternatively, there are viable arguments that a CEO dismissal would follow
negative media coverage of ESG practices. As the highest-level executive, a CEO bears
responsibility for organizational decisions and actions, including a company’s vision,
strategic direction, policies, and culture (Flatt, Harris-Boundy, and Wagner 2013).
Although it is impossible for CEOs to make all decisions within a company, they are
positioned in an oversight role and can be held responsible for decisions and actions at all
levels (e.g., Deloitte 2014; Farrell and Whidbee 2002). Recently, companies are expected
to create value for both shareholders and stakeholders (Porter and Kramer 2011), which
requires monitoring of both financial and ESG issues. Therefore, following negative media
coverage of ESG practices, directors may be more likely to dismiss executives to show
investors and other stakeholders that they are sensitive to these issues. This action is a form
of blame assignment or scapegoating, and can help to mitigate negative reactions following
misconduct (Gangloff et al. 2016; Shapiro 1991).
To the best of my knowledge, there are no studies that examine turnover following
coverage of environmental or social issues. There are, however, four studies that associate
negative media coverage of governance issues, as published in a specific or limited set of
news outlets, with the likelihood of CEO turnover. Wu (2004) finds that companies are
more likely to change their CEO after being publicly named by CalPERS (i.e. the largest
state pension fund in the U.S., which is known for promoting good corporate governance)
for having poor corporate governance practices. Similarly, Joe et al. (2009) find that firms
listed on Business Week’s worst board list are forced to take corrective actions, which
include CEO and board chairman replacement and an increase in independent directors.
Bednar (2012) detects a significant response to negative coverage of corporate governance
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issues (e.g., executive pay and management philosophy) in six major media outlets. In
contrast, Core et al. (2008) do not find that CEO turnover increases in response to negative
media coverage of CEO pay. Thus, in addition to documenting responses to coverage of
environmental and social issues, I also seek to extend findings of these governance studies
to an aggregate ESG measure, a more comprehensive set of media outlets, and to a broader
sample.
Guided by the cited findings that CEO turnover increases following negative
coverage of governance issues, as well as recent anecdotes of CEO turnover following
highly publicized ESG events, I predict that boards will hold CEOs accountable for both
overall negative media coverage and coverage of specific ESG events in H1 and H2,
respectively:
Hypothesis 1: Negative media coverage is positively associated with the
likelihood of CEO dismissal.
Hypothesis 2: Negative media coverage of environmental, social, and governance
issues are all positively associated with the likelihood of CEO dismissal.
Negative Media Coverage and CEO Successor Origin
With CEO turnover comes CEO replacement. Effective succession planning is an
important duty of the board of directors, as they are tasked with identifying the candidate
that can meet the business’ current and future needs (e.g., Zhang and Rajagopalan 2004).
When selecting a new CEO, a firm can appoint an inside successor, or it can appoint an
outsider. This decision can be critical for subsequent operating performance (Dalton and
Kesner 1985). Recognizing this, several studies examine the choice between appointing an
insider or outsider (e.g., Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani 1996; Farrell and Whidbee
2003; Gangloff et al. 2016; Shen and Cannella 2002).
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Generally, boards appoint insider replacements to provide continuity. Surveys
show that insiders are chosen as replacement CEOs around 80 percent of the time (Booz
and Company 2011; Conference Board 2016). In fact, insiders are often identified as CEO
succession candidates before turnovers occur and are groomed for the role by serving as
high-level executives until their succession (EY Center for Board Matters 2014). This
succession strategy is known as the “pass the baton” method (Naveen 2006). Strategies like
this are recognition that insiders benefit from possessing firm-specific knowledge such as
familiarity with products, markets, technologies, and standard operating procedures
(Agrawal et al. 2004; Datta and Guthrie 1994). Additionally, hiring an insider avoids
adverse selection issues that may be at play when selecting an outsider based on limited
knowledge of their abilities (Shen and Cannella 2002). Despite these strengths, an insider
CEO replacement following negative media coverage may be considered “scapegoating.”
Scapegoating is a largely symbolic action designed to placate demands for change
following misconduct without disrupting the continuity of company operations (Gangloff
et al. 2016). Replacing the CEO with an insider appeases public criticism by attributing
fault to an individual (i.e., the former CEO), but may not introduce real change to address
the misconduct. This solution effectively blames a single person, the former CEO, for
misconduct that likely permeates throughout the firm and its culture, which the insider
replacement is a part of.
Conversely, hiring an outsider as CEO replacement is a means to signal to investors
and other stakeholders about a firm’s intent to change future behavior (e.g., Agrawal et al.
1999; Farrell and Whidbee 2003; Gangloff et al. 2016). Top management brought in from
outside the firm are thought to have broad, fresh perspectives and an ability to implement
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change to firm policies and strategies (Farrell and Whidbee 2003; Gangloff et al. 2016).
This is evident in the recent events at Target and Volkswagen, where the mainstream media
questioned the latter’s choice of an insider replacement and the potential inability to break
from misconduct culture (Boston 2015). Whether there is truth to the signal or not, it may
be necessary to hire an outsider successor in situations where stakeholders do not believe
that insiders can bring desired change. This is documented in prior literature, in which
evidence is presented consistent with boards selecting outsiders following poor
performance or when the external environment is changing (e.g., Huson et al. 2004; Parrino
1997). Following misconduct, firms may wish to communicate their intent to change the
tone at the top and to alleviate concerns of the misconduct occurring again (Karaevli and
Zajac 2012). The selection of an outside successor acknowledges that misconduct is
pervasive and signals to internal and external stakeholders of the firm that the board is
serious about change (Datta and Guthrie 1994). However, it is important to note that
struggling companies may have difficulty attracting a suitable external replacement
because these individuals may not want to take control of a failing organization (Dalton
and Kesner 1985).
In sum, insider CEO replacements are thought to bring continuity and not disrupt
current organizational processes and culture, whereas outsider CEOs are often hired to
signal willingness to change in response to misconduct. Thus, while insider replacements
are most frequent, there is reason to believe this will not be the case when dismissal occurs
following negative media coverage. Specifically, the impact of negative media likely
extends beyond CEO control to impact the reputation of otherwise viable insider
candidates. It may be perceived that the ties of insiders to the culture which prompted
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negative media coverage complicate efforts to change, whereas an external CEO is
perceived as bringing a fresh perspective to operations and culture. This has not yet been
empirically examined, and it is thus unknown whether findings that external CEO
replacement follows poor performance are generalizable to media coverage or to ESG
issues. ESG issues may be seen as less important, and in their presence a trade-off decision
between breaking with former policy to correct ESG issues (i.e., appointing an outsider)
and maintaining operational and cultural norms (i.e., appointing an insider) must be made.
Additionally, ESG issues may not permeate a firm’s culture to tarnish the reputation of
otherwise viable insiders in the way that financial misconduct does. However, based on
prior literature and recent scrutiny of companies that hire external replacements following
an ESG incident, I hypothesize that firms with negative media coverage will be more likely
to appoint an outsider in order to send a signal of a clean break with failed policies and
strategies. I predict this in my third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: Negative media coverage is positively associated with the
likelihood of hiring an external CEO replacement following a dismissal.
Change in Negative Media Coverage
It is also fruitful to consider the alleviation of negative media coverage contingent on the
CEO turnover and replacement decision. Examining post-turnover negative media
coverage is beneficial because to the extent that media coverage is firm specific, any
change between the prior CEO and the new CEO regimes can be attributed to change in
media coverage associated with the new CEO regime. Prior literature has found that
following a negative event (e.g., a restatement), firms that dismiss top management recover
faster than firms that do not (e.g., Wilson 2008). This supports the notion that executive
dismissal signals that directors are adequately addressing issues, and that blame assignment
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of this sort helps to mitigate negative reactions following misconduct (Gangloff et al. 2016;
Shapiro 1991).
In this setting, CEO dismissal may be a necessary step to fend off media criticism.
If the media digests the dismissal signal consistent with blame assignment/scapegoating
logic, then negative coverage will decline. If CEO dismissal occurs following negative
media coverage, there is likely an expectation that the replacement CEO will prioritize
repairing the situation that led the former CEO to leave. However, if the board is merely
turning over their CEO to appease public opinion, the replacement CEO may not take
actual steps to change company practices and this could result in continued or additional
negative coverage. Further, negative media coverage may be endemic to a firm and persist
even after the CEO is forced out.
The choice of CEO successor is also likely to impact changes in media coverage.
However, prior literature documents mixed findings for the effectiveness of internal and
external replacements. Insider CEOs are generally seen as more able than outsiders as they
have acquired firm-specific knowledge and relationships (Agrawal et al. 2004). Survey
data has supported this, illustrating that shareholder returns of companies with insider
replacement CEOs outperform those with outsiders (Booz and Company 2011). However,
in misconduct scenarios, an insider hire may be blinded by an established view of the
company and unable to break with culture and lead the firm in its recovery. An outsider
will need to gain firm-specific knowledge (e.g., the people and their skills, the objectives
and prospects, etc.) before embarking on major changes, which can slow down repair.
Further, when selecting an outsider replacement, the board of directors has limited
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information, which may make the selected individual the incorrect choice to guide the firm
in its recovery (Shen and Cannella 2002).
In sum, it is not clear whether CEO dismissal nor either successor type will result
in a decline in negative media coverage. In fact, if the media sees through the CEO
dismissal signal, the successor does not enact proper change, or the negative coverage is
endemic to the firm’s environment, it may increase following dismissal. Given these
competing arguments, I present hypotheses for the change in negative media coverage in
their null form:
Hypothesis 4: CEO dismissal is not associated with the change in negative media
coverage.
Hypothesis 5: Firms that hire external CEO replacements do not experience
greater declines in negative media coverage than those who hire an
internal replacement.
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Sample
My sample consists of 9,027 firm-year observations with necessary coverage in several
databases from 2007 – 2015.63 The yearly distribution of this sample can be found in Table
3.1. Data on negative media coverage of ESG practices is gathered from RepRisk. Audit
Analytics’ Director and Officer Changes dataset is used to identify turnover events and is
supplemented with hand-collected data on the reason for turnover. Lastly, Compustat,
BoardEx, and CRSP contain necessary control variable data.
[INSERT TABLE 3.1 HERE]
Variable Definitions
Measuring CEO Dismissal and Successor Origin
63

RepRisk coverage begins in 2007, so the chosen sample period represents all available data.
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Audit Analytics aggregates data on director and officer changes, which is collected from
Item 5.02 of 8-K filings with the SEC. The dataset provides the date of CEO turnover
events, along with the name of the departed and successor CEO and the type of CEO
turnover event (e.g., deceased, dismissed, retired, etc.). These events include both
voluntary (e.g., retirement) and forced (e.g., dismissal) turnovers. In accordance with
predictions that CEOs are forced out following negative media coverage, it is important
that I capture only dismissals.64 Therefore, I manually search for news articles discussing
each turnover event identified by Audit Analytics. Following Campbell, Gallmeyer,
Johnson, Rutherford, and Stanley (2011), I classify a CEO turnover as a dismissal if it is
described as such in a news article, or if the following four criteria are met. These criteria
are: (1) turnover was not announced at least six months in advance of the turnover date, (2)
departing CEO does not leave for reasons of poor health, death, or to accept a position
elsewhere, (3) departing CEO is under the age of 60 and thus less likely to be retiring, and
(4) departing CEO does not remain on the board of directors after leaving the CEO
position.65 In order to cleanly separate treatment and control observations, I remove firmyear observations with voluntary CEO turnover from the sample.

64

This is in contrast to using a dependent variable that captures all turnover events, which would include
those related to death and retirement, amongst other reasons. There are many turnover events identified by
Audit Analytics that are clearly voluntary events, and should not be associated with negative media coverage.
For instance, in 2010 Domino’s Pizza CEO David Brandon left his post to become the athletic director at
University of Michigan (Stynes 2010). Based on the criteria outlined for forced turnover classification, this
turnover event is classified as voluntary because it is to accept a position elsewhere.
65
Hand collecting this data is imperative because 21.07% of CEO turnovers that I initially identified as
voluntary from the Audit Analytics dataset (i.e., because turnover action was listed as retired, personal leave,
etc.) are classified as forced based on the listed criteria. For example, in 2012 Best Buy’s CEO Brian Dunn
“resigned,” which would suggest a voluntary turnover. However, the turnover was announced abruptly (i.e.,
the same day) and most importantly, was discussed in multiple news articles that clearly suggest that Dunn
was forced out due to personal conduct issues (e.g., Bustillo 2012).
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CEO_DISMISSAL is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is dismissed
during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Data on the employment history of successor
CEOs is gathered from BoardEx. Following prior literature, I classify CEO successors with
less than one year of tenure in the firm as external replacements (EXTERNAL_CEO). CEO
successors who were employed by the firm for more than one year before the appointment
are classified as internal replacements (INTERNAL_CEO).
Measuring Negative Media Coverage
Data on negative media coverage is gathered from the RepRisk database. RepRisk contains
various measures of negative media coverage of ESG issues. The database aggregates over
80,000 external media sources into composite metrics. 66 RepRisk focuses on selectively
collecting criticism or negative news related to 28 ESG issues. Artificial intelligence is
used to collect coverage of these issues from a variety of sources (e.g., major print media,
newsletters, news sites, blogs, social media, etc.). Trained analysts then verify and analyze
the data.
RepRisk analysts use a proprietary algorithm to compile issue data into a monthly
index that measures negative media coverage of ESG practices. The algorithm is based on
the identified issues, the severity of the issues (i.e., their extent, cause, and consequences), 67

66

Referenced prior literature has used databases that allow access to individual news stories to collect media
coverage. For example, Christensen (2016) use the Factiva database to collect high-profile misconduct
incidents from a pre-selected group of media sources. Chen et al. (2015) also use Factiva to search for articles
in eight influential news sources (Wall Street Journal, Barron’s, Forbes, Financial Times, New York Times,
Washington Post, Chicago Sun-Times, and USA Today). To the best of my knowledge, Kothari, Li, and
Short (2009) have the broadest collection of media sources. The authors use Dow Jones Interactive and
Factiva to examine more than 400 sources.
67
The extent of the issue is based on the number of people impacted (e.g., one person, a group of people, a
large number of people). The cause of the issue is based on whether it was caused by an accident, negligence,
or intended. The consequences of the issue include no further consequences, injury, death, etc.
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the reach of media sources issues are identified in, 68 and the frequency and timing of this
information. This index is well suited to examine CEO dismissal in response to negative
media coverage since it adjusts for the reach of the media source. Specifically, theory
suggests issues that garner attention from high reach sources (e.g. Wall Street Journal or
New York Times) are likely to be more salient to the public and cause firms to consider
top management turnover in crisis management discussions.
To merge RepRisk with necessary dependent and control variables, I annualize the monthly
data provided. The primary test variable is NEG_MEDIA, which is measured as the
maximum index of negative media coverage within a specified period. For firm-years that
do not have a CEO dismissal, I take the maximum in each fiscal year. 69 For firm-years that
do have a CEO dismissal, I take the maximum within the year (i.e., twelve months) prior
to the turnover date. A graphical depiction of variable timing can be found in Figure 3.1.
In this figure, the measurement timing for NEG_MEDIA is shown above the timeline. For
treated observations, it is illustrated that the maximum index is taken in the year preceding
the turnover date, rather than the fiscal year as illustrated for untreated observations. 70 I
also create three indicator variables for the coverage of an issue in each of the following
categories: environmental (E_ISSUE), social (S_ISSUE), and governance (G_ISSUE).
These variables are equal to one if a firm-year observation has a granular issue within the
respective broad category, and zero otherwise.
[INSERT FIGURE 3.1 HERE]
68

The reach of media sources is a pre-classified determination. High reach media sources include
international media such as Financial Times, New York Times, BBC, etc. In this study, I collapse medium
reach media sources with this category; these include most national and regional media. Low reach media
sources include local media, blogs, internet sites, etc.
69
In this study, it is appropriate to use the maximum index because the board is likely to react to peak risk,
rather than average risk.
70
Results are consistent if alternative time periods are used.

97

Control Variables
In all multivariate analyses, I control for factors shown to impact the likelihood of CEO
turnover in prior research (e.g. Borokhovich et al. 1996; Huson, Parrino, and Starks 2001,
etc.). For firm-year observations with a CEO dismissal, all independent variables, other
than those described above as being annualized from RepRisk’s monthly data, are
measured during the fiscal year with the closest year-end to the turnover date. This timing
is consistent with prior turnover studies. For firm-year observations without a CEO
dismissal, all control variables are measured contemporaneously. Figure 3.1 depicts this
timing below the timeline.
I expect poorly performing companies to be more likely to dismiss their CEO, and
include ROA and STOCKRETURN as controls and expect a negative sign for both. I also
expect departing CEO age (CEO_AGE) to be positively associated with the likelihood of
CEO dismissal. Further, I control for firm size (LNASSETS) and complexity (SEGMENTS)
(Huson et al. 2001). Since the board makes turnover decisions, I include board
characteristics as controls (BOARD_INDEP and BOARD_SIZE). Lastly, since prior
literature has presented evidence consistent with turnover occurring in response to the
disclosure of financial reporting failures (e.g., Desai et al. 2006), I control for
RESTATEMENT and MW. All models also include industry (Fama-French 48 industry
classifications) and year fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by firm.
The sample for multivariate analyses testing H3, which utilizes EXTERNAL_CEO
as the dependent variable, is limited to firms that have a CEO dismissal in year t.71 I predict
that some control variables will behave differently in this models. For instance, complex

71

11 firm-year observations are dropped from this analysis because I am unable to identify the year the
departing CEO joined the company in BoardEx or via hand collection.
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firms may have a greater need for firm-specific knowledge and thus, be more likely to hire
an internal replacement. I therefore expect LNASSETS and SEGMENTS to be negative and
significant. Two additional controls are included in these models. Specifically, firms with
qualified internal candidates may be less likely to hire an outsider (Hoitash and Mkrtchyan
2015). I include controls for TALENT (an indicator variable equal to one if there is at least
one executive with outside directorships, and zero otherwise) and HEIR_APPARENT (an
indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a non-CEO president or chief operating
officer who has been in the position for less than two years prior to the CEO dismissal, and
zero otherwise). Additionally, Fama-French 12 (as opposed to 48) industry classification
are used as fixed effects to retain the largest sample possible. 72
IV. RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.2 displays summary statistics of test, dependent, and control variables (Panel A)
and a correlation matrix of key variables (Panel B). NEG_MEDIA is on average 14.401.
18.9 percent of firm-year observations in the sample have at least one environmental issue,
whereas 25.5 percent have social issues, and 19.4 percent have governance issues. The
mean likelihood of CEO dismissal is 3.7 percent, which is 334 firm-year observations.
Within these turnover events, the chosen successor is external to the company 34.7 percent
of the time.73 Further detail on the distribution of these turnover events, as well as the
distribution of internal and external replacements, is provided in Table 3.1. Descriptive
statistics for control variables are consistent with prior literature.

72

In other words, the Fama-French 48 industry classification drops a significant portion of the CEO turnover
sample due its perfect prediction of external CEO replacement.
73
The frequency of external replacements in my sample is higher than recent practitioner reports suggest
(e.g., Conference Board 2016). This is expected because I focus solely on forced turnover events.
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[INSERT TABLE 3.2 HERE]
Figure 3.2 graphically displays the monthly mean index value of negative media
coverage surrounding CEO dismissal events. Specifically, the mean index value is plotted
for each of the 24 months surrounding the CEO turnover date. The graph is powerful as it
provides initial results that negative media coverage peaks leading up to CEO dismissal,
and that firms that choose external replacements experience a greater peak in coverage.
Additionally, the graph illustrates that negative media coverage declines following
dismissal for both replacement types.
[INSERT FIGURE 3.2 HERE]
Table 3.2, Panel C provides further information on the distribution of RepRisk’s
granular data for both treatment and control firms. Specifically, the table displays the
frequency of E_ISSUE, S_ISSUE, and G_ISSUE within non-turnover firms, turnover firms,
turnover firms that choose internal successors, and turnover firms that choose external
successors. Further, each of these issue indicators is broken into buckets based on the
severity and reach of the issue. This results in four buckets: (1) issues that are low severity
and identified in low reach media sources, (2) issues that are high severity and identified
in low reach media sources, (3) issues that are low severity and identified in high reach
media sources, and (4) issues that are high severity and identified in high reach media
sources.74 These descriptive statistics illustrate the breadth of RepRisk’s collection, as well

74

Because each of the broad issue categories (i.e., environmental, social, and governance) is made up of
several granular issues, it is possible that during a firm-year there could be an issue that is in bucket 2 and
another in bucket 4 within the same category. For example, an animal mistreatment issue that is high severity
and identified in a low reach media source and a global pollution issue that is high severity and identified in
a high reach media source. Because future analysis requires mutually exclusive buckets, I assign these
buckets using a hierarchy. For example, following the reverse order of the buckets listed, if a firm-year
observation has an issue in the respective category that falls in bucket 4, then it cannot be counted in any
lower buckets. This continues through buckets 3, 2, and 1. I note that this hierarchy is subjective. The
argument set forth in this paper is that negative media coverage is positively associated with CEO turnover
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as the richness of the issue data. Distributions also provide preliminary evidence that ESG
issues, and specifically those that are high severity and high reach, are more common for
turnover firms than for non-turnover firms. For example, 10.18 percent of turnover firms
have a high severity and high reach governance issue, but just 6.80 percent of non-turnover
firms do. Further, external appointments are more common for firms with governance
issues (27.49 vs. 33.93 percent).
Results of H1 and H2: Negative Media Coverage and CEO Dismissal
To test H1, Table 3.3 presents the results of logit regressions estimating the association of
various measures of negative media coverage and the likelihood of CEO dismissal. 75 Each
column represents a different measure of negative media coverage. Column 1 suggests that
the overall coverage of ESG practices, as measured by NEG_MEDIA, is positively
associated with the likelihood of CEO dismissal. This finding supports H1. 76 This result is
also economically significant. I calculate the economic significance as the change in the
likelihood of CEO dismissal when NEG_MEDIA moves from the 25th percentile to the 75th
percentile. Holding all factors at their sample mean, I observe a 42.95 percent increase in
CEO dismissal likelihood.
[INSERT TABLE 3.3 HERE]

events, not the severity of the issue. Thus, I rank issues that are low severity but identified in a high reach
media source (bucket 3) as more influential than high severity issues that are identified in low reach media
sources (bucket 2).
75
The sample size reported in all logit models, including this table, is smaller than in the full available sample.
This is expected, because observations with perfect prediction of success or failure are dropped from logit
model predictions. I partially address this issue by using Fama-French 48 industry classifications, rather than
two-digit SIC codes, as industry fixed effects to avoid further dropping of observations due to perfect
prediction within a more constrained industry grouping. Results are consistent if two-digit SIC codes are
used.
76
Results in Table 3 are robust to the inclusion of firm (instead of industry) and year fixed effects. However,
results of models using industry ad year fixed effects are tabled for consistency with later analyses where it
is not possible to use firm fixed effects (i.e., replacement analysis within a sample of CEO turnovers, which
has very little within-firm variation).
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H2 predicts that negative media coverage of all categories compiled into
NEG_MEDIA also exhibit positive associations. Column 2 provides evidence in support of
H2, with E_ISSUE positive and significant. Similarly, Column 4 demonstrates that
G_ISSUE is positive and highly significant in predicting the likelihood of CEO dismissal.
Conversely, Column 3 does not provide evidence in support of H2, as S_ISSUE is
insignificant. Combined, I find partial support for H2. The impact of coverage of both
environmental and governance issues is economically significant. Here, I calculate
economic significance as the change in the likelihood of CEO dismissal when the
respective issue indicator moves from zero to one. A firm with coverage of an
environmental issue is associated with a 29.24 percent increase in the likelihood of CEO
dismissal when all other variables are measured at their sample mean. A firm with coverage
of a governance issue is associated with a 110.32 percent increase. 77
It is interesting that the association is weak for environmental issues and
insignificant for social issues. This is surprising given the theory that any issue receiving
substantial negative press would increase the likelihood of CEO dismissal. Taken as is,
results suggest that boards are less concerned about the repercussions of negative coverage
of environmental issues than those stemming from governance issues, and are not
concerned about negative coverage of social issues.

78

The strong association between

coverage of governance issues and CEO dismissal likelihood is consistent with the logic
that these issues are reflective of problems with the tone at the top, and that the media

77

It is not surprising that the economic significance of these variables is high since the CEO turnover
dependent variable captures a low frequency event. Additionally, the calculation used holds all other
variables at their sample mean, when in reality they would likely fluctuate if issues are identified.
78 I perform coefficient comparison tests and find that governance issues have a greater impact on CEO
dismissal likelihood than coverage of both social (p<0.01) and environmental (p<0.01) issues.
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pushes for the highest ranked executive within the problematic culture to be held
accountable.
An important feature of RepRisk data is the ability to disentangle the severity of an
issue and the reach of the media source in which the issue was identified. Theory, as
presented in this study, suggests that negative media coverage of ESG issues pushes boards
to remove their CEO, and that this association is not fully explained by the issue underlying
the coverage. To test this assumption, I conduct analysis grouping ESG issues based on
severity (i.e., extent, cause, and consequences) and reach of media source issues are
identified in (i.e., its prominence). Table 3.4 displays multivariate results regressing
CEO_DISMISSAL on these issue groupings. Columns 1-3 disaggregate environmental
issues, Columns 4-6 social issues, and Columns 7-9 governance issues. For simplicity, I
describe the test variables in this table related to the environmental category.
HIGH_REACH is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year observation had one
or more environmental issues in a high reach media source (e.g., Wall Street Journal, New
York Times, etc.), and zero otherwise. Conversely, LOW_REACH is an indicator variable
equal to one if the firm-year observation had environmental issues that were not identified
in high reach media sources, and zero otherwise. HIGH_SEV is an indicator variable equal
to one if the firm-year observation had one or more environmental issues that are classified
as high severity, and zero otherwise. LOW_SEV is an indicator variable equal to one if the
firm-year observation had environmental issues that were not classified as high severity.
Indicators included in the same model are mutually exclusive (e.g., if a firm-year is equal
to one for HIGH_REACH, then it is equal to zero for LOW_REACH in the same column).
These indicators are then combined to create four mutually-exclusive buckets within each
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issue

category

(i.e.,

LOWSEV_LOWREACH,

HIGHSEV_HIGHREACH,

LOWSEV_HIGHREACH, and HIGHSEV_HIGHREACH). The creation of these buckets is
described earlier in the text, and descriptives can be found in Table 3.2 Panel C. 79
[INSERT TABLE 3.4 HERE]
Results in Column 1 suggest that the reach of media source that environmental
issues are published in does not influence CEO dismissal likelihood. Conversely, results in
Column 2 appear to illustrate that the severity of environmental issues is a significant
determinant. Specifically, HIGH_SEV is positive and significant, suggesting that highseverity environmental issues are positively associated with CEO dismissal likelihood.
However, in Column 3, results suggest that it is actually the combination of high severity
environmental issues identified in high reach media sources that influence the turnover
decision (i.e., HIGHSEV_HIGHREACH is positive and significant). Results for social
issues, as displayed in Columns 4-6, suggest that severity alone does not matter for CEO
dismissal likelihood (Column 5), but rather that the reach of the media source a social issue
is published in (Column 4) is driving the decision. Consistent with environmental issues, I
further note that it is the combination of high severity social issues identified in high reach
media sources that determine the turnover decision (i.e., HIGHSEV_HIGHREACH is
positive and significant in Column 6).
Results for governance issues follow a different, yet interesting, pattern.
Specifically, results in Column 7 suggest that governance issues identified only in high
reach media sources influence the likelihood of CEO dismissal, whereas results in Column

79

As described earlier in the text, to create mutually exclusive buckets, I used theory to rank issues that were
low severity and high reach (LOWSEV_HIGHREACH) higher than issues that were high severity and low
reach (HIGHSEV_LOWREACH). Results are consistent if this ranking is switched, which alleviates concerns
that results are mechanically driven by the classification order.
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8 suggest that CEO dismissal likelihood increases regardless of the severity of a
governance issue. When combined, it appears that the reach of media dominates severity
in influencing the dependent variable. Specifically, both HIGHSEV_HIGHREACH and
LOWSEV_HIGHREACH are positive and significant. The former is consistent with
findings for environmental and social issues, but the latter suggests that for governance
issues, even issues that are not severe but are highly publicized, garner boardroom attention
To summarize, results suggest that ESG issues are only positively associated with
the likelihood of CEO dismissal when they are covered by high reach media sources. In
Table 3.3, it appears that environmental issues are a weak determinant of dismissal and that
social issues do not matter at all. However, results in Table 3.4 reconcile this perplexing
finding. Specifically, dismissal likelihood is influenced by severe environmental and social
issues identified in high reach media, as well as all governance issues identified in high
reach media regardless of severity. For all categories, firms could have severe issues, but
if they are not highly publicized, then results suggest that the board does not react by
holding the CEO publicly accountable. This suggests that negative media coverage of these
issues has an incremental impact to that explained by the event that underlies the coverage.
This is consistent with the theory that media criticism prompts boards to take action.
Results of H3: Negative Media Coverage and CEO Successor Origin
To test H3, Table 3.5 presents the results of logit regressions estimating the association of
various measures of negative media coverage with the likelihood of external CEO
replacement, within a sample of firm-year observations that have a CEO dismissal.
Consistent with previously presented tables, each column represents a different measure of
negative media coverage. Column 1 suggests that overall coverage of ESG practices, as
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measured by NEG_MEDIA, is not associated with the likelihood of CEO dismissal. Thus,
H3 is not supported. It appears that, in aggregate, negative media coverage of ESG issues
pushes boards to turnover CEOs, but does not cause them to choose external successors.
[INSERT TABLE 3.5 HERE]
Given limited literature and a priori theory on the topic, I do not formally predict
the impact of coverage of individual issues on the likelihood of external replacement.
Regardless, models using the E_ISSUE, S_ISSUE, and G_ISSUE indicator variables are
also presented in Table 3.5. The only significant determinant of external CEO replacement
is G_ISSUE (Column 4). It appears that when CEO dismissal occurs, coverage of
governance issues positively influences the likelihood of external replacement. This is
consistent with the theory that suggests an external replacement is necessary to break with
former policies and implement change. Governance issues are likely to permeate a firm’s
culture and potential insider candidates more than environmental and social issues. Further,
directors may believe that the media will see through any scapegoating attempts when
facing governance issues. To further explore this result, I again utilize unique data on the
severity and reach of media source in which issues were identified. These findings are
presented in Table 3.6. Consistent with the main results for H3, there are no significant
variables within coverage of environmental and social issues (Columns 1-4), but high
severity governance issues are significant (Column 6). I do not report results estimating the
impact of issue buckets (i.e., with reach and severity combined) on the likelihood of
external replacement because of sample constraints. However, these results suggest that
severe governance issues published in high reach media sources are those which drive this
association.
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[INSERT TABLE 3.6 HERE]
Overall, I do not find support for H3. In aggregate, negative media coverage of ESG
issues does not influence the likelihood of an external replacement when CEO dismissal
occurs. This is surprising since countless anecdotes exist in which the media criticizes the
choice of an internal successor when a CEO dismissal occurs in the wake of ESG issues
(e.g., BP, Volkswagen, Wells Fargo, etc.). These findings highlight that, on average, boards
are not more likely to hire an external successor even though there will be continued
criticism about that choice. However, when this data is disaggregated, firms facing negative
coverage of governance issues are more likely to hire an external replacement. To the best
of my knowledge, this is the first study to examine the influence of negative media
coverage on successor origin.
Results of H4 and H5: CEO Dismissal, CEO Successor Origin, and Change in
Negative Media Coverage
To test H4 and H5, Table 3.7 presents models which examine the impact of CEO dismissal
and external replacement on the change in NEG_MEDIA. This analysis is important for
addressing endogeneity concerns. Since I have data on the exact date of the CEO turnover
event, and monthly index values for data on negative media coverage, I am able to cleanly
separate negative media coverage before and after the turnover event. 80 Changes to media
coverage can therefore be attributed to the turnover event. Additionally, because
NEG_MEDIA is an index variable, there is significant variation to examine this change,
which has been a difficult task in previous media studies.

80

The sample size is smaller for this analysis than for previous due to the loss of firm-year observations with
turnover after 2014. These observations do not have complete data necessary to construct differenced
variables. Specifically, I cannot construct one-year-ahead data from RepRisk and other databases.
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[INSERT TABLE 3.7 HERE]
The dependent variable in this analysis is ∆NEG_MEDIA. For firm-year
observations with CEO dismissal, this is measured as the index value twelve months after
turnover less the maximum index value twelve months prior to turnover (i.e., the
NEG_MEDIA value used in earlier analyses). For firm-year observations without a CEO
dismissal, this is measured as the maximum index in t+1 less the maximum index in t (i.e.,
the NEG_MEDIA value used in earlier analyses).81 All continuous control variables, with
the exception of departing CEO age, are measured as the one-year change (year after
turnover less year of turnover). Additionally, indicator variables for restatement and
material weakness are measured as a one-year change to account for the impact of newly
disclosed financial reporting issues on the change in negative media coverage.
Results in Column 1 of Table 3.7 show that CEO_DISMISSAL is inversely
associated with ∆NEG_MEDIA. In other words, negative media coverage decreases
following a CEO dismissal. This supports H4. However, it does not appear that CEO
successor origin impacts this change. Specifically, EXTERNAL_CEO is not significant in
Column 2. I note that the true impact of dismissal due to negative media coverage may be
masked in these samples by firms that had low levels of coverage to begin with, and thus
removed their CEO for other reasons. Therefore, the sample in Columns 3 and 4 is
constrained to firms that had above median values of NEG_MEDIA pre-turnover, or in the
fiscal year in which they did not have a turnover event. This allows a comparison of
negative coverage declines amongst firms who had high levels before making the turnover

81

Results are similar if ∆NEG_MEDIA is measured in several different ways (e.g., post index measured as
the minimum or peak within several constrained time periods (e.g., six months after, 24 months after, FYE
for non-turnover observations, etc.), percentage change, pre-index measured within several constrained time
periods (e.g., six months, at the turnover date for turnover observations, etc.).
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decision. Findings in these samples again support H4 and do not support H5. 82 This
confirms theory that when facing negative media attention, boards that hold the CEO
publicly accountable mitigate this coverage.
Combined, it appears that CEO dismissal is necessary for recovery when high reach
media sources focus on ESG issues, but that the new CEO’s origin does not matter for
recovery. It is interesting that, anecdotally, the media pushes for external CEO
replacements (e.g., Boston 2015; Harris 2014), but negative coverage persists regardless
of the successor’s origin. Therefore, boards who follow the conventional wisdom that an
external replacement is needed in reputation-damaging situations may make suboptimal
replacement decisions by anchoring on successor origin.
Additional Analyses
ESG-focused Institutional Ownership as an Additional Pressure
Prior literature has suggested that the investment community serves as an additional
monitoring mechanism (e.g. Burns, Kedia, and Lipson 2010; Ramalingegowda and Yu
2012). Recently, investment management companies have differentiated themselves by
offering funds that incorporate ESG criteria into portfolio formation and analysis. In fact,
growth in ESG assets under management has outpaced growth in the general asset
management base (GSIA 2014). It is interesting to examine whether additional external
pressure, via inclusion in and thus monitoring by ESG-focused funds, makes boards more
likely to react to negative coverage of ESG practices. Two popular ESG-focused funds,
Vanguard FTSE Social Index Fund and iShares MSCI KLD Social ETF, list objectives to
screen for “certain social, human rights, and environmental criteria” and “positive

82

Coefficient comparisons for CEO_DISMISSAL between Columns 1 and 3 suggest that negative media
coverage declines to a greater extent for firms that had high levels of coverage before the turnover decision.
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environmental, social and governance characteristics,” respectively. I obtain holdings data
from Thomson Reuters and re-estimate results within a sample of firms that are held by the
listed funds. Table 3.8 presents these results.
[INSERT TABLE 3.8 HERE]
In this isolated sample, I find all measures of ESG negative media coverage to be positively
associated with CEO dismissal likelihood. Compared to findings in the full sample, boards
of companies held by ESG-conscious funds are more likely to dismiss their CEO following
coverage of environmental and social issues. This difference is statistically significant, as
evidenced by significant coefficient comparisons between the two samples. 83 These results
imply that corporate boards adhere to investor demands concerning the desired level of
sensitivity to ESG issues. ESG-conscious institutional ownership appears to encourage
boards to take all ESG issues, including previously undocumented environmental and
social issues, seriously.
Board Characteristics as Moderating Variables
Prior literature has shown certain board characteristics to influence the likelihood of CEO
dismissal (e.g., Fich and Shivdasani 2006). Decisions regarding executive turnover are
directly controlled by the board, and therefore resource dedication to the board is likely to
impact the association between negative media coverage and CEO dismissal likelihood.
Therefore, I conduct analyses that include interactions between the measures of negative
media coverage and certain board characteristics. Results of these analyses are presented
in Table 3.9.

83

I also compare this sample of companies held by ESG-conscious funds to a sample of companies not held
by these funds. Consistent with the tabled results, I find that coefficients on E_ISSUE and S_ISSUE are
significantly greater in the sample of companies held by ESG-conscious mutual funds.
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[INSERT TABLE 3.9 HERE]
Table 3.9 Panel A examines the existence of a board-level sustainability committee
as a moderating variable. The existence of these committees indicates board sensitivity to
ESG issues, as they are a voluntary means to oversee the impact of ESG-related issues on
firm performance (Burke, Hoitash, and Hoitash 2017). Boards that voluntarily dedicate
resources to this oversight may be more likely to react to negative media coverage. In this
analysis, COMMITTEE is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year observation
has a board-level committee with sustainability responsibilities explicitly listed in their
proxy filing, and zero otherwise.84 I find significant and positive interactions between this
variable and E_ISSUE and S_ISSUE (Columns 2 and 3, respectively). I do not find a
significant interaction between COMMITTEE and G_ISSUE.85 This suggests that boards
with sustainability committees, which are a signal of sensitivity to ESG issues, are more
likely to dismiss their CEO following negative coverage of environment and social
practices.
Table 3.9 Panel B examines board size as a moderating variable to the association
between negative media coverage and CEO dismissal likelihood. An extensive literature
debates the impact of board size on a board’s monitoring quality (e.g., Coles, Daniel, and
Naveen 2008; Cheng 2008; Yermack 1996) and largely finds that smaller boards are better
monitors. Consistent with this, I expect that larger boards will be less likely to hold a CEO
publicly accountable for negative media coverage. Column 4 shows that G_ISSUE *
84

To identify these committees, I hand collect committee responsibilities from the annual proxy filings of
companies that have a board-level committee with a name that suggests a sustainability focus. The sample
for this analysis is limited to 2007-2013 because the variable requires extensive hand collection.
85
As defined in Burke et al. (2017), the committee variable captures committees that oversee responsibilities
related to the community, employees, the environment, consumers, and suppliers. Thus, it is not surprising
that I do not find a significant interaction with G_ISSUE since responsibilities for the oversight of these issues
rests outside of sustainability committees, likely with the full board.
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BOARD_SIZE is negative and significant, which confirms the expectation that larger
boards are less likely to dismiss their CEO when governance issues are subject to negative
media coverage. I do not find that board size is a significant moderating factor to the
associations between other measures of negative media coverage and CEO dismissal
likelihood.
Table 3.9 Panel C examines board busyness as a moderating variable. Fich and
Shivdasani (2006) find that busy boards are less likely to remove a CEO for poor
performance. Similarly, I expect that busy boards are less likely to hold a CEO publicly
accountable for negative media coverage. BOARD_BUSY is an indicator variable equal to
one if more than 50 percent of directors are busy, and zero otherwise. A busy director is
defined as an independent director that serves on three or more boards (Fich and Shivdasani
2006). Consistent with this expectation and with board size results, I find that busy boards
are less likely to remove their CEO following coverage of governance issues (i.e.,
G_ISSUE * BOARD_BUSY is negative and significant in Column 4), but do not find that
board busyness influences the association for other measures of negative media coverage.
In sum, findings suggest that boards that have a formal committee to oversee
sustainability issues are more likely to dismiss their CEO when facing negative coverage
of environmental and social issues, suggesting that monitoring ESG risks is more important
to these companies. Conversely, larger and busier boards are less likely to hold CEOs
publicly accountable for negative media coverage of governance issues. This is consistent
with these characteristics harming the monitoring ability of the board and extends literature
that examines board monitoring quality.
Financial Performance as a Moderating Variable
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An extensive literature finds that executives are held accountable for poor performance
(e.g., Coughlan and Schmidt 1985; Murphy and Zimmerman 1993; Weisbach 1988).
Relatedly, if firms are performing well financially, it is possible that negative media
coverage of ESG issues is seen as less important. For instance, a board may not punish a
CEO who oversees a firm with high stock returns that has a few pollution or human rights
issues. Somewhat surprisingly, in untabulated results I do not find a significant interaction
between two measures of financial performance, stock return and return on assets, and all
four measures of negative media coverage. This suggests that CEOs are held accountable
for ESG issues regardless of financial performance. While I do not claim that the covered
ESG issues are independent from financial issues, this result alleviates the concern that
results are driven solely by financial performance consequences of the issues. It appears
that turnover occurs before these consequences, if any, are realized. I leave the question of
whether these issues cause financial consequences down the line open for future research.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Recent anecdotes suggest that negative media coverage of ESG issues can prompt CEO
turnover, yet this has not been empirically examined. It is not clear whether, on average,
media coverage of ESG issues are important to board deliberations, and thus whether they
impact turnover decisions. To address this gap in the literature, I investigate (a) negative
media coverage of ESG practices as a determinant to CEO dismissal, (b) the impact of this
coverage on CEO replacement decisions, and (c) subsequent declines in coverage
attributed to the CEO turnover event.
Unique data on this media coverage, made available by RepRisk, affords this
research opportunity. The limited literature that has examined negative media coverage has
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manually collected news stories. RepRisk collects media coverage from a comprehensive
range of sources, which vary in their prominence, and quantifies ESG-related negative
media coverage. This quantification is based on the existence of news, the severity of
underlying issues, and the reach of the media source that issues are identified in. Using this
data, I examine the prediction that the media, via its influence on public opinion, can
motivate directors to remove a CEO.
Consistent with my predictions, I find that CEOs are held accountable for negative
media coverage of ESG issues. I generally find that severe issues that are highly publicized
drive this finding. Interestingly, for coverage of governance issues, the likelihood of CEO
dismissal is impacted regardless of the issue’s severity. This, combined with several
additional analyses, suggests that the coverage of an issue is incremental to the impact of
the underlying issue in influencing CEO dismissal likelihood. These results confirm the
monitoring role of the media by illustrating that highly publicized ESG issues garner
boardroom attention and, on average, result in CEO dismissal. For firms that replace their
CEO, I further find that coverage of governance issues is positively associated with the
likelihood of an external CEO successor. Importantly, I also find that CEO dismissal is
effective at alleviating negative media coverage, but that this recovery is not contingent on
the successor’s origin (i.e., internal or external).
Overall, the findings of this study contribute to research and practice. Recent media
frenzies surrounding reputation-damaging incidents present a timely environment in which
to examine executive turnover, replacement, and subsequent improvement in media
coverage of ESG practices. Results can potentially inform boards that are faced with a CEO
turnover replacement decision following negative media attention. Specifically, findings
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suggest that CEO dismissal may be necessary following highly publicized and severe ESG
issues, but that the chosen successor’s origin does not impact future negative media
coverage.
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Figure 1.1

Graph of committee focus over time

The above graph displays the focus over time of the 1,243 sustainability committees in our unbalanced panel
dataset. Community focused committees are those that focus on community and/or human rights related
issues; employee focused committees are those that focus on employee and diversity related issues;
environment committees are those that focus on environment related issues; lastly, consumer and supplier
focused committees are those that focus on product related issues.
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Figure 1.2
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Figure 2.1

Timing of the audit process

This figure is adapted from Hackenbrack et al. (2014), who interview Big 4 partners to develop a timeline for auditor-client negotiations
and find that negotiation concludes with engagement letter signing at the end of the first quarter of the year under audit. Using RepRisk’s
monthly data, we are able to measure negative media coverage in periods previous, during, and subsequent to the negotiation period.
Q1, Q2, and Q3 of year t-1 (“previous period”) have the potential to impact the year t audit engagement and associated fees. Q4 of year
t-1 and Q1 of year t (“negotiation period”) represent the period in which coverage is most salient to the negotiation of the year t audit
fee. Our primary measure (NEG_MEDIA) is taken within this period. Q2, Q3, and Q4 of year t (“subsequent period”) capture the period
in which firm activity will be reported in the year t audit report. Lastly, the audit report for year t is released shortly after the end of Q1
in year t+1.
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Figure 3.1

Variable measurement example

Treated observation (CEO_DISMISSAL = 1)

Untreated observations (CEO_DISMISSAL = 0)

This figure illustrates variable timing used in main analyses. Specifically, the first timeline illustrates variable timing for a treated (i.e.,
has a CEO dismissal) observation, and the second illustrates variable timing for a non-treated (i.e., does not have a CEO dismissal)
observation during year t. As described throughout the text and in Appendix F, NEG_MEDIA is the dismissal negative media coverage
of ESG practices within the twelve months prior to the CEO turnover date for firm-year observations with a CEO turnover, and within
the fiscal year for firm-year observations without a CEO dismissal. These ranges are noted on the figures. For the treated observation,
CEO_DISMISSAL and EXTERNAL_CEO are both equal to one. The fiscal year assigned to this observation, along with the timing of
all variables that are only provided on an annual basis (e.g., Compustat, Audit Analytics, BoardEx), is that with the closest year-end to
the turnover date. The control group in this fiscal year is any firm where CEO_DISMISSAL is equal to zero. All variables for these
untreated observations are measured during year t. This includes NEG_MEDIA, which is equal to the maximum negative media coverage
of ESG practices during year t. Finally, ∆NEG_MEDIA is measured as the index value twelve months after turnover less the maximum
index value twelve months prior to turnover (i.e., NEG_MEDIA) for firms with dismissal. For firms without dismissal, ∆NEG_MEDIA
is measured as the maximum index value in year t+1 less the maximum index in year t.
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Graph of negative media coverage surrounding CEO dismissal

Index of negative media coverage

Figure 3.2

All turnovers
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External replacements

This graph plots mean monthly values of the index of negative media coverage of ESG practices, as provided by RepRisk, within
firm-year observations that have a CEO dismissal. The blue line represents mean monthly values for all dismissals, the green internal
replacements, and the red external replacements. The X axis displays the distance to the turnover event (marked by the vertical black
line).
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Table 1.1

Sample information

Description
All firm-year observations from 2003—2013 with available MSCI ESG STATS data
Less: missing Compustat control variable data
Less: missing BoardEx control variable data
Total firm-year observations available from 2003—2013
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Sample size
31,167
(5,531)
(14,178)
11,458

Table 1.2

Summary statistics

Panel A and B display summary statistics of dependent and control variables within the full sample of
11,458 firm-year observations. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Panel C displays simple
correlations for key variables employed in our analysis. Correlations that are significant at a level
below 10 percent (two-tailed) are in bold.
Panel A: Summary statistics of dependent variables
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
CSP score
0.24
0.00
2.73
-9.00
18.00
CSP strengths
1.83
1.00
2.74
0.00
21.00
CSP concerns
1.59
1.00
1.70
0.00
14.00
Community strengths
0.21
0.00
0.59
0.00
7.00
Community concerns
0.14
0.00
0.42
0.00
5.00
Employee strengths
1.16
0.00
1.70
0.00
12.00
Employee concerns
0.92
1.00
0.91
0.00
6.00
Environment strengths
0.36
0.00
0.83
0.00
5.00
Environment concerns
0.27
0.00
0.69
0.00
5.00
Consumer and supplier strengths
0.10
0.00
0.33
0.00
3.00
Consumer and supplier concerns
0.26
0.00
0.60
0.00
4.00
Panel B: Summary statistics of control variables
Board size (log)
Board size
Independence
Tenure
Busy board
Size
Total assets
Quick
ROA
Leverage
R&D investment

Mean
2.17
9.03
0.76
8.74
0.16
7.65
7,585.99
2.41
0.05
0.18
0.04

Panel C: Correlation matrix of key variables
1
2
1. CSP score
2. CSP strengths
0.81
3. CSP concerns
-0.31
0.31
4. Committee
0.11
0.29
5. Board size
0.23
0.37
6. Independence
0.13
0.20
7. Size
0.31
0.60

Median
2.20
9.00
0.78
8.20
0.00
7.51
1,854.77
1.92
0.06
0.16
0

Std. Dev.
0.25
2.22
0.13
3.85
0.37
1.47
19,782.07
1.94
0.10
0.16
0.11

Min
0.00
1.00
0.10
0.00
0.00
3.96
52.24
0.20
-1.77
0.00
0

3

4

5

6

0.30
0.23
0.12
0.47

0.26
0.16
0.32

0.17
0.56

0.22
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Max
3.53
34.00
1.00
30.00
1.00
12.54
27,7787.00
35.70
0.78
2.88
3.94

Table 1.2 (continued)
Panel D: Committee focus detail
Committee focus

Count

Percentage

Community
Employee
Environment
Consumer/supplier
Community & employee
Community & environment
Community & consumer/supplier
Community, employee & environment
Community, employee & consumer/supplier
Community, environment & consumer/supplier
Community, employee, environment & consumer/supplier
Employee & environment
Employee & consumer/supplier
Employee, environment & consumer/supplier
Environment & consumer/supplier
General

37
63
25
156
24
9
11
45
28
52
144
62
42
157
194
194

2.98
5.07
2.01
12.55
1.93
0.72
0.88
3.62
2.25
4.18
11.58
4.99
3.38
12.63
15.61
15.61
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Table 1.3

The impact of sustainability committees on CSP: OLS results using aggregate
measures
CSP score
Coefficient SE

CSP strengths
Coefficient SE

CSP concerns
Coefficient SE

Independent variables
Committee
Board size
Independence
Tenure
Busy board
Size
Quick
ROA
Leverage
R&D investment
Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Constant

0.30
1.02***
0.81**
-0.01
-0.13
0.64***
-0.01
1.44***
-1.51***
2.04***
Yes
Yes
-10.44***

1.01***
0.51***
0.88***
-0.02*
0.12
1.12***
0.02
0.95***
-1.96***
1.11*
Yes
Yes
-7.72***

0.70***
-0.51***
0.08
-0.00
0.24***
0.48***
0.03***
-0.48**
-0.46***
-0.94***
Yes
Yes
2.72**

Model statistics
N (sample size)
Adjusted R2

11,458
0.24

(0.23)
(0.19)
(0.33)
(0.01)
(0.12)
(0.07)
(0.02)
(0.36)
(0.30)
(0.85)
(1.04)

(0.19)
(0.17)
(0.28)
(0.01)
(0.10)
(0.06)
(0.02)
(0.31)
(0.28)
(0.66)
(0.62)

11,458
0.45

(0.14)
(0.11)
(0.21)
(0.01)
(0.07)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.19)
(0.15)
(0.26)
(1.14)

11,458
0.38

Variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance levels below 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively (two-tailed).
To formally test increase in explanatory power when separating the dependent variable into total strengths
and total concerns, we use the Vuong test statistic to show a significance increase in R2 from Model A to
Models B and C:
CSP score R2
0.24
0.24

CSP strengths R2
0.45

CSP concerns R2
0.38
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Vuong Z-statistic
-22.80***
-47.46***

Table 1.4

The impact of sustainability committees on CSP: OLS results using
disaggregated measures

Panel A: CSP strengths
Community
strengths
Coeff.
SE
Independent variables
No community focus
Community focus
No employee focus
Employee focus
No environment focus
Environment focus
No consumer/supplier focus
Consumer/supplier focus
Controls from Table 1.3
Constant

Employee
strengths
Coeff.
SE

Environment
strengths
Coeff.
SE

Consumer/suppli
er strengths
Coeff. SE

0.08* (0.05)
0.35*** (0.11)
0.36** (0.14)
0.80*** (0.17)
0.03
(0.06)
0.41*** (0.08)
Yes
-1.41*** (0.15)

Yes
-3.80***(0.51)

Yes
-2.05***(0.18)

0.08** (0.04)
0.04
(0.03)
Yes
-0.54***(0.07)

Model statistics
N (sample size)
11,458
11,458
11,458
11,458
Adjusted R2
0.27
0.39
0.35
0.12
Results of F-tests for significant difference in the coefficients of these mutually exclusive indicator
variables are as follows:
No community focus vs. community focus
5.90***
No employee focus vs. employee focus
5.17***
No environment focus vs. environment focus
14.73***
No consumer/supplier focus vs. consumer/supplier focus
0.88
Panel B: CSP concerns
Community
concerns
Coeff.
SE
Independent variables
No community focus
Community focus
No employee focus
Employee focus
No environment focus
Environment focus
No consumer/supplier focus
Consumer/supplier focus
Controls from Table 1.3
Constant

0.10**
0.11

Employee
concerns
Coeff. SE

Environment
concerns
Coeff.
SE

Consumer/suppli
er concerns
Coeff. SE

(0.05)
(0.07)
0.04 (0.07)
0.10 (0.07)
0.14*
0.45***

Yes
0.28

(0.34)

Yes
0.83

(0.51)

Yes
1.19

(0.08)
(0.10)

(0.72)

0.29*** (0.09)
0.19*** (0.06)
Yes
0.36
(0.52)

Model statistics
N (sample size)
11,458
11,458
11,458
11,458
Adjusted R2
0.25
0.18
0.41
0.33
Results of F-tests for significant difference in the coefficients of these mutually exclusive indicator
variables are as follows:
No community focus vs. community focus
0.00
No employee focus vs. employee focus
0.47
No environment focus vs. environment focus
5.91***
No consumer/supplier focus vs. consumer/supplier focus
0.74
Variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance levels below 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively (two-tailed).
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Table 1.5

Further committee characteristics: Summary statistics and univariate
comparisons of effectiveness

Panel A displays summary statistics of committee characteristics within the full available sample and
separately within samples of community, employee, environment, and consumer/supplier focused
committees. Panel B displays univariate comparisons of these characteristics within the full committee and
each group of focused committee samples.
Panel A: Summary statistics of committee characteristics
N
Minimum
25th
Mean Median
75th
Maximum
percentile
percentile
All committees
Committee size
1196
1.000
4.000
4.539
4.000
5.000
16.000
Fully independent
1196
0.000
1.000
0.753
1.000
1.000
1.000
Meeting frequency
1196
0.000
2.000
3.896
4.000
5.000
12.000
Community focused
Committee size
331
1.000
4.000
4.498
4.000
5.000
9.000
Fully independent
331
0.000
1.000
0.752
1.000
1.000
1.000
Meeting frequency
331
0.000
2.000
3.628
3.000
5.000
11.000
Employee focused
Committee size
539
1.000
4.000
4.412
4.000
5.000
9.000
Fully independent
539
0.000
1.000
0.787
1.000
1.000
1.000
Meeting frequency
539
0.000
2.000
3.571
4.000
5.000
11.000
Environment focused
Committee size
667
1.000
4.000
4.675
4.000
5.000
13.000
Fully independent
667
0.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
Meeting frequency
667
0.000
2.000
3.550
4.000
5.000
11.000
Consumer/supplier
focused
Committee size
764
1.000
4.000
4.723
4.000
5.000
16.000
Fully independent
764
0.000
0.000
0.733
1.000
1.000
1.000
Meeting frequency
764
0.000
2.000
3.728
4.000
5.000
12.000
Panel B: Univariate comparisons: committee characteristics by effectiveness
“Ineffective” committees
“Effective” committees
Count
Mean
Count
Mean
t-stat for
pdifference value
All committees
Committee size
748
4.394
448
4.781
-4.246
0.000
Fully independent
748
0.730
448
0.792
-2.430
0.015
Meetings
748
3.743
448
4.152
-3.125
0.002
Community focus
Committee size
165
4.364
166
4.633
-2.244
0.025
Fully independent
165
0.679
166
0.825
-3.123
0.002
Meetings
165
3.364
166
3.892
-3.131
0.002
Employee focus
Committee size
259
4.193
280
4.614
-4.372
0.000
Fully independent
259
0.772
280
0.800
-0.786
0.432
Meetings
259
3.425
280
3.707
-2.078
0.038
Environment focus
Committee size
464
4.651
203
4.729
-0.616
0.538
Fully independent
464
0.746
203
0.798
-1.460
0.145
Meetings
464
3.461
203
3.754
-2.292
0.022
Consumer/supplier focus
Committee size
636
4.701
128
4.828
-0.794
0.428
Fully independent
636
0.717
128
0.812
-2.233
0.026
Meetings
636
3.692
128
3.906
-1.315
0.189

126

Table 1.6

Univariate comparisons of committee focus, by sensitive industry
Not in sensitive industry
Count

Full sample comparison
Community focus
10,510
Employee focus
10,259
Environment focus
7,941
Consumer/supplier focus
9,366
Committee sample comparison
Community focus
1,068
Employee focus
1,066
Environment focus
486
Consumer/supplier focus
922
p-values: * p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01

In sensitive industry

Mean

Count

Mean

t-stat for
difference

0.03
0.05
0.02
0.06

948
1,199
3,517
2,092

0.08
0.09
0.15
0.09

-8.51***
-6.76***
-28.48***
-4.49***

0.26
0.43
0.32
0.64

175
177
757
321

0.41
0.61
0.71
0.59

-4.15***
-4.36***
-14.53***
1.67*
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Table 1.6 (continued)
Sensitive industry definitions (by 2 digit SIC code)
Community sensitive industries:
01, 10, 12, 16, 21, 29, 31, 39, 40, 48, 53, 54, 61, 65, 70, 99
Employee sensitive industries:
01, 10, 20, 21, 29, 40, 45, 48, 52, 53, 54, 61, 65, 70, 75, 99
Environment sensitive industries:
01, 10, 12, 13, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 33, 37, 40, 49, 99
Consumer/supplier sensitive industries:
01, 02, 20, 21, 28, 40, 45, 48, 53, 54, 61, 62, 63, 64, 99
Division
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing

2-digit
SIC
code
01-09

Mining

10-14

Construction

15-17

Manufacturing

20-39

Transportation and public utilities

40-49

Retail trade

52-59

Finance, insurance, and real estate

60-67

Services

70-89

Non-classifiable establishments

99
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Sensitive industries
01 (agriculture products – crops); 02
(agricultural production – livestock)
10 (metal, mining); 12 (coal mining);
13 (oil and gas extraction)
16 (heavy construction, except
building)
20 (food and kindred products); 21
(tobacco products); 22 (textile mill
products); 24 (lumber and wood
products); 25 (furniture and fixtures);
26 (paper and allied products); 28
(chemical and allied products); 29
(petroleum & coal products); 31
(leather & leather products); 33
(primary metal industries); 37
(transportation equipment); 39
(miscellaneous manufacturing
industries)
40 (railroad transportation); 45
(transportation by air); 48
(communications); 49 (electric, gas,
and sanitary services)
52 (building materials and gardening
supplies); 53 (general merchandise
stores); 54 (food stores)
61 (nondepository institutions); 62
(security and commodity brokers); 63
(insurance carriers); 64 (insurance
agents, brokers and service); 65 (real
estate)
70 (hotels and other lodging places);
75 (auto repair, services, and parking),
99 (non-classifiable establishments)

Table 1.7

Sensitive industry analysis, the impact of sustainability committees on
CSP: OLS using disaggregated measures in sensitive industries

Panel A: CSP strengths
Community
strengths
Coeff.
SE
Independent variables
Community focus
Employee focus
Environment focus
Consumer/supplier focus
Controls from Table 1.3
Constant

Employee
strengths
Coeff.
SE

Environment
strengths
Coeff.
SE

Consumer/suppl
ier strengths
Coeff. SE

1.02*** (0.28)
1.22*** (0.29)
0.37*** (0.09)
Yes
-2.36*** (0.54)

Yes
-6.95***(1.38)

Yes
-3.15*** (0.34)

948
0.37

1,199
0.47

3,517
0.40

Model statistics
N (sample size)
Adjusted R2

-0.00 (0.07)
Yes
-0.62***(0.15)
2,092
0.19

Panel B: CSP concerns
Community
concerns
Coeff.
SE
Independent variables
Community focus
Employee focus
Environment focus
Consumer/supplier focus
Controls from Table 1.3
Constant
Model statistics
N (sample size)
Adjusted R2

0.23

Employee
concerns
Coeff. SE

Environment
concerns
Coeff.
SE

Consumer/suppl
ier concerns
Coeff. SE

(0.16)
-0.03 (0.18)
0.39*** (0.12)

Yes
-0.80

(0.50)

948
0.43

Yes
-0.22 (1.11)
1,199
0.31

Yes
-0.35

(0.66)

3,517
0.41

-0.04 (0.15)
Yes
-0.75 (0.56)
2,092
0.41

Variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance levels below 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively (two-tailed).
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Table 2.1

Sample derivation

Steps
Sample of 2007-2014 fiscal year companies covered in RepRisk

Observations
15,160

Merge with Compustat
(observations with non-missing total assets or sales)

9,348

Merge with Audit Analytics
(observations with non-missing audit fees)

9,005

Final sample
(after deleting firms without necessary control variable data)
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7,754

Table 2.2

Descriptive statistics

Panel A: Summary statistics
N = 7,754

Mean

Median

Standard
deviation

25th
percentile

75th
percentile

Risk measures
NEG_MEDIA (unadjusted)
NEG_MEDIA
E_ISSUE
S_ISSUE
G_ISSUE

10.171
1.032
0.126
0.160
0.107

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

13.857
1.678
0.332
0.366
0.309

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

22.000
1.805
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.029
0.004
$3,837,775
14.567

0.000
0.000
$2,014,295
14.516

0.168
0.062
$5,201,309
1.091

0.000
0.000
$1,033,790
13.849

0.000
0.000
$4,500,000
15.320

7.824
0.029
0.227
0.172
3.917
0.252
0.128
-1.812
0.072
0.013
0.098
0.750
1.778
0.058

7.887
0.047
0.204
0.055
4.000
0.000
0.000
-1.763
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
1.000
0.000

1.768
0.126
0.192
3.696
2.070
0.434
0.334
0.119
0.259
0.113
0.298
0.433
1.030
0.233

6.703
0.015
0.076
-0.020
2.000
0.000
0.000
-1.770
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000

8.999
0.084
0.324
0.147
6.000
1.000
0.000
-1.758
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
2.000
0.000

0.031
0.047
0.251

0.000
0.000
0.000

0.174
0.211
0.434

0.000
0.000
0.000

0.000
0.000
1.000

0.074
0.158
0.000
0.003
0.129
0.052
0.048
58.371
-5.465
1,108
0.888
0.047
0.136
28.948
0.045
0.215
0.058

0.068
0.000
0.009
0.000
0.000
0.036
0.031
58.000
-4.000
249
1.000
0.033
0.091
22.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.032
0.365
0.438
0.057
0.336
0.062
0.061
10.598
8.571
3,474
0.315
0.057
0.151
18.336
0.207
0.411
0.392

0.051
0.000
-0.287
0.000
0.000
0.017
0.014
53.000
-9.000
66
1.000
0.019
0.050
14.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.091
0.000
0.285
0.000
0.000
0.068
0.061
60.000
-1.000
796
1.000
0.056
0.167
46.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Auditor response
AUDITORCHANGE
RESIGN
Audit Fees ($)
LOGAUDITFEES
Control variables
LNASSETS
ROA
LEVERAGE
SALESGROWTH
ZSCORE
MA
FOREIGN
P_SCORE
RESTATEMENT
GC
INDUSTRYEXP
FYE_DEC
SEGMENTS
MW
Supplemental variables
NEGMEDIA_PEAK_PRIOR
NEGMEDIA_PEAK_NEGOT
NEGMEDIA_PEAK_SUBSEQ
UENT
BENFORD_SCORE
BENFORD_FAIL
ABFEE
NEW_GC
MISSTATEMENT
DACC
TACC
DELAY
DELAY_ADJ
OANCF
BIG4
STDOPCASH_5YR
STDSALES_5YR
FIRM_AGE
LITRISK
DISTRESSED
LOWHIGH_SUM
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Table 2.2 (continued)
Panel B: Correlation matrix
(1)
(1) NEG_MEDIA
1
(2) E_ISSUE
0.491***
(3) S_ISSUE
0.541***
(4) G_ISSUE
0.407***
(5) AUDITORCHANGE
-0.012
(6) LOGAUDITFEES
0.391***
(7) GC
-0.024*
(8) MISSTATEMENT
-0.035**
(9) MW
-0.052***
(10) DACC
-0.092***
*
**
***
p < 0.05, p < 0.01, p < 0.001

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

1
0.648***
0.351***
-0.026*
0.324***
-0.023*
-0.039***
-0.039***
-0.098***

1
0.373***
-0.030**
0.353***
-0.022
-0.021
-0.052***
-0.088***

1
-0.013
0.329***
-0.028*
-0.014
-0.017
-0.028*

1
-0.104***
0.0413***
0.025*
0.108***
0.059***

1
-0.135***
-0.034**
-0.088***
-0.211***

1
0.014
0.104***
0.193***

1
0.234***
0.028*

1
0.069***
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Table 2.3

Negative media coverage and ESG issue descriptive by industry
Sample distribution

1: Consumer nondurables
2: Consumer durables
3: Manufacturing
4: Oil, gas and coal extraction and
product
5: Chemicals and allied products
6: Business equipment
7: Telephone and television transmission
8: Utilities
9: Wholesale, retail and some services
10: Healthcare, medical equipment, and
drug
11: Finance
12: Other

NEG_MEDIA
(unadj)

E_ISSUE

S_ISSUE

G_ISSUE

N

% of
sample

Mean

N

% of
industry

N

% of
industry

N

% of
industry

630
196
949

8.12
2.53
12.24

14.067
7.056
9.609

98
8
97

15.56
4.08
10.22

162
15
149

25.71
7.65
15.7

112
18
86

17.78
9.18
9.06

628

8.1

12.105

164

26.11

156

24.84

75

11.94

390
1,012
182
546
1,089

5.03
13.05
2.35
7.04
14.04

12.328
9.06
11.148
13.923
9.571

86
81
13
172
95

22.05
8
7.14
31.5
8.72

69
149
36
152
131

17.69
14.72
19.78
27.84
12.03

43
115
28
37
91

11.03
11.36
15.38
6.78
8.36

748

9.65

7.735

26

3.48

40

5.35

94

12.57

381
1,003

4.91
12.94

7.029
9.377

16
119

4.2
11.86

32
146

8.4
14.55

34
95

8.92
9.47
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Table 2.4

Client negative media coverage and auditor changes

Predicted
sign
NEG_MEDIA

+

E_ISSUE

+

S_ISSUE

+

G_ISSUE

+

LNASSETS

+

ROA

-

LEVERAGE

+

SALESGROWTH

+

ZSCORE

+

MA

+

FOREIGN

+

P_SCORE

+

RESTATEMENT

+

GC

+

LOGAUDITFEES

-

INDUSTRYEXP

-

Industry and year
fixed effects
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2

(1)
AUDITOR
CHANGE

(2)
AUDITOR
CHANGE

(3)
AUDITOR
CHANGE

(4)
AUDITOR
CHANGE

0.085**
(1.96)
-0.023
(-0.08)
0.079
(0.29)
0.114
(1.17)
-1.291***
(-2.19)
0.100
(0.26)
0.012***
(2.20)
0.029
(0.61)
0.032
(0.17)
0.409**
(1.95)
-0.801
(-1.31)
0.786***
(3.83)
-0.456
(-1.20)
-0.737***
(-4.73)
-0.119
(-0.37)
Included

0.143*
(1.49)
-1.318***
(-2.23)
0.059
(0.15)
0.012***
(2.19)
0.030
(0.63)
0.013
(0.07)
0.412**
(1.96)
-0.800
(-1.29)
0.770***
(3.75)
-0.417
(-1.12)
-0.725***
(-4.66)
-0.124
(-0.39)
Included

0.139*
(1.44)
-1.315***
(-2.23)
0.063
(0.16)
0.012***
(2.19)
0.030
(0.63)
0.017
(0.09)
0.411**
(1.95)
-0.803
(-1.30)
0.772***
(3.76)
-0.423
(-1.13)
-0.728***
(-4.67)
-0.126
(-0.39)
Included

0.482**
(1.70)
0.131*
(1.37)
-1.276***
(-2.15)
0.083
(0.21)
0.012***
(2.19)
0.030
(0.65)
0.015
(0.08)
0.415***
(1.98)
-0.806
(-1.31)
0.769***
(3.75)
-0.442
(-1.17)
-0.745***
(-4.78)
-0.106
(-0.33)
Included

5.361**
(2.13)
7,245
0.105

5.237**
(2.05)
7,245
0.103

5.271**
(2.06)
7,245
0.103

5.475**
(2.18)
7,245
0.104

This table reports results of logit regressions estimating the association of client negative media coverage with the likelihood of auditor
change. The test variables in Columns (1)-(4) are NEG_MEDIA, E_ISSUE, S_ISSUE, and G_ISSUE, respectively. NEG_MEDIA is the
maximum client negative media coverage of ESG practices during the audit negotiation period (fourth quarter of t-1 and first quarter of
t), adjusted by the negotiation period mean. E_ISSUE, S_ISSUE, and G_ISSUE are indicator variables equal to one if an environmental,
social, or governance issue is covered, respectively, and zero otherwise. Control variables are defined in Appendix E. Regressions
include year and two-digit SIC code industry fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. For coefficients that are consistent with
predictions, significance is one-tailed.
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Table 2.5

Client negative media coverage and auditor resignations
Predicted
sign

NEG_MEDIA

+

E_ISSUE

+

S_ISSUE

+

G_ISSUE

+

LNASSETS

+

ROA

-

LEVERAGE

+

SALESGROWTH

+

ZSCORE

+

MA

+

FOREIGN

+

P_SCORE

+

RESTATEMENT

+

GC

+

LOGAUDITFEES

-

INDUSTRYEXP

-

Industry and year
fixed effects
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2

(1)
RESIGNED

(2)
RESIGNED

(3)
RESIGNED

(4)
RESIGNED

0.166**
(1.75)
-0.450
(-0.41)
-0.737
(-0.66)
-0.075
(-0.24)
1.818
(1.04)
-1.489
(-1.00)
-0.073
(-0.18)
-0.015
(-0.16)
0.069
(0.15)
0.082
(0.13)
-2.650*
(-2.18)
0.973**
(1.74)
1.608***
(2.53)
-0.653
(-1.23)
1.257
(1.66)
Included

-0.029
(-0.09)
1.721
(0.99)
-1.475
(-1.01)
-0.093
(-0.21)
-0.014
(-0.16)
0.045
(0.10)
0.069
(0.11)
-2.647*
(-2.17)
0.957**
(1.73)
1.651***
(2.63)
-0.625
(-1.20)
1.243
(1.62)
Included

-0.019
(-0.06)
1.735
(0.99)
-1.480
(-1.00)
-0.091
(-0.21)
-0.014
(-0.16)
0.035
(0.08)
0.066
(0.10)
-2.651*
(-2.17)
0.955**
(1.72)
1.676***
(2.69)
-0.625
(-1.19)
1.258
(1.62)
Included

2.006***
(3.33)
-0.111
(-0.34)
2.066
(1.20)
-1.414
(-1.01)
-0.072
(-0.18)
0.002
(0.03)
0.014
(0.03)
0.123
(0.19)
-2.646*
(-2.21)
0.938**
(1.68)
1.641***
(2.57)
-0.686*
(-1.37)
1.501
(1.84)
Included

1.259
(0.19)
4,376
0.178

0.822
(0.13)
4,376
0.176

0.737
(0.11)
4,376
0.177

2.192
(0.38)
4,376
0.199

This table reports results of logit regressions estimating the impact of client negative media coverage on the likelihood of auditor
resignation. The test variables in Columns (1)-(4) are NEG_MEDIA, E_ISSUE, S_ISSUE, and G_ISSUE, respectively. NEG_MEDIA is
the maximum client negative media coverage of ESG practices during the audit negotiation period (fourth quarter of t-1 and first quarter
of t), adjusted by the negotiation period mean. E_ISSUE, S_ISSUE, and G_ISSUE are indicator variables equal to one if an
environmental, social, or governance issue is covered, respectively, and zero otherwise. Control variables are defined in Appendix E.
Regressions include year and two-digit SIC code industry fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm. Numbers in parentheses
are t-statistics. Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. For coefficients that are
consistent with predictions, significance is one-tailed.
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Table 2.6

Client negative media coverage and audit fees

Panel A: Main results

NEG_MEDIA

Predicted
sign
+

E_ISSUE

+

S_ISSUE

+

G_ISSUE

+

LNASSETS

+

ROA

-

LEVERAGE

+

SALESGROWTH

+

ZSCORE

+

MA

+

FOREIGN

+

FYE_DEC

+

SEGMENTS

+

P_SCORE

+

RESTATEMENT

+

GC

-

MW

+

INDUSTRYEXP

+

(1)
LOGAUDIT
FEES
0.026***
(4.79)

(3)
LOGAUDIT
FEES

(4)
LOGAUDIT
FEES

0.122***
(4.64)
0.099***
(4.15)

Industry and year
fixed effects
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R2
Coefficient comparisons
E_ISSUE vs. S_ISSUE
E_ISSUE vs. G_ISSUE
S_ISSUE vs. G_ISSUE

(2)
LOGAUDIT
FEES

Chi2
1.42
0.69
3.05

0.528***
(55.30)
-0.330***
(-3.32)
-0.100
(-1.13)
-0.004
(-0.83)
0.025***
(2.68)
0.072***
(3.61)
0.119***
(5.14)
0.039
(1.17)
0.081***
(6.45)
0.437***
(3.85)
0.031*
(1.28)
-0.046
(-0.52)
0.295***
(6.94)
-0.012
(-0.26)
Included

0.531***
(56.17)
-0.330***
(-3.31)
-0.106
(-1.20)
-0.004
(-0.84)
0.025***
(2.68)
0.071***
(3.55)
0.118***
(5.11)
0.039
(1.17)
0.080***
(6.40)
0.427***
(3.77)
0.030
(1.26)
-0.041
(-0.46)
0.293***
(6.91)
-0.015
(-0.32)
Included

0.531***
(55.37)
-0.333***
(-3.34)
-0.105
(-1.19)
-0.004
(-0.86)
0.025***
(2.67)
0.073***
(3.63)
0.120***
(5.19)
0.040
(1.21)
0.080***
(6.39)
0.427***
(3.76)
0.030
(1.25)
-0.044
(-0.50)
0.294***
(6.96)
-0.012
(-0.27)
Included

0.145***
(5.68)
0.530***
(57.28)
-0.322***
(-3.24)
-0.103
(-1.16)
-0.004
(-0.91)
0.026***
(2.76)
0.068***
(3.38)
0.121***
(5.25)
0.040
(1.23)
0.081***
(6.47)
0.428***
(3.78)
0.031
(1.26)
-0.041
(-0.46)
0.290***
(6.87)
-0.010
(-0.22)
Included

11.124***
(35.10)
7,528
0.818

11.120***
(34.14)
7,528
0.818

11.123***
(35.21)
7,528
0.818

11.111***
(35.50)
7,528
0.819

p-value
0.2340
0.4069
0.0808
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Table 2.6 (continued)
Panel B: Change model of main pricing result

∆NEG_MEDIA
∆LNASSETS
∆ROA
∆LEVERAGE
∆SALESGROWTH
∆ZSCORE
∆MA
∆FOREIGN
∆FYE_DEC
∆SEGMENTS
∆P_SCORE
∆RESTATEMENT
∆GC
∆MW
∆INDUSTRYEXP
Industry and year fixed effects
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R2

Predicted
sign
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

(1)
∆LOGAUDITFEES
0.003**
0.000
-0.029
0.144***
0.053***
0.016**
-0.020**
-0.005
-0.288***
0.019***
0.098***
0.015**
-0.063*
0.100***
0.008
Included
0.063***
6,393
0.099

(1.88)
(0.03)
(-0.99)
(3.27)
(4.08)
(4.10)
(-3.24)
(-0.93)
(-2.54)
(2.04)
(2.62)
(1.67)
(-2.19)
(5.91)
(0.47)
(4.01)

Panel C: Reputation risk peaks and audit pricing

NEGMEDIA_PEAK_PRIOR

Predicted
sign
?

NEGMEDIA_PEAK_NEGOT

+

NEGMEDIA_PEAK_SUBSEQ

+

All controls from Panel A
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R2

(1)
LOGAUDIT
FEES
0.015
(0.15)

(2)
LOGAUDIT
FEES

(3)
LOGAUDIT
FEES

0.106**
(1.83)
Included
10.632***
(26.70)
1,090
0.791

Included
10.239***
(26.56)
1,275
0.789

0.046**
(1.90)
Included
10.341***
(28.91)
1,625
0.780

This table reports results of multivariate regressions estimating the impact of client negative media coverage on audit fees. The dependent
variable in Panel A is the natural logarithm of audit fees. The test variables in Columns (1)-(4) are NEG_MEDIA, E_ISSUE, S_ISSUE,
and G_ISSUE, respectively. NEG_MEDIA is the maximum client negative media coverage of ESG practices during the audit negotiation
period (fourth quarter of t-1 and first quarter of t), adjusted by the negotiation period mean. E_ISSUE, S_ISSUE, and G_ISSUE are
indicator variables equal to one if an environmental, social, or governance issue is covered, respectively, and zero otherwise. Panel B
reports results of a one-year change model, where all variables are calculated by subtracting the value in t-1 from the value in t. Panel C
reports results from testing the association between various coverage peaks and LOGAUDITFEES. For the sake of presentation, all
controls from Panel A are included in the estimation of Panel C but are not tabled. NEGMEDIA_PEAK_PRIOR is an indicator variable
equal to one if the index within the first through third quarters of t-1 is above the 60th percentile and if the index within the fourth quarter
of t-1 and throughout year t is below the 40th percentile, and zero otherwise. NEGMEDIA_PEAK_NEGOT is an indicator variable equal
to one if the index within the fourth quarter of t-1 and the first quarter of t is above the 60th percentile and if the index within the second
through fourth quarters of year t is below the 40th percentile, and zero otherwise. NEGMEDIA_PEAK_SUBSEQ is an indicator variable
equal to one if the index within the second through fourth quarters of year t is above the 60th percentile and if the index within the fourth
quarter of t-1 and the first quarter of t is below the 40th percentile. For all panels, control variables are defined in Appendix E. Regressions
include year and two-digit SIC code industry fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. For coefficients that are consistent with
predictions, significance is one-tailed.
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Table 2.7

Supplemental: Reaction to reach of media sources

LOWHIGH_SUM_LEAD

Predicted
sign
?

LOWHIGH_SUM

+

LNASSETS

+

ROA

-

LEVERAGE

+

SALESGROWTH

+

ZSCORE

+

MA

+

FOREIGN

+

FYE_DEC

+

SEGMENTS

+

P_SCORE

+

RESTATEMENT

+

GC

-

MW

+

INDUSTRYEXP

+

Industry and year fixed
effects
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R2

(1)
LOGAUDITFEES

(2)
LOGAUDITFEES

0.038
(1.35)
0.535***
(55.73)
-0.297***
(-2.85)
-0.106
(-1.14)
-0.006
(-1.07)
0.026***
(2.69)
0.075***
(3.42)
0.127***
(5.11)
0.038
(1.11)
0.082***
(6.25)
0.440***
(3.69)
0.008
(0.30)
-0.042
(-0.43)
0.329***
(7.02)
-0.012
(-0.25)
Included

0.045**
(1.88)
0.537***
(58.50)
-0.341***
(-3.41)
-0.112
(-1.26)
-0.004
(-0.86)
0.025***
(2.69)
0.068***
(3.36)
0.122***
(5.25)
0.040
(1.21)
0.081***
(6.43)
0.433***
(3.77)
0.031
(1.27)
-0.038
(-0.42)
0.295***
(7.00)
-0.013
(-0.28)
Included

11.093***
(32.61)
6,326
0.811

11.120***
(33.84)
7,528
0.817

This table reports results of regressions estimating the association between issue elevation from low to high reach media sources and
LOGAUDITFEES. LOWHIGH_SUM_LEAD is a count variable of ESG issues that move from a low reach media source in t to a high
reach media source in t+1. LOWHIGH_SUM is a count variable of ESG issues that move from a low reach media source in t-1 to a high
reach media source in t. Control variables are defined in Appendix E and consistent with those used in Table 2.6. Regressions include
year and two-digit SIC code industry fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. For coefficients that are consistent with
predictions, significance is one-tailed.
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Table 2.8

Supplemental: Sample isolations

Panel A: Auditor resignations
(1)
Failed Benford
removed

NEG_MEDIA

Predicted
sign

RESIGNED

(2)
Top quartile
of p-score
removed
RESIGNED

+

0.232***
(2.18)
Included

0.195**
(1.67)
Included

0.271***
(2.68)
Included

0.229**
(1.77)
Included

-0.231
(-0.03)
2,461
0.208

0.931
(0.12)
3,281
0.190

5.128
(0.60)
2,118
0.203

-0.467
(-0.04)
1,100
0.236

LOGAUDIT
FEES
0.027***
(4.80)
Included

(2)
Top quartile
of p-score
removed
LOGAUDIT
FEES
0.028***
(4.69)
Included

(3)
Negative
change in sales
removed
LOGAUDIT
FEES
0.024***
(4.30)
Included

(4)
Negative stock
returns
removed
LOGAUDIT
FEES
0.020***
(3.16)
Included

11.163***
(38.25)
6,347
0.818

11.026***
(32.13)
5,643
0.826

11.123***
(32.57)
5,250
0.811

10.899***
(33.72)
3,774
0.830

All controls from
Table 2.5
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2

(3)
Negative
change in sales
removed
RESIGNED

(4)
Negative stock
returns
removed
RESIGNED

Panel B: Audit fees
(1)
Failed Benford
removed

NEG_MEDIA
All controls from
Table 2.6, Panel A
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R2

Predicted
sign
+

This table reports results re-estimating our main results within isolated samples. Panel A reports results of logit regressions estimating
the association of NEG_MEDIA with the likelihood of auditor change. Panel B reports results of multivariate regressions estimating the
association of NEG_MEDIA with the natural logarithm of audit fees. The sample used in Column (1) excludes firms where
BENFORD_FAIL is equal to one. The sample used in Column (2) excludes firms with P_SCORE in the top quartile. The sample used
in Column (3) excludes firms where sales decrease from t-1 to t. The sample used in Column (4) excludes firms where STOCKRETURN
is negative. In all columns, NEG_MEDIA is the maximum client negative media coverage of ESG practices during the audit negotiation
period (fourth quarter of t-1 and first quarter of t), adjusted by the negotiation period mean. For the sake of presentation, all controls
from Tables 2.5 and 2.6 are included in the estimations but not tabled. Regressions include year and two-digit SIC code industry fixed
effects and standard errors clustered by firm. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and
* for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. For coefficients that are consistent with predictions, significance is one-tailed.
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Table 2.9

Supplemental: Abnormal audit fees

NEG_MEDIA

Predicted
sign
+

E_ISSUE

+

S_ISSUE

+

G_ISSUE

+

LNASSETS

+

ROA

-

LEVERAGE

+

SALESGROWTH

+

ZSCORE

+

MA

+

FOREIGN

+

FYE_DEC

+

SEGMENTS

+

P_SCORE

+

RESTATEMENT

+

GC

-

MW

+

INDUSTRYEXP

+

Industry and year
fixed effects
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R2
Coefficient comparisons
E_ISSUE vs. S_ISSUE
E_ISSUE vs. G_ISSUE
S_ISSUE vs. G_ISSUE

(1)
ABFEE
0.023***
(4.57)

(2)
ABFEE

(3)
ABFEE

(4)
ABFEE

0.107***
(4.45)
0.093***
(4.18)
-0.016
(-1.93)
0.251**
(2.83)
-0.107
(-1.33)
0.001
(0.26)
0.029***
(3.47)
0.077***
(4.26)
0.091***
(4.20)
-0.003
(-0.10)
0.002
(0.14)
0.018
(0.17)
-0.024
(-1.10)
-0.038
(-0.47)
0.237***
(5.98)
-0.029
(-0.67)
Included
-0.027
(-0.10)
7,513
0.028
Chi2
0.63
0.94
2.75

-0.013
(-1.61)
0.250**
(2.81)
-0.113
(-1.40)
0.001
(0.22)
0.030***
(3.48)
0.076***
(4.21)
0.090***
(4.18)
-0.003
(-0.10)
0.001
(0.11)
0.010
(0.09)
-0.025
(-1.13)
-0.033
(-0.42)
0.236***
(5.95)
-0.031
(-0.72)
Included
-0.031
(-0.11)
7,513
0.027
p-value
0.4259
0.3320
0.0975

-0.014
(-1.61)
0.248**
(2.79)
-0.112
(-1.38)
0.001
(0.19)
0.029***
(3.47)
0.078***
(4.30)
0.092***
(4.26)
-0.002
(-0.07)
0.001
(0.10)
0.010
(0.09)
-0.025
(-1.12)
-0.037
(-0.46)
0.236***
(5.98)
-0.029
(-0.67)
Included

0.131***
(5.69)
-0.014
(-1.75)
0.258**
(2.92)
-0.110
(-1.36)
0.001
(0.15)
0.030***
(3.56)
0.074***
(4.04)
0.093***
(4.31)
-0.002
(-0.05)
0.002
(0.16)
0.011
(0.10)
-0.024
(-1.10)
-0.034
(-0.41)
0.233***
(5.89)
-0.027
(-0.62)
Included

-0.028
(-0.11)
7,513
0.026

-0.038
(-0.15)
7,513
0.029

This table reports results of multivariate regressions estimating the impact of client negative media coverage on abnormal audit fees,
which is defined as the difference between the actual and fitted values of audit fees estimated as a function of misstatement risk and
other control variables (following the model in Lobo and Zhao (2013)). The test variables in Columns (1)-(4) are NEG_MEDIA,
E_ISSUE, S_ISSUE, and G_ISSUE, respectively. Control variables are defined in Appendix E. Regressions include year and two-digit
SIC code industry fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Statistical significance is
indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. For coefficients that are consistent with predictions, significance is onetailed.
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Table 2.10

Supplemental: Negative media coverage, business risk, and financial
reporting failures

Panel A: Within full sample
Predicted
sign
NEG_MEDIA

?/?/?/?

LNASSETS

-/-/-/-

LEVERAGE

-/+/+/+

OANCF

-/-/-/+

ROA

-/-/-/-

BIG4

-/+/-/-

AUDITORCHANGE

+/+/+/+

STD_CASH_5YR

+/+/+/+

STD_SALES_5YR

+/+/+/+

FIRM_AGE
LIT_RISK
GC

-/-/-/+/+/+/+

+

TACC

+

Observations
Pseudo/Adjusted R2

(2)
MISSTATE
MENT

(3)
MW

(4)
DACC

-0.010
(-0.07)
0.574**
(3.33)
-3.412***
(-2.07)
-0.000
(-0.09)
-3.293***
(-2.74)
-1.467***
(-2.31)
0.000
(N/A)
-8.080
(-1.40)
1.402*
(1.32)
-0.043***
(-2.06)
12.877***
(11.60)

0.001
(0.05)
-0.043
(-0.83)
0.555***
(2.01)
-0.000***
(-2.64)
-0.476
(-1.26)
0.391**
(1.92)
0.270*
(1.39)
0.082
(0.07)
0.816***
(3.07)
0.001
(0.13)
-0.592
(-0.75)
0.067
(0.20)

0.055
(1.32)
-0.276***
(-4.07)
0.154
(0.40)
-0.000***
(-3.38)
-1.227***
(-3.18)
-0.505***
(-2.52)
1.023***
(5.43)
-1.246
(-1.39)
1.063***
(2.98)
-0.002
(-0.31)
2.200**
(1.84)
0.639**
(1.92)

0.000
(0.49)
-0.002***
(-2.15)
-0.007
(-1.22)
0.000***
(3.46)
-0.051***
(-3.94)
0.001
(0.37)
0.009*
(1.49)
0.304***
(6.90)
0.009*
(1.51)
-0.000***
(-4.42)
-0.006
(-0.42)
0.032**
(1.72)

+/+/+

ZSCORE

Industry and year
fixed effects
Constant

(1)
NEW_GC

0.747***
(3.05)
Included

Included

Included

0.000***
(2.49)
Included

-6.727***
(-3.40)
672
0.331

-1.918**
(-2.49)
7,217
0.051

0.951
(0.68)
6,652
0.148

0.061***
(5.58)
6,570
0.211
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Table 2.10 (continued)
Panel B: Within firm-year observations where fees decline or do not change
(1)
(2)
(3)
Predicted
NEW_GC
MISSTATE
MW
sign
MENT
NEG_MEDIA
Controls from Panel A
Constant
Observations
Pseudo/Adjusted R2

?/?/?/?

-0.297
(-0.73)
Included
-12.381***
(-2.61)
290
0.411

0.016
(0.36)
Included
-2.485**
(-2.10)
3,183
0.059

0.011
(0.15)
Included
1.910
(1.14)
2,757
0.157

(4)
DACC
0.000
(0.30)
Included
0.049***
(4.07)
2,779
0.268

This table reports results from regressions of NEG_MEDIA on four measures of client negative media coverage and financial reporting
quality. The dependent variables in columns (1)-(4) are NEW_GC, MISSTATEMENT, MW, and DACC, respectively. NEG_MEDIA is
the maximum client negative media coverage of ESG practices during the audit negotiation period (fourth quarter of t-1 and first quarter
of t), adjusted by the negotiation period mean. NEW_GC is an indicator variable equal to one for companies with a going concern
opinion that did not receive this opinion in the prior year, and zero otherwise. For this analysis, the sample is limited to distressed firms
(i.e., those with negative net operating cash flows or negative net income in t) and firms in financial industries are removed.
MISSTATEMENT is an indicator variable equal to one for companies with a misstatement in the current period that subsequently led to
a restatement, and zero otherwise. MW is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm discloses a material weakness and zero otherwise.
DACC is discretionary accruals calculated from the modified Jones model with control for firm performance. Control variables are
defined in Appendix E. For presentation sake, we use select control variables that are consistent predictors of all four dependent
variables. Untabulated results with common sets of control variables remain consistent. Panel A estimates these regressions within the
full sample, while Panel B removes firm-year observations where audit fees increase in that year. For the sake of presentation, all
controls from Panel A are included in the estimation of Panel B but are not tabled Regressions include year and two-digit SIC code
industry fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Statistical significance is indicated
by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. For coefficients that are consistent with predictions, significance is one-tailed.
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Table 3.1

Sample distribution
Year

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Firm-year observations

Observations
1,032
1,080
1,091
1,072
1,052
991
965
942
802
9,027

CEO
dismissal
38
39
45
43
59
39
24
29
18
334
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Internal
appointments
23
26
29
28
43
24
14
15
9
211

External
appointments
15
13
15
15
14
15
9
12
4
112

Table 3.2

Descriptive statistics

Panel A:

Summary statistics
Number of
observations

Mean

Median

Standard
deviation

25th
percentile

75th
percentile

Media measures
NEG_MEDIA
E_ISSUE
S_ISSUE
G_ISSUE

9,027
9,027
9,027
9,027

14.401
0.189
0.255
0.194

11.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

15.537
0.391
0.436
0.395

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

26.000
0.000
1.000
0.000

Dependent variables
CEO_DISMISSAL
INTERNAL_CEO
EXTERNAL_CEO

9,027
323
323

0.037
0.653
0.347

0.000
1.000
0.000

0.189
0.477
0.477

0.000
0.000
0.000

0.000
1.000
1.000

Control variables
ROA
STOCKRETURN
CEO_AGE
LNASSETS
SEGMENTS
BOARD_INDEP
BOARD_SIZE
RESTATEMENT
MW
TALENT
HEIR_APPARENT

9,027
9,027
9,027
9,027
9,027
9,027
9,027
9,027
9,027
334
334

0.028
0.057
56.475
7.988
1.794
0.789
9.322
0.076
0.031
0.548
0.302

0.043
-0.004
56.000
7.987
1.000
0.833
9.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000

0.123
0.483
7.186
1.793
1.071
0.130
2.252
0.265
0.174
0.498
0.460

0.013
-0.194
52.000
6.858
1.000
0.714
8.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.081
0.207
61.000
9.139
2.000
0.889
11.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
1.000

Panel B:

Correlation matrix

(1)
(1) NEG_MEDIA
1
(2) E_ISSUE
0.584***
(3) S_ISSUE
0.689***
(4) G_ISSUE
0.608***
(5) CEO_DISMISSAL
0.027**
(6) ROA
0.083***
(7) STOCKRETURN
-0.065***
(8) LNASSETS
0.474***
*
**
***
p < 0.05, p < 0.01, p < 0.001

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

1
0.589***
0.314***
0.003
0.037***
-0.046***
0.382***

1
0.377***
0.004
0.073***
-0.045***
0.409***

1
0.049***
0.055***
-0.043***
0.373***

1
-0.055***
-0.057***
-0.023*

1
0.174***
0.240***

1
-0.012
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Table 3.2 (continued)
Panel C:

Further detail on frequency of ESG issues

Sample for CEO dismissal analyses
CEO_DISMISSAL = 0
(N = 8,693)
1,638
(18.84%)
E_ISSUE
Low severity and low reach
261
(3.00%)
High severity and low reach
182
(2.09%)
Low severity and high reach
499
(5.74%)
High severity and high reach
695
(7.99%)
2,215
(25.48%)
S_ISSUE
Low severity and low reach
318
(3.66%)
High severity and low reach
242
(2.78%)
Low severity and high reach
659
(7.58%)
High severity and high reach
994
(11.43%)
1,651
(18.99%)
G_ISSUE
Low severity and low reach
197
(2.27%)
High severity and low reach
120
(1.38%)
Low severity and high reach
741
(8.52%)
High severity and high reach
591
(6.80%)

CEO_DISMISSAL = 1
(N = 334)
65
(19.46%)
13
(3.89%)
7
(2.10%)
11
(3.29%)
34
(10.18%)
88
(26.35%)
14
(4.19%)
5
(1.50%)
24
(7.19%)
45
(13.47%)
98
(29.34%)
6
(1.80%)
3
(0.90%)
55
(16.47%)
34
(10.18%)

Sample for CEO succession analyses
INTERNAL_CEO = 1
(N = 211)
47
(22.27%)
E_ISSUE
Low severity and low reach
8
(3.79%)
High severity and low reach
5
(2.37%)
Low severity and high reach
7
(3.32%)
High severity and high reach
27
(12.80%)
58
(27.49%)
S_ISSUE
Low severity and low reach
8
(3.79%)
High severity and low reach
1
(0.47%)
Low severity and high reach
16
(7.58%)
High severity and high reach
33
(15.64%)
58
(27.49%)
G_ISSUE
Low severity and low reach
3
(1.42%)
High severity and low reach
2
(0.95%)
Low severity and high reach
33
(15.64%)
High severity and high reach
20
(9.48%)

EXTERNAL_CEO = 1
(N = 112)
16
(14.29%)
4
(3.57%)
2
(1.79%)
4
(3.57%)
6
(5.36%)
27
(24.11%)
4
(3.57%)
4
(3.57%)
7
(6.25%)
12
(10.71%)
38
(33.93%)
3
(2.68%)
1
(0.89%)
21
(18.75%)
13
(11.61%)
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Table 3.3

Negative media coverage and CEO dismissal
(1)
CEO_
DISMISSAL

NEG_MEDIA

(2)
CEO_
DISMISSAL

(3)
CEO_
DISMISSAL

0.017***
(4.05)
0.277*
(1.70)

E_ISSUE
S_ISSUE

0.220
(1.57)
-1.420***
(-3.32)
-0.770***
(-3.13)
0.028***
(3.41)
-0.108**
(-2.03)
-0.013
(-0.19)
0.103
(0.23)
0.086**
(2.45)
-0.107
(-0.46)
0.531*
(1.94)
Included

-1.488***
(-3.46)
-0.806***
(-3.23)
0.028***
(3.38)
-0.063
(-1.20)
-0.010
(-0.15)
0.176
(0.39)
0.093***
(2.69)
-0.110
(-0.47)
0.565**
(2.06)
Included

-1.500***
(-3.51)
-0.806***
(-3.22)
0.028***
(3.39)
-0.063
(-1.19)
-0.010
(-0.14)
0.178
(0.40)
0.094***
(2.71)
-0.114
(-0.49)
0.561**
(2.05)
Included

0.864***
(5.75)
-1.349***
(-3.16)
-0.777***
(-3.16)
0.029***
(3.50)
-0.121**
(-2.31)
-0.002
(-0.03)
0.155
(0.34)
0.089**
(2.51)
-0.132
(-0.57)
0.514*
(1.87)
Included

-4.760***
(-4.97)
8,838
0.061

-4.936***
(-5.19)
8,838
0.057

-4.913***
(-5.22)
8,838
0.057

-4.648***
(-4.87)
8,838
0.067

G_ISSUE
ROA
STOCKRETURN
CEO_AGE
LNASSETS
SEGMENTS
BOARD_INDEP
BOARD_SIZE
RESTATEMENT
MW
Industry and year
fixed effects
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
Coefficient comparisons
E_ISSUE vs. S_ISSUE
E_ISSUE vs. G_ISSUE
S_ISSUE vs. G_ISSUE

(4)
CEO_
DISMISSAL

Chi2
0.12
7.93
12.16

p-value
0.7319
0.0049
0.0005

This table reports results of logit regressions estimating the impact of negative media coverage on the likelihood of CEO dismissal
(CEO_DISMISSAL). The test variables in Columns (1)-(4) are NEG_MEDIA, E_ISSUE, S_ISSUE, and G_ISSUE, respectively.
NEG_MEDIA is the maximum negative media coverage of ESG practices within the twelve months prior to the CEO turnover date for
firm-year observations with a CEO dismissal, and within the fiscal year for firm-year observations without a CEO dismissal. E_ISSUE,
S_ISSUE, and G_ISSUE are indicator variables equal to one if an environmental, social, or governance issue is covered within the
specified periods, respectively, and zero otherwise. Control variables are defined in Appendix F. Regressions include year and industry
(Fama-French 48 classification) fixed effects and standard errors are clustered by firm. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Twotailed statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 3.4

Severity and reach of ESG issues covered in the media and CEO dismissal

LOW_REACH
HIGH_REACH
LOW_SEV
HIGH_SEV
LOWSEV_
LOWREACH
HIGHSEV_
LOWREACH
LOWSEV_
HIGHREACH
HIGHSEV_
HIGHREACH
ROA
STOCKRETURN
CEO_AGE
LNASSETS
SEGMENTS
BOARD_INDEP

Environment
(1)
(2)
(3)
CEO_
CEO_
CEO_
DISMISS DISMISS DISMISS
AL
AL
AL
Indicators represent
environmental issues
0.308
(1.22)
0.264
(1.35)
0.020
(0.08)
0.495**
(2.44)
0.364
(1.20)
0.250
(0.61)
-0.256
(-0.79)
0.554**
(2.49)
-1.489*** -1.474*** -1.473***
(-3.61)
(-3.58)
(-3.57)
-0.805*** -0.802*** -0.800***
(-4.68)
(-4.67)
(-4.66)
0.028***
0.028***
0.028***
(3.55)
(3.53)
(3.56)
-0.062
-0.072
-0.071
(-1.32)
(-1.51)
(-1.50)
-0.010
-0.009
-0.009
(-0.17)
(-0.14)
(-0.15)
0.175
0.178
0.173
(0.38)
(0.39)
(0.37)

Social
(4)
(5)
(6)
CEO_
CEO_
CEO_
DISMISS DISMISS DISMISS
AL
AL
AL
Indicators represent social
issues
0.007
(0.03)
0.305*
(1.84)
0.245
(1.28)
0.200
(1.08)
0.300
(1.03)
-0.520
(-1.12)
0.189
(0.82)
0.392**
(1.99)
-1.491*** -1.501*** -1.472***
(-3.62)
(-3.65)
(-3.57)
-0.805*** -0.806*** -0.806***
(-4.68)
(-4.68)
(-4.68)
0.028***
0.028***
0.028***
(3.56)
(3.57)
(3.56)
-0.068
-0.062
-0.072
(-1.42)
(-1.30)
(-1.50)
-0.010
-0.010
-0.013
(-0.17)
(-0.16)
(-0.22)
0.187
0.178
0.202
(0.41)
(0.39)
(0.44)
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Governance
(7)
(8)
(9)
CEO_
CEO_
CEO_
DISMISS DISMISS DISMISS
AL
AL
AL
Indicators represent governance
issues
0.098
(0.27)
0.999***
(6.46)
0.917***
(5.53)
0.769***
(3.64)
0.113
(0.26)
0.062
(0.10)
1.045***
(6.04)
0.917***
(4.15)
-1.382*** -1.351***
-1.385***
(-3.35)
(-3.28)
(-3.35)
-0.770*** -0.780***
-0.772***
(-4.51)
(-4.55)
(-4.52)
0.029***
0.029***
0.029***
(3.70)
(3.70)
(3.71)
-0.126***
-0.118**
-0.123***
(-2.67)
(-2.48)
(-2.59)
-0.003
-0.001
-0.002
(-0.04)
(-0.02)
(-0.03)
0.151
0.156
0.152
(0.33)
(0.34)
(0.33)

Table 3.4 (continued)

BOARD_SIZE
RESTATEMENT
MW
Industry and year
fixed effects
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2

Environment
(1)
(2)
(3)
CEO_
CEO_
CEO_
DISMISS DISMISS DISMISS
AL
AL
AL
Indicators represent
environmental issues
0.093***
0.093***
0.093***
(2.81)
(2.80)
(2.80)
-0.110
-0.108
-0.100
(-0.49)
(-0.48)
(-0.45)
0.565**
0.566**
0.563**
(2.12)
(2.12)
(2.11)
Included Included Included

Social
(4)
(5)
(6)
CEO_
CEO_
CEO_
DISMISS DISMISS DISMISS
AL
AL
AL
Indicators represent social
issues
0.093***
0.094***
0.094***
(2.81)
(2.83)
(2.83)
-0.107
-0.114
-0.104
(-0.48)
(-0.51)
(-0.47)
0.566**
0.561**
0.564**
(2.12)
(2.10)
(2.11)
Included Included Included

Governance
(7)
(8)
(9)
CEO_
CEO_
CEO_
DISMISS DISMISS DISMISS
AL
AL
AL
Indicators represent governance
issues
0.089***
0.089***
0.089***
(2.67)
(2.67)
(2.67)
-0.124
-0.133
-0.125
(-0.55)
(-0.59)
(-0.55)
0.503*
0.515*
0.504*
(1.86)
(1.91)
(1.87)
Included Included
Included

-4.935***
(-5.00)
8,838
0.057

-4.931***
(-4.99)
8,838
0.057

-4.628***
(-4.65)
8,838
0.070

-4.964***
(-5.03)
8,838
0.058

-4.963***
(-5.02)
8,838
0.059

-4.908***
(-4.97)
8,838
0.057

-4.972***
(-5.03)
8,838
0.058

-4.641***
(-4.67)
8,838
0.067

-4.626***
(-4.65)
8,838
0.070

This table reports results of logit regressions estimating the impact of various measures of negative media coverage of ESG issues on the likelihood of CEO dismissal (CEO_DISMISSAL). In Columns 13, environmental issues are disaggregated into the reach of media sources the issues were identified in (Column 1), the severity of the issues (Column 2), and a combination of reach and severity (Column
3). These variables are defined in Appendix F. In Columns 4-6, these indicator variables are disaggregated from social issues and in Columns 7-9 from governance issues. Control variables are defined in
Appendix F. Regressions include year and industry (Fama-French 48 classification) fixed effects. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Two-tailed statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and *
for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 3.5

Negative media coverage and CEO successor origin
(1)
EXTERNAL
_CEO

NEG_MEDIA

(2)
EXTERNAL
_CEO

(3)
EXTERNAL
_CEO

0.012
(1.35)

E_ISSUE

-0.247
(-0.60)

S_ISSUE

0.220
(0.67)
-2.138**
(-2.40)
-0.628**
(-2.03)
-0.016
(-0.85)
0.123
(1.17)
0.058
(0.44)
2.424*
(1.93)
-0.257***
(-3.08)
0.116
(0.20)
0.915
(1.29)
0.387
(1.24)
0.408
(1.33)
Included

-2.221**
(-2.50)
-0.642**
(-2.11)
-0.015
(-0.81)
0.172*
(1.67)
0.063
(0.47)
2.368*
(1.90)
-0.246***
(-2.95)
0.069
(0.12)
0.953
(1.33)
0.317
(1.01)
0.389
(1.25)
Included

-2.196**
(-2.46)
-0.637**
(-2.06)
-0.016
(-0.84)
0.144
(1.38)
0.054
(0.41)
2.471**
(1.97)
-0.254***
(-3.02)
0.069
(0.12)
0.971
(1.33)
0.371
(1.19)
0.387
(1.24)
Included

0.577*
(1.73)
-2.091**
(-2.34)
-0.638**
(-2.08)
-0.016
(-0.86)
0.119
(1.15)
0.046
(0.36)
2.347*
(1.87)
-0.248***
(-2.97)
0.111
(0.19)
0.895
(1.27)
0.395
(1.30)
0.409
(1.31)
Included

-0.524
(-0.30)
323
0.113

-0.827
(-0.47)
323
0.110

-0.715
(-0.41)
323
0.110

-0.476
(-0.28)
323
0.116

G_ISSUE
ROA
STOCKRETURN
CEO_AGE
LNASSETS
SEGMENTS
BOARD_INDEP
BOARD_SIZE
RESTATEMENT
MW
TALENT
HEIR_APPARENT
Industry and year fixed
effects
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2

(4)
EXTERNAL
_CEO

This table reports results of logit regressions estimating the impact of negative media coverage on the likelihood of external CEO
replacements (EXTERNAL_CEO). The sample is isolated to firm-year observations that have a CEO dismissal. The test variables in
Columns (1)-(4) are NEG_MEDIA, E_ISSUE, S_ISSUE, and G_ISSUE, respectively. NEG_MEDIA is the maximum negative media
coverage of ESG practices within the twelve months prior to the CEO turnover date for firm-year observations with a CEO dismissal,
and within the fiscal year for firm-year observations without a CEO dismissal. E_ISSUE, S_ISSUE, and G_ISSUE are indicator variables
equal to one if an environmental, social, or governance issue is covered within the specified periods, respectively, and zero otherwise.
Control variables are defined in Appendix F. Regressions include year and industry (Fama-French 12 classification) fixed effects and
standard errors clustered by firm. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Two-tailed statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and
* for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively
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Table 3.6

Severity and reach of ESG issues covered in the media and CEO
successor origin

LOW_REACH
HIGH_REACH
LOW_SEV
HIGH_SEV
ROA
STOCKRETURN
CEO_AGE
LNASSETS
SEGMENTS
BOARD_INDEP
BOARD_SIZE
RESTATEMENT
MW
TALENT
HEIR_APPARENT
Industry and year
fixed effects
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2

Environment
(1)
(2)
EXTERN EXTERN
AL_CEO AL_CEO
Indicators represent
environmental
issues
0.132
(0.22)
-0.456
(-0.95)
0.014
(0.03)
-0.443
(-0.88)
-2.259**
-2.248**
(-2.39)
(-2.37)
-0.650*
-0.643*
(-1.88)
(-1.86)
-0.014
-0.016
(-0.74)
(-0.82)
0.183*
0.179*
(1.74)
(1.71)
0.056
0.063
(0.44)
(0.50)
2.374*
2.358*
(1.90)
(1.89)
-0.251*** -0.246***
(-3.17)
(-3.12)
0.093
0.068
(0.17)
(0.13)
0.955
0.955
(1.59)
(1.59)
0.304
0.311
(0.90)
(0.93)
0.372
0.386
(1.21)
(1.26)
Included Included
-0.895
(-0.51)
323
0.112

-0.808
(-0.46)
323
0.111

Social
(3)
(4)
EXTERN EXTERN
AL_CEO AL_CEO
Indicators represent
social issues
0.861
(1.47)
-0.008
(-0.02)

Governance
(5)
(6)
EXTERN EXTERN
AL_CEO AL_CEO
Indicators represent
governance issues
1.094
(1.32)
0.536
(1.59)

-2.182**
(-2.29)
-0.636*
(-1.83)
-0.015
(-0.78)
0.167
(1.58)
0.051
(0.40)
2.519**
(2.00)
-0.262***
(-3.26)
-0.006
(-0.01)
1.025*
(1.70)
0.373
(1.11)
0.378
(1.22)
Included

0.098
(0.22)
0.328
(0.77)
-2.190**
(-2.31)
-0.639*
(-1.84)
-0.016
(-0.83)
0.141
(1.36)
0.054
(0.43)
2.473**
(1.98)
-0.256***
(-3.21)
0.088
(0.17)
0.947
(1.57)
0.372
(1.11)
0.394
(1.28)
Included

-2.101**
(-2.22)
-0.646*
(-1.86)
-0.016
(-0.85)
0.128
(1.22)
0.039
(0.31)
2.395*
(1.91)
-0.253***
(-3.16)
0.121
(0.23)
0.880
(1.47)
0.429
(1.27)
0.382
(1.23)
Included

0.442
(1.20)
0.875*
(1.84)
-2.138**
(-2.25)
-0.652*
(-1.88)
-0.015
(-0.81)
0.115
(1.11)
0.037
(0.29)
2.304*
(1.84)
-0.254***
(-3.19)
0.117
(0.22)
0.905
(1.51)
0.415
(1.23)
0.412
(1.33)
Included

-0.902
(-0.51)
323
0.114

-0.674
(-0.39)
323
0.110

-0.510
(-0.29)
323
0.117

-0.358
(-0.20)
323
0.118

This table reports results of logit regressions estimating the impact of various measures of negative media coverage of ESG issues on
the likelihood of external CEO replacements (EXTERNAL_CEO). The sample is isolated to firm-year observations that have a CEO
dismissal. In Columns 1-2, environmental issues are disaggregated into the reach of media sources the issues were identified in (Column
1) and the severity of the issues (Column 2). These variables are defined in Appendix F. In Columns 3-4, these indicator variables are
disaggregated from social issues and in Columns 5-6 from governance issues. Control variables are defined in Appendix F. Regressions
include year and industry (Fama-French 12 classification) fixed effects. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Two-tailed statistical
significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 3.7

CEO dismissal, CEO successor origin, and change in negative media
coverage

CEO_DISMISSAL

(1)
∆NEG_MEDIA
-5.710***
(-6.52)

(2)
∆NEG_MEDIA

EXTERNAL_CEO
∆ROA
∆STOCKRETURN
CEO_AGE
∆LNASSETS
∆SEGMENTS
∆BOARD_INDEP
∆BOARD_SIZE
∆RESTATEMENT
∆MW

Included

Included

-1.198
(-0.51)
0.711
(0.06)
3.706*
(1.81)
0.222
(1.17)
4.661
(1.17)
-3.012**
(-2.14)
1.619
(0.09)
0.186
(0.23)
2.002
(0.60)
-0.110
(-0.03)
2.874
(1.12)
-0.084
(-0.04)
Included

3.031*
(1.89)
7,319
0.020

2.088
(0.22)
260
0.032

2.029
(0.61)
3,408
0.076

-27.639**
(-2.28)
136
0.075

-0.920
(-0.53)
-0.607***
(-2.69)
-0.009
(-0.71)
2.221***
(2.99)
-0.003
(-0.01)
-1.218
(-0.40)
-0.175
(-1.00)
0.326
(0.67)
-0.205
(-0.26)

HEIR_APPARENT

Observations
Adjusted R2

(4)
∆NEG_MEDIA

-0.656
(-0.37)
-6.337
(-0.86)
1.126
(0.90)
-0.065
(-0.49)
2.991
(0.71)
-2.602
(-1.56)
-13.314
(-1.15)
0.224
(0.29)
-0.612
(-0.25)
2.535
(0.61)
2.886
(1.49)
-0.704
(-0.33)
Included

TALENT

Industry and year
fixed effects
Constant

(3)
∆NEG_MEDIA
-7.276***
(-7.13)

Coefficient comparisons
CEO_DISMISSAL in Column (1) vs. Column (3)
EXTERNAL_CEO in Column (2) vs. Column (4)

0.891
(0.49)
-0.462
(-1.65)
0.019
(0.65)
1.259
(1.35)
-0.440
(-0.93)
-3.528
(-1.00)
-0.224
(-1.27)
0.112
(0.23)
0.398
(0.50)

Chi2
3.65
0.09

p-value
0.0560
0.7641

This table reports results of a change model examining the impact of CEO_DISMISSAL and EXTERNAL_CEO on ∆NEG_MEDIA. For
firm-year observations with CEO dismissal, this is measured as the index value twelve months after turnover less the maximum index
value twelve months prior to turnover (i.e., the NEG_MEDIA value used in earlier analyses). For firm-year observations without a CEO
dismissal, this is measured as the maximum index value in t+1 less the maximum index within t (i.e., the NEG_MEDIA value used in
earlier analyses). All continuous control variables, with the exception of departing CEO age, are measured as the one-year change (year
after turnover less year of turnover). Additionally, indicator variables for restatement and material weakness are measured as a one-year
change. Control variables are defined in Appendix F. Regressions include year and industry (Fama-French 48 classification in Columns
1 and 3, Fama-French 12 classification in Columns 2 and 4) fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm. Numbers in parentheses
are t-statistics. Two-tailed statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 3.8

ESG-focused institutional ownership as an additional pressure
(1)
CEO_
DISMISSAL

(2)
CEO_
DISMISSAL

(3)
CEO_
DISMISSAL

0.022***
(3.24)

NEG_MEDIA

0.569***
(2.78)

E_ISSUE

0.463**
(2.55)

S_ISSUE
G_ISSUE
ROA
STOCKRETURN
CEO_AGE
LNASSETS
SEGMENTS
BOARD_INDEP
BOARD_SIZE
RESTATEMENT
MW
Industry and year fixed effects
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
Coefficient comparisons
NEG_MEDIA
E_ISSUE
S_ISSUE
G_ISSUE

(4)
CEO_
DISMISSAL

-2.472***
(-3.00)
-0.674
(-1.44)
0.060***
(4.93)
-0.214**
(-2.38)
0.063
(0.72)
-0.282
(-0.39)
0.117**
(2.35)
-0.505
(-1.23)
0.618
(1.06)
Included
-6.321***
(-4.48)
4,138
0.085

Table 3.8
(isolated sample)
0.022*** (3.24)
0.569*** (2.78)
0.463** (2.55)
0.681*** (3.33)

-2.379***
(-2.81)
-0.706
(-1.50)
0.058***
(4.80)
-0.163*
(-1.82)
0.060
(0.68)
-0.196
(-0.27)
0.123**
(2.47)
-0.502
(-1.23)
0.642
(1.11)
Included
-6.479***
(-4.69)
4,138
0.082
Table 3.3
(full sample)
0.017*** (4.05)
0.277* (1.70)
0.220 (1.57)
0.864*** (5.75)

-2.382***
(-2.83)
-0.712
(-1.49)
0.058***
(4.76)
-0.166*
(-1.82)
0.075
(0.84)
-0.210
(-0.28)
0.125**
(2.52)
-0.516
(-1.27)
0.656
(1.14)
Included
-6.431***
(-4.82)
4,138
0.081

0.681***
(3.33)
-2.423***
(-2.92)
-0.699
(-1.48)
0.060***
(4.96)
-0.192**
(-2.12)
0.076
(0.85)
-0.222
(-0.30)
0.128***
(2.58)
-0.461
(-1.14)
0.654
(1.13)
Included
-6.297***
(-4.53)
4,138
0.085
Chi2
0.78
4.28
3.32
1.57

p-value
0.3767
0.0386
0.0685
0.2106

This table reports results of logit regressions estimating the impact of negative media coverage on the likelihood of CEO dismissal
(CEO_DISMISSAL), within a sample of firms held by two popular ESG-focused funds (Vanguard FTSE Social Index Fund and iShares
MSCI KLD Social ETF). The test variables in Columns (1)-(4) are NEG_MEDIA, E_ISSUE, S_ISSUE, and G_ISSUE, respectively.
NEG_MEDIA is the maximum negative media coverage of ESG practices within the twelve months prior to the CEO turnover date for
firm-year observations with a CEO dismissal, and within the fiscal year for firm-year observations without a CEO dismissal. E_ISSUE,
S_ISSUE, and G_ISSUE are indicator variables equal to one if an environmental, social, or governance issue is covered within the
specified periods, respectively, and zero otherwise. Control variables are defined in Appendix F. Regressions include year and industry
(Fama-French 48 classification) fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Two-tailed
statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively
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Table 3.9

Board characteristics as moderating variables

Panel A:

Sustainability committee interactions
(1)
(2)
CEO_
CEO_
DISMISSAL
DISMISSAL
0.020***
(4.15)
0.336*
(1.89)

NEG_MEDIA
E_ISSUE
S_ISSUE

(3)
CEO_
DISMISSAL

0.138
(0.87)

G_ISSUE
COMMITTEE
NEG_MEDIA * COMMITTEE

-0.101
(-0.34)
0.019
(1.36)

-0.081
(-0.27)

-0.153
(-0.50)

1.065**
(2.38)

S_ISSUE * COMMITTEE
G_ISSUE * COMMITTEE
Controls from Table 3.3
Constant

NEG_MEDIA

Included
-4.740***
(-4.23)
6,937
0.058
Board size interactions
(1)
CEO_
DISMISSAL
0.018***
(4.20)

Included
-4.757***
(-4.48)
6,937
0.052

Included
-4.784***
(-4.46)
6,937
0.052

-0.069
(-0.16)
Included
-4.310***
(-4.25)
6,937
0.067

(2)
CEO_
DISMISSAL

(3)
CEO_
DISMISSAL

(4)
CEO_
DISMISSAL

E_ISSUE

0.270
(1.52)

S_ISSUE

0.216
(1.44)

G_ISSUE
BOARD_SIZE
NEG_MEDIA * BOARD_SIZE

0.090**
(2.55)
-0.001
(-0.94)

0.093***
(2.66)

E_ISSUE * BOARD_SIZE

0.094***
(2.69)

0.006
(0.10)

G_ISSUE * BOARD_SIZE

Observations
Pseudo R2

0.941***
(6.39)
0.101***
(2.87)

0.007
(0.11)

S_ISSUE * BOARD_SIZE

Controls from Table 3.3
Constant

1.049***
(6.45)
0.160
(0.62)

0.752*
(1.65)

E_ISSUE * COMMITTEE

Observations
Pseudo R2
Panel B:

(4)
CEO_
DISMISSAL

Included
-4.817***
(-5.09)
8,838
0.062

Included
-4.929***
(-5.16)
8,838
0.057
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Included
-4.907***
(-5.21)
8,838
0.057

-0.130**
(-2.29)
Included
-4.818***
(-5.17)
8,838
0.069

Table 3.9 (continued)
Panel C:

Board busyness interactions
(1)
CEO_
DISMISSAL

NEG_MEDIA

(2)
CEO_
DISMISSAL

(3)
CEO_
DISMISSAL

0.017***
(4.02)

E_ISSUE

0.248
(1.50)

S_ISSUE

0.195
(1.39)

G_ISSUE
BOARD_BUSY
NEG_MEDIA * BOARD_BUSY

0.121
(0.65)
-0.008
(-0.78)

E_ISSUE * BOARD_BUSY

0.023
(0.12)

0.091
(0.50)

0.055
(0.15)

G_ISSUE * BOARD_BUSY

Observations
Pseudo R2

0.875***
(5.85)
0.171
(0.94)

0.489
(1.35)

S_ISSUE * BOARD_BUSY

Controls from Table 3.3
Constant

(4)
CEO_
DISMISSAL

Included
-4.703***
(-4.85)
8,793
0.061

Included
-4.781***
(-5.01)
8,793
0.057

Included
-4.824***
(-5.09)
8,793
0.057

-0.773*
(-1.88)
Included
-4.602***
(-4.76)
8,793
0.069

This table reports results replicating those in Table 3, with variables added for the interaction of negative media coverage measures (i.e.,
NEG_MEDIA, E_ISSUE, S_ISSUE, and G_ISSUE) and board characteristics. Panel A includes interactions with the presence of a
sustainability committee. COMMITTEE is an indicator variable equal to one if a board-level committee focusing on sustainabilityrelated issues exists, and zero otherwise. Panel B includes board size interactions; BOARD_SIZE is measured as the number of directors
on the board during the fiscal-year. Panel C includes board busyness interactions; BOARD_BUSY is an indicator variable equal to one
for firm-year observations where more than 50% of independent directors sit on three or more boards, and zero otherwise. All interaction
variables are mean-centered. All control variables from previous analyses (i.e., Table 3) are included. Regressions include year and
industry (Fama-French 48 classification) fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
Two-tailed statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Appendix A

Part One: Variable definitions

Dependent variables
CSP score =
CSP strengths =
CSP concerns =
Community strengths =
Community concerns =
Employee strengths =
Employee concerns =
Environment strengths =
Environment concerns =
Consumer and supplier strengths =
Consumer and supplier concerns =

Variable definitions
sum of net score (total strengths – total concerns) from each of
the six MSCI ESG STATS dimensions (community, diversity,
employee relations, environment, human rights, product);
sum of total strengths from the six MSCI ESG STATS
dimensions;
sum of total concerns from the six MSCI ESG STATS
dimensions;
sum of strengths from community and human rights
dimensions;
sum of concerns from community and human rights
dimensions;
sum of strengths from employee relations and diversity
dimensions;
sum of concerns from employee relations and diversity
dimensions;
sum of strengths from environment dimension;
sum of concerns from environment dimension;
sum of strengths from product dimension;
sum of concerns from product dimension;

Test variables
Committee =
Community focus =
No community focus =
Employee focus =
No employee focus =
Environment focus =
No environment focus =
Consumer and supplier focus =
No consumer and supplier focus =
Committee size =
Fully independent =
Meeting frequency =

indicator variable equal to one if a board-level committee
focusing on sustainability related issues exists in firm-year;
indicator variable equal to one if a board-level committee
focusing on community and/or human rights related issues
exists in firm-year;
indicator variable equal to one if a board-level committee
exists in firm-year and does not focus on community and/or
human rights related issues;
indicator variable equal to one if a board-level committee
focusing on employee related issues exists in firm-year;
indicator variable equal to one if a board-level committee
exists in firm-year and does not focus on employee related
issues;
indicator variable equal to one if a board-level committee
focusing on environment related issues exists in firm-year;
indicator variable equal to one if a board-level committee
exists in firm-year and does not focus on environment related
issues;
indicator variable equal to one if a board-level committee
focusing on product related issues exists in firm-year;
indicator variable equal to one if a board-level committee
exists in firm-year and does not focus product related issues;
number of members on the committee;
indicator variable equal to one if all members of the
committee are independent directors;
number of committee meetings;
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Appendix A (continued)
Control variables
Board size =
Independence =
Tenure =
Busy board =
Size =
Quick =
ROA =
Leverage =
R&D investment =

natural log of number of members on the board of directors;
percentage of directors who are independent;
mean tenure of all directors;
indicator variable equal to one if 50% or more of board
members sit on at least three boards (including the associated
company);
natural log of total assets at end of year;
current assets divided by current liabilities;
income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at
beginning of the year;
long-term debt divided by total assets from end of year;
ratio of research and development expense to sales
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Appendix B

Part One: Sustainability committee classification

Stakeholder
groups

MSCI
dimension
Community

Community
Human rights
Employee
relations
Employees
Diversity
Environment

Environment

Consumer/supplier

Product

Sample committee names (from coded data)

Common committee responsibilities

Public interest, public issues, community and
external relations, civic and charitable affairs,
charitable contributions, etc.
Public policy, public issues, corporate social
responsibility, ethics compliance and sustainability,
etc.
Occupational safety and environmental protection,
operational safety, public policy, employee
development and retention, etc.
Employee and public responsibility, public affairs,
diversity review, corporate responsibility,
excellence, etc.
Environmental health safety and public policy,
environmental and safety, environmental and
corporate responsibility, etc.
Environmental and safety, quality, public policy,
best practices, nuclear, clinical quality, excellence,
safety, etc.

Charitable giving, Community impact, Community
engagement, volunteer programs, etc.
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Labor rights, Human rights policies and initiatives,
human rights violations, etc.
Union relations, employee involvement, employee
health and safety, professional development, child
labor, etc.
Women and minority contracting, employment of
the disabled, employment of underrepresented
groups, etc.
Waste management, climate change, water stress,
biodiversity and land use, raw material sourcing,
etc.
Product quality and safety, customer relations, etc.

Appendix C

Part One: Independent variable coding

The following responsibility statements are taken from the proxy filing for each committee-firm-year:
Arch Coal Inc. 2013
“Energy and Environmental Policy”
Committee
The Energy and Environmental Policy
Committee reviews, assesses and
provides advice to the Board on current
and emerging energy and environmental
policy trends and developments that
affect or could affect us. In addition, the
Energy and Environmental Policy
Committee makes recommendations
concerning whether, and to what extent,
we should become involved in current
and emerging energy and environmental
policy issues.

Delta Air Lines Inc. 2013
“Safety and Security” Committee
Among other matters, the Committee:
 oversees and consults with management
regarding customer, employee and aircraft
operating safety and security, including
related goals, performance and initiatives by:
 reviewing current and proposed safety and
security-related programs, policies and
compliance matters
 reviewing matters with a material effect on
Delta’s flight safety operations and security
 establishing and approving annual safety and
security goals
 reviewing the safety and security programs
and performance of the Delta Connection
carriers
 reviewing the security of the Company’s
information technology systems and
operations, including defenses against cyber
threats to the airline.

These descriptions illustrate that the committees focus on different dimensions of sustainability. These
committees are therefore coded as one for the following indicators, which are used in empirical analysis.
Arch Coal Inc. 2013
“Energy and Environmental Policy”
Committee
Committee
Environment focus
No community focus
No employee focus
No consumer/supplier focus

Delta Air Lines Inc. 2013
“Safety and Security” Committee
Committee
Employee focus
Consumer/supplier focus
No community focus
No environment focus
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Appendix D

Part Two: RepRisk Data: ESG issues examined

ENVIRONMENT
Environmental
footprint
Global pollution
 Climate change
 GHG emissions
Local pollution
Impacts on ecosystems
and landscapes
Overuse and wasting of
resources
Waste issues

SOCIAL
Community relations
Human rights abuses
and corporate
complicity
Impacts on
communities
Local participation
issues
Social discrimination

Animal mistreatment

Employee relations
Forced labor

Child labor
Freedom of association
and collective
bargaining
Discrimination in
employment
Health and safety
issues
Poor employment
conditions

Controversial products and services

GOVERNANCE
Corporate governance
Corruption, bribery,
extortion, money
laundering
Executive compensation
Misleading
communication (e.g.
“greenwashing”)
Fraud
Tax evasion
Tax optimization
Anti-competitive
practices

Product-related health and environmental issues
Violation of international standards
Violation of national legislation
Supply chain
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Appendix E

Part Two: Variable definitions

Risk measures
NEG_MEDIA
E_ISSUE
S_ISSUE
G_ISSUE

Variable definitions
Maximum of index measuring client negative media coverage of ESG
practices during the audit negotiation period (fourth quarter of t-1 and
first quarter of t), adjusted by negotiation period mean [RepRisk]
=1 if an environmental issue is covered, zero otherwise [RepRisk]
=1 if a social issue is covered, zero otherwise [RepRisk]
=1 if a governance issue is covered, zero otherwise [RepRisk]

Auditor response
AUDITORCHANGE
RESIGN
LOGAUDITFEES
Control variables
LNASSETS
ROA
LEVERAGE
SALESGROWTH
ZSCORE
MA
FOREIGN
P_SCORE
RESTATEMENT
GC
INDUSTRYEXP
FYE_DEC
SEGMENTS
MW

=1 for companies that have an auditor change, zero otherwise [Audit
Analytics]
=1 for companies that have an auditor resignation, zero otherwise
[Audit Analytics]
Natural logarithm of audit fees [Audit Analytics]
Natural log of total assets [Compustat]
The ratio of net income to total assets (NI/AT) [Compustat]
The ratio of total liabilities to total assets (DLC+DLTT/AT)
[Compustat]
The ratio of the change in sales revenue to prior year sales revenue
[Compustat]
Calculated as the decile rank of the Altman’s [1980] z-score for nonfinancial firms [Compustat]
=1 if the company has a merger or acquisition, zero otherwise
[Compustat]
=1 if the company has foreign operations, zero otherwise [Compustat]
Predicted probability of misstatement estimated using the Dechow et
al. (2011) model as presented in Lobo and Zhao (2013)
=1 for companies that announce a restatement to their financial reports,
zero otherwise [Audit Analytics]
=1 if the company received a going-concern modified audit opinion,
zero otherwise [Audit Analytics]
=1 if the listed auditor receives more than 30 percent of total audit fees
in the associated 2-digit SIC code, zero otherwise [Audit Analytics]
=1 if fiscal year end in December, zero otherwise
The number of unique business segments
=1 for companies disclosing a material weakness in their SOX section
302/404, zero otherwise [Audit Analytics]

Supplemental variables
NEGMEDIA_PEAK_PRIOR

NEGMEDIA_PEAK_NEGOT

NEGMEDIA_PEAK_SUBSEQ

=1 if the index within the first through third quarters of t-1 is above the
60th percentile and if the index within the fourth quarter of t-1 and
throughout year t is below the 40th percentile, zero otherwise
[RepRisk]
=1 if the index within the fourth quarter of t-1 and the first quarter of t
is above the 60th percentile and if the index within the second through
fourth quarters of year t is below the 40th percentile, zero otherwise
[RepRisk]
=1 if the index within the second through fourth quarters of year t is
above the 60th percentile and if the index within the fourth quarter of t1 and the first quarter of t is below the 40th percentile, zero otherwise
[RepRisk]
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BENFORD_SCORE

BENFORD_FAIL
ABFEE
NEW_GC
MISSTATEMENT
DACC
TACC

DELAY_ADJ
OANCF
BIG4
STDOPCASH_5YR
STDSALES_5YR
FIRM_AGE
LITRISK
DISTRESSSED
LOWHIGH_SUM
LOWHIGH_SUM_LEAD

Maximum deviation of the cumulative differences between the
distribution of leading digits in annual financial statement data and
their theoretical Benford distribution, following Amiram et al. (2015)
[Compustat]
=1 if BENFORD_SCORE is significantly different than the critical
value (equal to 1.36 divided by the square root of the total number of
digits used) at the five percent level, zero otherwise [Compustat]
Difference between the actual and fitted values of audit fees estimated
as a function of misstatement risk and other control variables
(following the model in Lobo and Zhao (2013))
=1 if GC is equal to one but was not in the prior year, zero otherwise
[Audit Analytics]
=1 for companies where the financial reports contained a significant
misstatement that subsequently led to a restatement, zero otherwise
[Audit Analytics]
Discretionary accruals calculated using the modified Jones model with
control for firm performance [Compustat]
The absolute value of abnormal accruals derived from the difference
between total accruals (calculated as IB-OANC) and expected accruals
estimated with the modified Jones model augmented with lag ROA
(Kothari et al. (2005)) [Compustat]
The number of days between the fiscal year end date and the audit
report date minus the SEC’s filing deadline requirement (60, 75, and
90 days for large accelerated, accelerated, and non-accelerated,
respectively) [Audit Analytics]
Net operating cash flow [Compustat]
=1 if Big 4 auditor conducts annual financial statement auit, zero
otherwise [Audit Analytics]
The standard deviation of cash flows from operations calculated over
five years with a minimum of three years [Compustat data OANCF]
The standard deviation of sales calculated over five years with a
minimum of three years [Compustat data SALE]
The number of years since formation
=1 for companies within 4-digit SIC codes from 3600 to 3675, zero
otherwise
=1 for companies with negative net income or net operating cash
flows, zero otherwise
Number of individual issues (as listed in Appendix D) that move from
a low reach media source in t-1 to a high reach media source in t
[RepRisk]
Number of individual issues (as listed in Appendix D) that move from
a low reach media source in t to a high reach media source in t+1
[RepRisk]
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Part Three: Variable definitions

Test variable
NEG_MEDIA

E_ISSUE

S_ISSUE

G_ISSUE

HIGH_REACH

LOW_REACH

HIGH_SEV
LOW_SEV
HIGHSEV_HIGHREACH
LOWSEV_HIGHREACH
HIGHSEV_LOWREACH

LOWSEV_LOWREACH

Variable definition
Maximum of index measuring negative media coverage of ESG practices
within the twelve months prior to the CEO turnover date for firm-year
observations with a CEO dismissal, and within the fiscal year for firm-year
observations without a CEO dismissal [RepRisk]
=1 if an environmental issue is covered within the twelve months prior to the
CEO turnover date for firm-year observations with a CEO dismissal, and
within the fiscal year for firm-year observations without a CEO dismissal,
zero otherwise [RepRisk]
=1 if a social issue is covered within the twelve months prior to the CEO
turnover date for firm-year observations with a CEO dismissal, and within
the fiscal year for firm-year observations without a CEO dismissal, zero
otherwise [RepRisk]
=1 if a governance issue is covered within the twelve months prior to the
CEO turnover date for firm-year observations with a CEO dismissal, and
within the fiscal year for firm-year observations without a CEO dismissal,
zero otherwise [RepRisk]
=1 if the firm-year observation was equal to one for the associated issue
indicator variable and an issue within that category was covered by a high
reach media source (e.g., Wall Street Journal, New York Times, etc.), zero
otherwise [RepRisk]
=1 if the firm-year observation was equal to one for the associated issue
indicator variable and no issues within that category were covered by a high
reach media source (e.g., Wall Street Journal, New York Times, etc.), zero
otherwise [RepRisk]
=1 if the firm-year observation was equal to one for the associated issue
indicator variable and an issue within that category was classified as high
severity, zero otherwise [RepRisk]
=1 if the firm-year observation was equal to one for the associated issue
indicator variable and no issues within that category were classified as high
severity, zero otherwise [RepRisk]
=1 if the firm-year observation was equal to one for both HIGH_SEV and
HIGH_REACH, zero otherwise
=1 if the firm-year observation was equal to zero for
HIGHSEV_HIGHREACH and equal to one for both LOW_SEV and
HIGH_REACH, zero otherwise
=1 if the firm-year observation was equal to zero for both
HIGHSEV_HIGHREACH and LOWSEV_HIGHREACH and equal to one for
both HIGH_SEV and LOW_REACH, zero otherwise
=1 if the firm-year observation was equal to zero for
HIGHSEV_HIGHREACH, LOWSEV_HIGHREACH, and
HIGHSEV_LOWREACH and equal to one for both LOW_SEV and
LOW_REACH, zero otherwise

Dependent Variables
CEO_DISMISSAL
INTERNAL_CEO
EXTERNAL_CEO

=1 for companies that have a CEO dismissal, zero otherwise [Audit
Analytics D&O changes]
=1 for companies with a replacement CEO that was employed with the firm
more than one year before the turnover announcement, zero otherwise
[BoardEx]
=1 for companies with a replacement CEO that joined the firm less than one
year before the turnover announcement, zero otherwise [BoardEx]
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Control variables
ROA
STOCKRETURN
CEO_AGE
LNASSETS
SEGMENTS
BOARD_INDEP
BOARD_SIZE
COMMITTEE
BOARD_BUSY
RESTATEMENT
MW
TALENT
HEIR_APPARENT

The ratio of net income to total assets (NI/AT) [Compustat]
Buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) for the twelve months ending at
FYE [Compustat]
Age of the former CEO [BoardEx]
Natural log of total assets [Compustat data AT]
The number of business segments
Percent of directors who are unaffiliated with the firm beyond their
directorship [BoardEx]
Number of directors on the board [BoardEx]
=1 if a board-level committee focusing on sustainability-related issues
exists, zero otherwise
=1 if more than 50 percent of independent directors are busy, which is
defined as serving on three or more boards, zero otherwise
=1 for companies that announce a restatement to their financial reports, zero
otherwise [Audit Analytics]
=1 for companies disclosing a material weakness in their SOX section
302/404, zero otherwise [Audit Analytics]
=1 for companies with at least one executive with outside directorships, zero
otherwise[BoardEx]
=1 for companies with a non-CEO president or COO who has been in their
position for less than two years before the turnover announcement, zero
otherwise [BoardEx]
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